Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Straser built a carport in 2009, about 17 feet from the road. The zoning ordinance requires carports to be 30 feet from the road. The city notified Straser four times that his carport violated the rule. In 2016, the city cited Straser’s neighbor for violating the setback rule. The neighbor accused the city of targeting him for enforcement based on his race and Muslim religion. In 2017, the city cited Straser for his carport. City Attorney Trew stated that the city would enforce the rule, having “had trouble with a Muslim” who complained about a similar violation. Straser claimed he was fined because he is a Christian and the city did not want to favor him over his Muslim neighbor.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A government that enforces its laws equally against those of different faiths honors the neutrality imperative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Straser did not identify any cases in which the city refused to enforce the 30-foot rule against non-Christians nor did he show discriminatory purpose and effect. Straser’s own account of the conversation showed that Trew was committed to even-handed enforcement. Straser has no evidence that Trew knew of Straser’s religious beliefs. View "Straser v. City of Athens" on Justia Law

Davis, an African American inmate, claims that officer Gallagher called him “Bubba” and “boy.” Davis stated he might file a grievance over Gallagher’s perceived racism. Later that day, Davis encountered Gallagher. According to Davis, Gallagher “searched” Davis and planted heroin in Davis’s pocket and wrote an incident report which falsely alleged that Davis possessed heroin. Davis was placed in administrative segregation and was tested for drug use. The test came back negative. Gallagher’s version is that he saw Davis put something in his pocket, “shook [Davis] down,” and discovered a rock-like substance, which proved to be heroin. Davis claims that Inspector Miller told him that he would be released from segregation only if he revealed who had supplied him with drugs and threatened to make Davis “suffer.” A jury found Davis not guilty of felony heroin possession by a prisoner.Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for being placed in solitary confinement; First Amendment retaliation for threatening to file a grievance; malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment); and substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court ultimately rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to Gallagher on Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. When there is evidence to support each version of the parties’ dueling allegations, summary judgment is not appropriate—even when the evidence includes self-serving statements from the parties. View "Davis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

J.H., a 14-year-old pretrial detainee, was placed in segregated housing in Williamson County’s juvenile detention facility after other juveniles alleged that he threatened to assault them. J.H. suffers from Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections (PANDAS), which often manifests in psychiatric symptoms. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, J.H. alleged that his placement in segregated housing for a month in 2013 amounted to unconstitutional punishment; that a detention monitor, Cruz, sexually assaulted him during this period, as a result of Williamson County’s failure to train Cruz; and that during that period, officials failed to provide adequate medical care.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The official is entitled to qualified immunity. While the punishment imposed on J.H. was excessive in relation to the verbal threats he made, the right at issue was not established with sufficient specificity as to hold it clearly established as of 2013. J.H. met with and received medication from multiple medical professionals, none of whom requested that the facility make any accommodations for J.H.’s medical needs. J.H. has not shown a “direct causal connection” between the failure to train Cruz and his alleged assault; it is far from clear that any lack of training was the “moving force” behind Cruz’s decision to sexually assault a child. View "J.H. v. Williamson County" on Justia Law

Lee, a public-school teacher, was required to either join the union or pay fair-share fees as a non-member because the collective bargaining agreement between the school district and the union included a fair-share clause. Lee paid fair-share fees. Anticipating that the Supreme Court would overrule its precedent endorsing fair-share fees (Abood), Lee filed a putative class action, asserting that the union and state actors had violated her constitutional rights by imposing compulsory fair-share fees as a condition of employment. She sought a declaration that provisions of Ohio law were unconstitutional and damages. Two days later, the Supreme Court issued its "Janus" decision, reasoning that fair-share fees resulted in non-members being “forced to subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities,” thereby violating the free speech rights of non-members. Lee dismissed her claims against the state officials and the school district. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the union. The union, as a private actor sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, was entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio law and Supreme Court precedent. The state-law conversion count failed to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Lee v. Ohio Education Association" on Justia Law

In 1974, a clerk was killed at a store near Toledo. According to Bailey, he entered the store, robbed the cash register at gunpoint, then shot the clerk in the neck and head. The Ohio Parole Board described the crime differently: Bailey entered the store, robbed Cannon, forced him to the ground, “told him . . . exactly what he was planning on doing,” placed the gun to the back of his head and shot him “execution-style” because “he was in need of money and ... the only way he was going to be successful was to kill all witnesses.” In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio prisoners had a right to a factually accurate parole record. Bailey challenged the Board’s version of events. Bailey ordered a transcript to show that trial testimony contradicted the Board's description and moved to correct his parole record. The Board and state courts denied his request. Bailey sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging due process violations by the Board’s refusal to investigate and correct inaccuracies in its description of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Bailey is in custody but does not purport to be in custody in violation of federal law. Bailey cannot argue that, but for the allegedly inaccurate description, the Board would grant him parole. View "Bailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Robinson was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under Michigan’s complex sentencing scheme, the judge sentenced Robinson as a fourth habitual offender to “concurrent terms of 47-1/2 to 120 years’ imprisonment for the assault and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.” The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Robinson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. On appeal, Robinson argued that Supreme Court and state decisions postdating his sentencing have established that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Robinson’s sentencing claim undoubtedly has merit; the Supreme Court’s Alleyne decision clearly established the unconstitutionality of Michigan’s sentencing regime. However, Robinson did not “fairly present” his sentencing claim to the Michigan Supreme Court and failed to exhaust that claim in state court. On remand, the district court should decide whether to dismiss Robinson’s sentencing claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust or to stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while Robinson returns to state court to exhaust that claim. Stay and abeyance is appropriate only “when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court” and when the claims are not “plainly meritless.” View "Robinson v. Horton" on Justia Law

Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his role in a drive-by shooting outside a Detroit nightclub. The trial was marked by outbursts, threats toward witnesses, and offensive language by witnesses, spectators, and counsel. After a particularly contentious incident involving a witness and defense counsel, the court took protective action, temporarily closing the courtroom to spectators before reopening it a few days later. On direct appeal, and in this habeas proceeding, Williams argued that the temporary closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Williams’s trial counsel failed to object to the closure, so Williams defaulted his public trial claim in the state proceeding. He has not overcome that failure by showing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, which might otherwise constitute cause and prejudice excusing the default. Regardless of whether closing the courtroom was an error, Williams cannot establish that his defense was prejudiced by the closure. The vast majority of his trial took place in an open setting, transcripts were made available from the limited sessions that took place behind closed doors, and the closure had no discernable effect on the judge, counsel, or jury. Nor did the temporary closure “lead to basic unfairness.” View "Williams v. Burt" on Justia Law

A cat was clawing Barton's daughter in the yard. Intending to “scare it away,” Barton shot a BB gun at their trampoline’s legs, several feet from the cat. Barton yelled to Porter, three doors down, “the next cat that I see in my yard will be a dead one.” Barton had previously complained to animal control that Porter fed stray cats. Barton returned to his work. Porter called 911 and said that Barton had told her that “your grey cat ... got shot in the head.” She said she did not know if it was a BB gun and admitted she had not seen the injured cat and that the cat could not have been hers. The dispatcher broadcast: a woman said that her neighbor was “shooting cats” and that she was not sure what type of weapon was used. Animal Control arrived and spoke to Barton, who refused to come outside or provide identification. He explained that he had shot at a trampoline with a BB gun to scare the cat. The officer saw neither weapons nor injured cats.Minutes later, eight officers arrived, produced weapons, and “surrounded” Barton’s house. Barton passed his identification through the door. Moments later, “fearing that [Barton] was grabbing a gun,” Officer Vann “ripped [their] screen door off [and barged] into [their] house.” Vann “threw [Barton] up against the counter.” Other officers followed. Vann handcuffed Barton, then “shoved” Barton down his steps and into a patrol car. At the station, Barton was strip-searched while handcuffed to the wall above his head despite complaints of shoulder injury. Three hours later, Barton was released on a $500 cash bond. The charge was dismissed.Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Barton alleged illegal entry, unreasonable arrest and prosecution, excessive force, and First Amendment retaliation. The court granted Vann summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Warrantless entry into a home without an exception to the warrant requirement violated clearly established law. A phone call reporting criminal activity, without corroboration, does not provide probable cause for an arrest. A reasonable jury could find that Vann’s actions violated Barton’s right to be free from excessive force during the arrest and that Vann used excessive force after arresting Barton. View "Barton v. Martin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Michigan inmates adhere to a religion called Christian Identity. Plaintiffs believe that their religion requires the observance of seven “Biblical Holy Days,” weekly group worship on the Sabbath, baptism by full-body immersion, and that Caucasians not mix with other races “in marriage and worship” and that people of different races not cohabitate. In other areas of life, plaintiffs apparently have no objection to interacting with people of other races. Plaintiffs contend they cannot engage in group worship because the Department of Corrections does not recognize Christian Identity as a religion. While they are allowed to attend the services of other religions that have been recognized, they do not because of the differences between Christian Identity and other faiths. One inmate believes that not being baptized “affects [his] salvation of [his] eternal soul." The district court rejected a challenged under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA).The Sixth Circuit reversed. The sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs is not at issue. Under RLUIPA’s second step, the plaintiffs have established that the policy substantially burdens their exercise of religion. At step three, the burden shifts to the Department to prove that the imposition of the substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and that it used “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The district court made no findings on those questions. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law

At 11:53, Tennessee Highway Troopers stopped Hernandez for speeding and ran a warrant-check Hernandez and Betancourt, the front seat passenger and the car's owner. The check came back negative at 11:59. Troopers were denied consent to search the car. At 12:13, Troopers searched the names of all four occupants of the car through a more comprehensive database. A K-9 unit arrived at 12:17. The dog sniffed the outside of the car, alerting to the odor of drugs. The dog did not alert again when allowed into the car. After checking with their supervisor, Troopers manually searched the car and found re-encoded gift cards and suspected amphetamines. The car's occupants were arrested and held for months before all charges were dropped. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the Troopers qualified immunity on the car search based on caselaw existing at that time. A jury found that the car stop was not impermissibly prolonged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs have not met the high burden of showing that the verdict was unreasonable as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the dog's first search was not sufficiently thorough, it did not dissipate the probable cause justifying a second search. At the time, a reasonable officer would not have been on notice that the dog’s failure to alert again to the car's interior was the kind of new information that dissipated the probable cause provided by its initial alert. View "Hernandez v. Boles" on Justia Law