Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Sensabaugh, the former head football coach at David Crockett High School in Washington County, Tennessee, made two Facebook posts expressing his concerns about the conditions and practices of schools within the District. The posts included pictures of students. Sensabaugh refused to comply with requests to remove the posts and became aggressive with his supervisors who noted other alleged misconduct, including his use of profane language with students and his requiring a student to practice while injured. He was fired after a guidance meeting where his conduct caused his supervisor to report her concern “that Sensabaugh posed a threat to the safety of the students and staff.” He sued, raising First Amendment retaliation and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no causal connection between Sensabaugh’s Facebook posts and his termination. A thorough independent investigation preceded Sensabaugh’s termination; that investigation concluded that the misconduct allegations were substantiated in full or in part and that the misconduct supported termination. View "Sensabaugh v. Halliburton" on Justia Law

Brintley is blind. To navigate the internet, she uses a screen reader that scans webpages and narrates their contents. The technology struggles with some material, especially pictures and video. With some effort, companies can make their websites fully screen-reader compatible. The credit unions, established under Michigan law, maintain a limited brick-and-mortar presence; both operate websites. Brintley tried to browse these websites but found her screen reader unable to process some of their content. A “tester” of website compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, Brintley sued the credit unions, seeking compensatory and injunctive relief, arguing that the websites were a “service” offered through a “place of public accommodation,” entitling her to the “full and equal enjoyment” of the websites. 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). The district court rejected an argument that Brintley failed to satisfy Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To establish standing, Brintley must show that she sustained an injury in fact, that she can trace the injury to the credit unions’ conduct, and that a decision in her favor would redress the injury. Brintley must show an invasion of a “legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” and that affects her in some “personal and individual way.” Brintley lacks eligibility under state law to join either credit union and her complaint does not convey any interest in becoming eligible to do so. View "Brintley v. Belle River Community Credit Union" on Justia Law

Police received a report of a drunk driver, with the vehicle’s license plate number. The database reported the vehicle as stolen. The suspect’s name came back: Powell, who was allegedly “armed and dangerous.” Using the caller’s updates on the vehicle’s location, in minutes three deputies found it stopped on a dirt road with the driver standing outside. The deputies told the driver to get on the ground. He dropped to his knees and put his hands in the air. As the deputies approached, Deputy Stetson instructed the driver to lie down on the ground. The driver yelled back that he would not comply and asked what he had done wrong. Stetson and the driver repeated the conversation nine times, with the driver becoming more belligerent. At one point, the driver reached toward his open truck door but then returned his hands to the air. The driver had three warnings that deputies would tase him if he did not obey. Stetson tased the driver. Deputies then handcuffed him. The driver was not Powell but was the vehicle’s owner, Shanaberg. Powell had allegedly stolen the vehicle months before, but the police later recovered it. The vehicle remained in the stolen-vehicle database. Shanaberg sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Stetson, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity on Shanaberg’s excessive-force claim. Given what Stetson knew, it was objectively reasonable to tase Shanaberg after warning him. View "Shanaberg v. Licking County" on Justia Law

In 2015, Davis was the Rowan County, Kentucky County Clerk, responsible for issuing marriage licenses. Same-sex marriage offended her religious beliefs; when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Davis stopped issuing marriage licenses altogether. When plaintiffs, same-sex couples, sought marriage licenses they could not get them. Plaintiffs sued Davis in her individual capacity and in her official capacity, seeking damages. In a different lawsuit, the district court enjoined Davis from refusing to issue marriage licenses. After the injunction, plaintiffs obtained marriage licenses. Before the Sixth Circuit could rule on the injunction, Kentucky legislators changed the law and Davis began to issue licenses without objection. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Davis's appeal of the injunction. Davis then moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that sovereign immunity shielded her from suit in her official capacity and that qualified immunity shielded her from suit in her individual capacity. The Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields Davis as an official because, when refusing to issue marriage licenses, she acted on Kentucky’s behalf, not on Rowan County’s behalf. The doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield Davis as an individual; the plaintiffs adequately alleged she violated plaintiffs’ right to marry, which was clearly established when she acted. View "Yates v. Davis" on Justia Law

The day after a controlled buy, Detroit police officer Benitez obtained a warrant to search 12011 Bramell. His affidavit stated that a reliable confidential informant had been at two Burnette addresses and “12011 BRAMELL (the target location) and that a certain drug dealer had been selling cocaine and heroin out of 9542 Burnette for several months. Burnette Street and Bramell are eight miles apart. Benitez could not have simultaneously observed the locations as stated in the affidavit. Detroit police executed the warrant at Bramell, which is owned by Butler, a retiree with no prior convictions or links to drug operations. Officers asked for Butler's ID, which Butler provided; he stated he had a concealed pistol license and was carrying a weapon. Butler was handcuffed. Sergeant Meadows “slammed” him “against the wall.” Butler had sustained a serious neck injury during military service, resulting in a spinal fusion operation and disability-based retirement. The “slam” reinjured him. From the house, the police recovered $3,702 cash, weapons, a bulletproof vest, and ibuprofen pills. The state did not charge Butler, who filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Meadows on the excessive force claim and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to Benitez on the false affidavit claim. Assaulting an unarmed, compliant individual is a clearly-established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Removing alleged falsehoods, Benitez had not personally seen suspicious activity at Bramell but he corroborated what the informant stated about the Burnette addresses. Officers need not corroborate every detail provided by an informant to show the informant’s reliability. Even without personally observing any drug activity at Bramell, Benitez put enough in the affidavit for a magistrate to conclude that the informant—who was correct about everything else—would be right that Bramell was a “stash house.” View "Butler v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 1995, Pike and Slemmer, students at the Knoxville Job Corps Center, had a strained relationship; Pike told Iloilo, that she intended to kill Slemmer. The next day, Iloilo observed Pike and Slemmer together. That night, Pike told Iloilo that she had just killed Slemmer and showed Iloilo a piece of Slemmers’s skull, describing many details about the murder. Pike made similar statements to another student. After Slemmer’s body was found, police quickly discovered Pike’s connection to the crime. Pike waived her Miranda rights and gave a complete statement. At trial, much of Pike’s defense centered on her mental health. A jury convicted Pike of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. At a sentencing hearing, Pike’s attorney, Talman, originally intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. McCoy, a mitigation expert; shortly before the hearing, Talman switched his plan and called only Pike’s relatives to testify about Pike’s difficult childhood, and her behavioral problems throughout her adolescence.The jury sentenced Pike to death by electrocution. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. State courts also denied postconviction relief, concluding that Pike’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present alternative expert testimony or additional lay testimony on compelling mitigation in her life history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her federal habeas petition; the state court’s determination that she is unable to establish prejudice on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Pike v. Gross" on Justia Law

Vanderhoef crashed his Ford Mustang into Dixon’s vehicle. Dixon, an off-duty, part-time reserve Maryville, Tennessee police officer, responded by holding Vanderhoef and his passengers at gunpoint for about two minutes. Keller let them go after a bystander threatened to call the police. A jury found that Dixon violated Vanderhoef’s Fourth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court set aside the jury’s verdict, ruling that Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law put him on notice that doing what he did was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The facts presented at trial adequately established a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be free from excessive force and unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. At the time of this accident and confrontation, Dixon should have known that pointing his gun at a non-fleeing teenager whom he did not reasonably suspect of any prior crime beyond speeding and reckless driving and holding him at gunpoint for roughly two minutes, violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "Vanderhoef v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Boxill worked at Franklin County Municipal Court. Boxill alleges that the defendants, judges and an administrator, formulated a concealed policy that female employees asserting complaints about abusive and discriminatory treatment by judges would be discouraged and intimidated. She claimed that in 2011 O’Grady began making sexist and racist comments and that Brandt was “hostile and intimidating." Boxill reported this to administrators and judges in 2011-2013; “[n]o administrator or Judge acted ... each discouraged [her] from action.” They began removing her responsibilities. A week after others reported O’Grady’s behavior Boxill was demoted. She claims that O’Grady then recruited other judges to monitor her and her staff. The Defendants began bypassing her and going directly to the Caucasian male subordinate. She resigned and later filed suit, alleging that each Defendant retaliated against her in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1981 and contributed to a hostile work environment. The district court dismissed her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Boxill offered no plausible, non-conclusory facts to show that O’Grady was aware of her complaints and cannot demonstrate that O’Grady’s adverse actions were motivated by her protected speech. Reversing as to the hostile work environment claim, the court stated Boxill’s complaint plausibly alleged that O’Grady made sexist and racist comments to her and others for years, she reported that behavior, and the harassment was sufficiently severe and/or pervasive that others found it necessary to memorialize their concerns in writing. View "Boxill v. O'Grady" on Justia Law

In 1999, Vowell pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, agreeing that his prior criminal history qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Vowell waived his right to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, except for claims asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or “that an applicable change in the case law renders the defendant’s conduct ... not a violation of federal law.” Vowell had Tennessee convictions for second-degree burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary, and a 1983 conviction for Georgia burglary. The district court determined that Vowell qualified as an ACCA career offender and sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment. Vowell did not appeal. In 2016, Vowell filed a section 2255 motion to set aside his sentence, asserting that his 1983 Georgia conviction did not constitute a predicate offense because it was broader than generic burglary and “portions of Georgia’s burglary statute could only have qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s now-void residual clause,” citing the Supreme Court’s Johnson and Mathis decisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Vowell’s petition, first holding that Vowell’s appellate waiver did not prohibit him from raising his claims. The court determined that Georgia’s burglary statute was divisible and that because Vowell was convicted of burglarizing a “dwelling house,” Vowell was correctly designated as a career offender. View "Vowell v. United States" on Justia Law

American Islamic Community Center (AICC) unsuccessfully sought zoning permission to build a mosque in Sterling Heights, Michigan. AICC sued, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First Amendment. The Department of Justice also investigated. The city negotiated a consent judgment that allowed AICC to build the mosque. At the City Council meeting at which the consent judgment was approved, people voiced concerns about issues such as traffic and noise; others disparaged Islam and AICC. Comments and deliberation were punctuated by audience outbursts. Eventually, Mayor Taylor cleared the chamber of all spectators, except the press. The Council voted to settle the case. A consent judgment was entered. Plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the consent judgment invalid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The defendants fulfilled their procedural obligations; they considered and made findings on the relevant criteria, such as “parking, traffic and overall size,” before voting. The court upheld limitations on speech imposed during the meeting: the relevance rule and a rule forbidding attacks on people and institutions. The city did not “grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.” View "Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights" on Justia Law