Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

At 2:30 a.m., Bey and two friends went out to purchase space heaters. Bey had purchased his older minivan days earlier, so it had a temporary registration tag but no license plate. The three went to a Livonia store but came away empty-handed. They drove to a Canton Walmart, where they purchased space heaters. Undercover Livonia police Sergeant McKinley noticed the minivan. Livonia had recently experienced several retail break-ins. McKinley followed the minivan on “a hunch” that criminals often use stolen, older vehicles for retail crimes. The officers noted that the minivan’s passengers were black. McKinley observed the paper temporary registration taped to the window; he later testified that officers ran the registration through the Michigan state database but found no matching records. Another officer recalled that McKinley said over the radio that the problem was that “it was unreadable.” On the freeway, the officers thought the minivan executed an evasive driving tactic. An officer followed the men into the Walmart and watched them pay for their merchandise. At Livonia’s request, the Canton Police Department dispatched uniformed officers, who surrounded Bey’s van and ordered him out of the vehicle. Bey was carrying a concealed weapon; he properly stated that he was armed and produced a concealed weapon license. That license had expired; Bey was arrested him. The state court found the stop unconstitutional; the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bey then sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit: dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, McKinley’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity as to Bey’s equal protection claim; affirmed the denial of as to Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim; and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the other officers. View "Bey v. Falk" on Justia Law

The Playpen website, a message board for advertising and distributing child pornography, is within the “dark-web,” protected by the “Tor hidden service network,” rendering the website relatively inaccessible. A foreign law enforcement agency alerted FBI agents of its suspicions that a U.S.-based IP address was used to house Playpen. Agents identified the server and executed a search warrant, which allowed them to create a duplicate server at a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia. The FBI assumed administrative control of the website, then obtained a search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to employ a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) to unmask anonymous users. The NIT warrant led the District Court of the Southern District of Ohio to issue a search warrant that allowed authorities to search Bateman’s residence and computer where they found over 599 illicit images of children. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence and for a "Franks" hearing, to question Agent Macfarlane, who submitted the affidavit to obtain the NIT warrant. The search of Bateman’s home was valid under the good-faith exception. Agent Macfarlane’s affidavit provided a detailed and sufficiently specific picture of Playpen and of the NIT program; it accurately described the locations to be searched, which necessarily included locations outside of the Eastern District of Virginia, and accurately described the NIT’s operation as triggered only when an activating computer’s signals entered the Eastern District of Virginia. View "United States v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Giles County contracted with private probation companies to supervise people it convicted of misdemeanors. Probationers sued Giles County, its Sheriff, the probation companies, and some company employees, alleging RICO violations, civil conspiracy, improper debt collection, and constitutional violations. The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on a claim that the county and sheriff violated the probationers' “substantive right against wealth-based detention” by detaining them after arrest until they pay bail because the bail amount is set “without reference to the person’s ability to pay,” outside the person’s presence, and without determining whether the person poses “a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” The injunction permits bail based on evidence of the probationer’s ability to pay, the necessity of detention, and the alternatives to bail. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the probationers should have sued the state judges who determine the bail amounts instead of suing the county and sheriff who enforce them. The plaintiffs can sue the sheriff, regardless of whether he acts for the state or the county while judges have absolute immunity from suits based on their judicial acts, except in matters over which they clearly lack jurisdiction. View "McNeil v. Community Probation Services, LLC" on Justia Law

While traveling to a mental health treatment facility, Blough got out of his fiancée’s (Reich) vehicle holding his knife, walked through traffic, and wandered into a residential neighborhood. Blough was experiencing hallucinations, having quit his schizophrenia medication. When he ignored his fiancée’s repeated pleas to get back in the car, she called 911. Reich told police officers that Blough was paranoid and did not like the police, having been shot by police in the past. After he refused commands to drop the knife, Blough “took a step forward toward them” with his knife raised in his right hand in a stabbing position. The officers fired three shots, killing Blough. His estate sued, claiming that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims on summary judgment. The officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; they are shielded by qualified immunity. The totality of the circumstances gave the officers probable cause to believe that Blough posed a threat of serious physical harm to them and others. The court noted Reich’s contradictory testimony. View "Reich v. City of Elizabethtown" on Justia Law

Mason, a Sheriff’s Department investigator, and uniformed officers were tracking Harrelson, a fugitive, whose vehicle was previously seen outside the home of Wooden and Harris. They approached the home. Mason, who was not in uniform, knocked on the door, while the uniformed officers dispersed. Wooden answered. Mason asked to speak with Harris and to step inside, to stay warm. According to Mason, Wooden responded “Yes.” Mason and an officer entered the home. As Wooden walked down the hallway, the officers saw him pick up a rifle. When they told him to put the weapon down, Wooden did so. Mason knew Wooden was a felon. The officers handcuffed and searched Wooden, finding a holstered loaded revolver. Harris gave the officers permission to search the home. The officers did not find Harrelson but found another rifle. After waiving his Miranda rights, Wooden admitted that he possessed all three firearms and ammunition. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Wooden unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The district court Wooden was classified as an armed career criminal based on Georgia convictions: a 1989 aggravated assault, 10 1997 burglaries, and a 2005 burglary. Wooden argued that neither the aggravated-assault nor burglary offenses qualified as violent felonies and that the 1997 burglaries arose out of a single occasion and were a single ACCA predicate. The court rejected those arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, seeing no improper deception or “definite and firm” basis for discrediting the district court’s assessment that Wooden consented to Mason entering his home View "United States v. Wooden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, inmates in Michigan prison facilities, were once juveniles housed with adult inmates, a policy that Michigan has since abandoned. They filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims stemming from alleged sexual abuse by adult inmates, which occurred when the policy was in place. Prior suits were dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The inmates had different experiences in filing grievances under a process enacted pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30302. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The parties disputed which administrative process the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust, MDOC’s regular three-step grievance process or PREA but the Defendants unquestionably treated the Plaintiffs’ complaints as PREA grievances. That grievance process was “unavailable” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court characterized the PREA grievance process as: “a classic case of Orwellian doublethink” full of contradictions and machinations that render it “incapable of use.” One inmate adequately alleged retaliation that might excuse following the process. View "John Does 8-10 v. Snyder" on Justia Law

A Tennessee jury convicted Atkins of murdering his stepfather in 2000 when he was 16 years old. A state court imposed a life sentence that renders Atkins eligible for release after at least 51 years’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court later held, in “Miller,” that a sentence of “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” a decision that applies retroactively. Atkins argued that the life sentence he received as a 16-year-old also qualified as a “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment. A state appellate court rejected his claim. The district court denied relief in his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) prohibits a federal habeas court from upending a state criminal judgment unless a state court’s rejection of a constitutional claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Reasonable people can debate a sentencing policy that did not give the 16- year-old Atkins any opportunity for release for 51 years but the state appellate court reasonably distinguished Miller. View "Atkins v. Crowell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four female students each reported sexual assault to the campus police and authorities. The plaintiffs contend that the administration’s response was inadequate, caused them physical and emotional harm, and consequently denied them educational opportunities. They sued, claiming violations of Title IX, Due Process and Equal Protection under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Michigan law. The district court dismissed all but three claims under Title IX and one section 1983 claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded for dismissal of those claims. A victim of “student-on-student sexual harassment” has a private cause of action against the school under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, if the harassment was “pervasive” and the school’s response “caused” the injury. A student-victim must plead, and ultimately prove, that the school had actual knowledge of actionable sexual harassment and that the school’s deliberate indifference to it resulted in further actionable sexual harassment against the student-victim, which caused the Title IX injuries. A student-victim’s subjective dissatisfaction with the school’s response is immaterial to whether the school’s response caused the claimed Title IX violation. Because none of the plaintiffs suffered any actionable sexual harassment after the school’s response, they did not suffer “pervasive” sexual harassment and cannot meet the causation element. The court also held that the individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hudson became a firefighter. He was outspoken about his Christian faith. According to Hudson, other firefighters watched pornography in communal spaces and engaged in extra-marital affairs at the fire station. For five years, he criticized their behavior; they responded with disrespectful comments about his religious practices and sexual orientation. In 2015, Hudson’s supervisors learned that he had claimed extra hours on his timesheet and suspended him without pay. A local union officer attended Hudson’s suspension meeting. The statewide union filed an unsuccessful grievance. During an ensuing meeting, the city added a claim that Hudson had engaged in “double-dipping.” On his union representatives’ advice, Hudson invoked his right not to incriminate himself and was fired him on the spot. The union continued to attempt a resolution. The local firefighters and the statewide union had a falling out. Hudson’s “Step 2” meeting was canceled. Hudson emailed the local union, asking for arbitration. The local officials nonetheless scheduled another “Step 2” meeting. No one notified Hudson about the meeting until the day before. Hudson could not attend; he insisted on arbitration. At the meeting, the local union did not pursue Hudson’s grievance. The district court rejected all his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to a First Amendment retaliation claim. Hudson complained about poor administration, protected speech, and the department fired him, an adverse employment action. The court affirmed the rejection of his due process and Title VII claims. View "Peter Hudson v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

The Ohio Department of Public Safety fired Trooper Johnson after he sexually harassed women while on duty. When the Department learned of the first incident, it let him sign a “Last Chance Agreement,” which said the Department would not fire him if he followed the rules for two years. When the Department learned of another incident, it fired Morris Johnson for violating the Last Chance Agreement. The district court and Sixth Circuit found that the Department did not racially discriminate against Johnson in doing so. Johnson did not show that he was “similarly situated” in all of the relevant respects to an employee of a different race who was treated better. While Johnson and a white trooper both acted inappropriately, their situations were different. The white trooper’s first incident was unverified while the Department verified all of Johnson’s incidents. Johnson propositioned a woman to go out with him; the white trooper did not. Johnson pulled a woman over without probable cause to ask her out; the white trooper did not. Johnson went to a woman’s home; the white trooper did not. The two troopers had different direct supervisors and were subject to different standards because Johnson signed a Last Chance Agreement. View "Johnson v. Ohio Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law