Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Senn testified that he saw Winkler and Jenkins in his yard. Jenkins dropped a gasoline jug and ran into the woods with Winkler. Senn told his wife, Sherri, to call the police and fired shots into the woods. Senn smelled gasoline and saw that it had been poured on his porch, the side of his house, and on his cars. Sherri testified that her brother, Abercrombie, had a long-running feud with Winkler. Abercrombie lived approximately 100 yards from her house. Sherri testified that, days before the incident, her sister-in-law played for her a voicemail message from Winkler, stating: “You are going to die, you are going to burn.” Winkler unsuccessfully moved to impeach Senn with his previous felony conviction for reckless endangerment. Winkler unsuccessfully objected to Sherri’s testimony as inadmissible character evidence. Convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder and for attempted aggravated arson, Winkler appealed. His counsel filed the trial record, except for the transcript of his motion for a new trial. Without it, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the evidentiary issues for plain error, found none, and affirmed; that court also denied Winkler’s post-conviction petition, stating that counsel's failure to prepare an adequate appellate record does not, alone, amount to ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, rejecting his argument that under Supreme Court precedent (Entsminger (1967)), failure to file a portion of the record entitled him to presumed prejudice in the ineffective-assistance analysis. View "Winkler v. Parris" on Justia Law

Michigan prisons allow Wiccan inmates to worship as a group for eight major holidays (Sabbats). Wiccans celebrate other holidays (Esbats) 12-13 times a year. Wiccans are not permitted to congregate on Esbats and permits Wiccan inmates to use candles and incense only in the prison’s chapel. Cavin asked the Department of Corrections to allow him and other Wiccans to celebrate Esbats together. Officials denied his request. He filed suit, requesting injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), and sought damages. At summary judgment, the court ruled that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the damages claims against the Department of Corrections; that Chaplain Leach deserved qualified immunity; and that only Cavin’s RLUIPA claim for religious accommodation could proceed. After a bench trial, the court rejected Cavin’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief, concluding that the prison’s regulations implicate but do not burden Cavin’s exercise of religion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of qualified immunity and the denial of appointed counsel but vacated with respect to injunctive relief under RLUIPA, remanding for a determination of whether the Department’s policy survives scrutiny under RLUIPA. A policy substantially burdens religious exercise when it bars an inmate from worshipping with others and from using ritualistic items. View "Cavin v. Michigan Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Fazica was arrested for drunk driving and taken to the Bloomfield County Police Department, and then to Oakland County Jail, which was alerted that she was intoxicated, yelling, and spitting. A Cell Extraction Team met Fazica upon her arrival. She alleges that they roughly removed her from the vehicle and immediately applied a spit hood that nearly entirely obscured her vision. The Team handcuffed her in a bent-over position, handled her forcefully, and threatened her with a taser. The entirely male team took Fazica to a room where she was made to lie on her stomach and was strip-searched. Her pants were torn off her; one officer placed his hands on her genitals and another groped her breasts. Fazica was then made to walk to a cell wearing only her bra and the hood. The hood prevented her from attributing certain specific acts to specific officers. Fazica sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that four officers used excessive force. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, arguing only that Fazica cannot show each officer’s personal involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional acts. The district court denied their motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that each defendant either committed or observed and failed to stop the allegedly unconstitutional acts. View "Fazica v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services collects blood samples from nearly every newborn baby in Michigan, to test for diseases. After testing, the samples are transferred to the Michigan Neonatal Biobank and stored for future use by the state. Plaintiffs challenged the law, claiming that blood is drawn from newborns and retained without the consent or knowledge of the newborns’ parents. Plaintiffs allege that despite Defendants’ assurances that all blood samples are secure and not identifiable to the individuals from whom they were taken, some samples have been given up under court orders and some are being sold to researchers.The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims for: damages based on alleged violations of the parents’ and the children’s substantive due process rights when the blood samples were collected and screened; damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief, based on alleged violations of the parents’ and children’s substantive due process rights by retention of the samples; damages based on alleged violations of the parents’ and children’s Fourth Amendment rights when the samples were collected and screened; injunctive and declaratory relief, based on alleged violations of the children’s Fourth Amendment rights by’ retention of their samples. Rights related to directing the medical care of children devolve upon their parents or guardians; the children’s rights were not violated when Defendants drew their blood, screened it, and stored it. State sovereign immunity and qualified immunity bar all claims alleging that the parents’ substantive due process rights were violated when Defendants drew their children’s blood and screened it. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ retention of the samples violates the parents’ fundamental rights. The court remanded that issue and Fourth Amendment claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for Defendants’ ongoing storage of the samples. View "Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

In an intersection, Patterson’s SUV rammed the door of Green’s sedan. According to Green, she was briefly unconscious and, after coming to, was dazed and in intense pain. Southfield Officer Maya arrived and spoke with Patterson, who did not look injured. Maya then went to Green, still on her back on the median. Because Green “didn’t respond too many times,” Maya refrained from asking many questions. Traffic Specialist Birberick arrived while paramedics were looking after Green. Patterson told him that he had entered the intersection with a green light when his car “was struck” by Green’s car. Birberick did not think that the accident was not severe enough to warrant significant investigation. Birberick determined that the physical evidence corroborated Patterson’s account. Birberick did not complete a police incident report but only completed the crash report that Michigan requires for highway-safety planning purposes. In the “Hazardous Action” box, Birberick wrote “none” for Patterson and “disregarded traffic [signal]” for Green. Crash reports cannot be used in court. Green was hospitalized for several days. When she saw the report, she insisted that Patterson ran the light and that she had a witness. Officers followed up but decided against amending the report. Green sued Patterson, then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983; 1985 action against officers and the city, alleging that the investigation violated her equal protection rights (Green is a black woman, Patterson a white man) and her right of access to the courts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, characterizing the officers’ actions as “mere laxity.” View "Green v. Southfield" on Justia Law

Petitioner robbed a restaurant of approximately $200-300. Attorney Walwyn represented petitioner. Days before trial, the state offered that petitioner plead guilty in exchange for a 20-year sentence. He allegedly rejected that offer. Convicted, he was sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, eight years for one conviction of aggravated assault, 10 years on the other aggravated-assault conviction, and eight years for evading arrest, all to be served consecutively. On appeal, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and his sentences. Tennessee courts rejected his motion for postconviction relief, in which he raised was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. At a hearing, he testified that his attorney never advised him of the plea offer until years later. Throughout the post-conviction proceedings, petitioner maintained his innocence and speculated that he may have been misidentified. Walwyn testified that he “did relay the offer” but petitioner told him “he was not taking any time.” The state court also considered a claim that Walwyn conveyed the offer but did not advise petitioner of the much higher sentence he could face. The court reasoned that, despite the disparity between the offer and the possible sentence, petitioner could not show prejudice because he was uninterested in taking any plea offer. The district court dismissed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Tennessee court did not act contrary to federal law and was not unreasonable in determining that petitioner was uninterested in taking any plea. View "Johnson v. Genovese" on Justia Law

DEA agents waited along I-94, for a black Toyota Camry. The previous evening, agents had arranged for a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Soto, who agreed to drive the shipment from Chicago to Detroit. Agents obtained a warrant to track the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents spotted Soto’s Camry, matching it to the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents noticed a RAV4 behind Soto, driving at approximately the same speed as the Camry and changing lanes at the same time, concluded that the cars were traveling “in tandem” and asked Michigan State Police to pull over both cars. As a trooper pulled up, the RAV4 slowed to 53 miles per hour, under the minimum speed limit. The trooper effectuated a stop. The RAV4’s driver, Belakhdhar, and his passenger provided identification, explaining that they were driving to visit someone in the hospital. Belakhdhar consented to a car search. Failing to find any contraband, the trooper let them go. DEA continued surveilling the vehicle, determined that Belakhdhar lacked legal immigration status, and requested that Border Patrol stop the car. During that second stop, another agent walked a drug dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the back bumper. Opening the trunk, the agents discovered hidden heroin hidden and arrested Belakhdhar. The court suppressed the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a matter of law, the district court erred to the extent it held that tandem driving with a vehicle suspected of drug activity cannot, alone, support reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Belakhdhar" on Justia Law

In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had prior convictions under Ohio law: attempted felonious assault, domestic violence, and assault on a peace officer, which subjected him to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). Williams twice unsuccessfully filed 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions to vacate his sentence. In 2015, (Johnson) the Supreme Court found the ACCA's residual clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional and subsequently held that Johnson had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Williams filed a third motion, arguing that his prior convictions no longer counted as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider whether Williams’ felonious assault conviction still qualifies as an ACCA violent felony, noting its 2012 holding (Anderson), that committing felonious assault in Ohio necessarily requires the use of physical force and is an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause. The district court then held, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that Anderson remained controlling precedent. The Sixth Circuit, en banc, subsequently overruled Anderson and held that a conviction for Ohio felonious assault no longer categorically qualifies as a violent felony predicate under the ACCA’s elements clause. The court then remanded Williams’ case. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Farris, a Tennessee judicial commissioner, issued a warrant for Norfleet’s arrest based on an affidavit from his probation officer saying that he had violated his probation. Norfleet went to jail for several months. A state court judge dismissed the warrant on the ground that Tennessee commissioners lack authority to issue such warrants. Norfleet sued Farris under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she violated his Fourth Amendment rights by issuing a defective arrest warrant. Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that judicial immunity shielded Farris from the lawsuit. Issuing an arrest warrant is a judicial act and nothing clearly deprived Farris of subject matter jurisdiction to issue Norfleet’s probation-revocation warrant. A broad warrant-issuing authority with an open-ended list of duties combined with a non-exclusive revocation-warrant provision means the Tennessee statutory scheme does not plainly deprive Farris of jurisdiction. View "Norfleet v. Renner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Michigan’s practice of suspending drivers' licenses for unpaid court fees, as applied to indigent drivers, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs argued that practice is irrational because license suspension made their commuting to work much harder, reducing the chances that they will pay the debt, and made it difficult to attend medical appointments. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the law. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The mere fact that a driver has a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in his license does not answer the more particular question of whether Michigan law creates the specific property entitlement Plaintiffs claimed. Michigan’s statutory scheme for license suspension makes no reference to the indigency status of those whose licenses are subject to suspension. If Plaintiffs’ indigency is not relevant to the state’s underlying decision to suspend their licenses, then providing a hearing where they could raise their indigency would be pointless and do nothing to prevent the “the risk of erroneous deprivation.” The state has a general interest in compliance with traffic laws. By imposing greater consequences for violating traffic laws, the state increases deterrence for would-be violators. The state also has legitimate interests in promoting compliance with court orders and in collecting traffic debt. View "Fowler v. Benson" on Justia Law