Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In January 2010, police found Joann’s car alone in a church driveway and thought the driver might be in the water. Police activated a dive team and contacted the Coast Guard. Joann’s daughter reported that Joann had attended Mass and was not answering her phone. In the following weeks, police questioned people who knew Joann, who saw her at Mass, and who were near the lake. Two months later, a fisherman found her body in the Detroit River. A Canadian coroner performed an autopsy and concluded that Joann drowned. A Michigan coroner performed another autopsy and drew the same conclusions, noting that homicide was “less likely” than suicide because Joann had no significant injuries and that an accident seemed “quite unlikely” because Joann had no reason to be near the water. A doctor at the University of Michigan reported drowning as the cause of death with an undetermined manner of death. Police stopped actively investigating Joann’s death, but the case remains open. Joann’s estate believes that an unknown person murdered Joann and that the police knew about the murder before it happened and botched the investigation to protect the killer, who sold the officers alcohol at prices cheaper than Costco. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The court acknowledged some “odd facts” cited by the estate but concluded that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the estate. View "Estate of Romain v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms" on Justia Law

Virginia Run Cove is a privately owned Memphis street that offers access to the parking lots of several businesses, including a Planned Parenthood clinic. It is described on county records as “common area” in a commercial development. Brindley sought a preliminary injunction requiring the city to let him stand near the entrance to this clinic and spread his pro-life message. He argued that Virginia Run Cove was a traditional public forum and that his exclusion from the street violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court has long held that public streets are traditional public fora. Even when a street is privately owned, it remains a traditional public forum if it looks and functions like a public street. Virginia Run Cove, which connects directly to a busy public thoroughfare, displays no sign of private ownership, and is used by the general public to access many nearby buildings, including the clinic, a gas station, a church, and a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement office, has all the trappings of a public street. View "Brindley v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

Shelby County Deputy Lane responded to a hit-and-run call. People at the scene told Lane to follow Studdard, who was walking away along the road and had slit his wrists. Lane turned his motorcycle around and rode after Studdard. Studdard ignored Lane’s request to stop and turned toward Lane, displaying what appeared to be a knife. Lane saw Studdard’s bloody wrists. Lane continued to follow Studdard and called for backup, noting that Studdard had a knife and had slit his wrists. Three deputies parked their vehicles north of Studdard, seeking to block his path forward; Lane followed from the south. They exited their vehicles and displayed firearms. Studdard halted. They directed Studdard to drop the knife. Studdard stood still, knife in hand. An officer said that they would shoot if Studdard did not drop the weapon. Studdard raised the knife to his throat and began “swaying.” “Almost immediately,” two deputies opened fire. Studdard fell. Reed kicked the knife out of Studdard’s hand. The officers administered aid. Studdard died in the hospital due to complications from the gunshot wounds. In his wife’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the officer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. To justify lethal force, an officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect presents an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. Officers may not shoot an uncooperative individual when he presents an immediate risk to himself but not to others . View "Studdard v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

In 2003, Clark and Harrington were jointly tried for the Martin murder. The only evidence connecting Clark to the crime was the preliminary testimony of Martin’s neighbor, Stewart. At trial, Stewart would not say what she had seen the day of the murder. The prosecutor asked if she was afraid or nervous; she responded she was not. Stewart agreed that she had been threatened but would not say by whom. The prosecutor attempted to refresh her recollection with her testimony from preliminary examinations, but Stewart would not ratify her earlier statements. The judge declared Stewart unavailable and had her preliminary testimony, including cross-examinations, read to the jury. Clark’s attorney, who had not been counsel of record during the preliminary proceedings, was not permitted to cross-examine Stewart. Clark was found guilty. Stewart has recanted. Clark sought habeas relief, based on an exculpatory affidavit from another purported eyewitness, who states that her father, a city police detective, told her not to report what she had seen. Clark was granted permission to file a second or successive habeas petition in light of the alleged Brady violation. The district court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether Clark has made out a Brady violation and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 are satisfied. View "Clark v. Nagy" on Justia Law

In 2004, O’Neal was convicted in state court of the second-degree murder of Shelby, who was shot at a gas station. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 36-80 years in prison. At trial, O’Neal argued that Hickman had shot Shelby. Over O’Neal’s objections, the court excluded Hickman’s jailhouse confession to another inmate and Shelby’s statement to a police officer at the hospital where he died, identifying Hickman as the shooter. The statement was also overheard by a nurse. Hickman had pleaded guilty to manslaughter, which carried a sentence of 3-15 years' imprisonment, in exchange for his testimony at O’Neal’s murder trial. The district court granted O’Neal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s argument that the Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably determined that the erroneous exclusion of the statements was harmless. The district court properly granted relief based on the exclusion of the jailhouse statement because of its potentially profound impact on jurors, particularly when added to the already considerable admitted evidence indicating that Hickman, not O’Neal, was the shooter. Had the hospital identification been admitted, it would have joined an impressive array of evidence that Hickman was the shooter. View "O'Neal v. Balcarcel" on Justia Law

A 911 caller reported that two men had approached and tried to break into her parked car. Officers were dispatched. Because there was fresh snow, the officers followed a trail of snowprints to the Coffey home. Outside the home, Coffey’s father, David, told the officers that Coffey and Jerrell were inside. David claims he never gave them permission to enter the home. The officers claim that David did consent. The officers entered and found Coffey, asleep on a loveseat. David says that the officers tried to wake Coffey by poking him in the chest. An officer then punched Coffey in the face and yelled, “stop resisting.” Officers flipped him onto his stomach and handcuffed him. Coffey says he did not resist but that the officers used his face to open the storm door as they dragged him out of the house, leaving him with injuries. The officers claim that Coffey, fought, kicked two officers, and pulled his arms away. Coffey was acquitted of assaulting a police officer. Coffey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, The officers sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit agreed that there existed material disputes of fact over whether the officers unlawfully entered Coffey’s home, whether they used excessive force when arresting Coffey, and whether the officers influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey for assaulting a police officer. View "Coffey v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Hubbell worked as a FedEx parcel sorter. She alleges that her manager told her she should accept a demotion because “females are better suited to administrative roles and males are better suited to leadership roles,” repeatedly disciplined her, then eventually demoted her from her position as lead parcel sorter based on her sex. She also alleges that FedEx retaliated against her for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing a lawsuit by unfairly disciplining her, not allowing her to earn extra pay by clocking in early or clocking out late, and closely surveilling her. Eventually, she was fired. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding in favor of Hubbell on her Title VII retaliation claim and the reduction of her attorney’s fees from the requested amount. A reasonable factfinder could find that several of the actions Hubbell testified about would be sufficient, on their own or in combination, to dissuade a reasonable worker from filing or pursuing an EEOC complaint. A reasonable factfinder could also find that some or all these acts were taken in retaliation for Hubbell’s EEOC complaints. A reasonable factfinder could determine that, despite its formal anti-discrimination policy, FedEx did not engage in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. View "Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner raised two issues regarding whether the interrogating officer mislead him to believe that he did not have a right under the Fifth Amendment to have counsel present during interrogation and misstated the availability of a defense attorney in the county where Mitchell was interrogated, and whether the officer provided Miranda warnings to petitioner in "mid-stream," in violation of Supreme Court precedent. The court held that, although the manner in which the officer interacted with petitioner regarding the right to counsel was troubling, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision—that the Miranda warnings, considered as a whole, adequately advised petitioner of his rights—was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Mitchell v. MacLaren" on Justia Law

Hennessee pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act, section 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee’s three prior convictions for violent felonies. Hennessee objected that the government could not prove that two of his prior offenses were committed on different occasions. The district court agreed with Hennessee, finding that Sixth Circuit precedent precluded its review of non-elemental facts when conducting the different-occasions analysis. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing with the ACCA enhancement. A sentencing court may consider non-elemental facts such as times, locations, and victims in documents described in the Supreme Court’s “Shepard” decision when conducting the different-occasions analysis. The facts of Hennessee’s prior convictions—as established in Shepard-approved documents—indicate that he committed those violent felonies on occasions different from one another. The government proved that Hennessee’s prior convictions qualify him for a sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Hennessee" on Justia Law

Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and mouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to die. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens in 2003 of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased Owens’s sentence to 24 years, based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was warranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the Sixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding that the state court’s error was harmless. Under Supreme Court precedent, the verdict alone did not authorize Owens’s sentence. There is, however, little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding that Owens’ actions amounted to “psychological abuse or torture,” and reflected his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering.” View "Owens v. Parris" on Justia Law