Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Allen was convicted of aggravated robbery and murder for the death of 84-year-old English, whom he knew through a prison ministry. Allen’s thumbprint was found on England’s glasses. Cigarette butts consistent with Allen’s brand and saliva were found in English’s trash. The coroner put English’s time of death between before six a.m. on January 25, 1991. A bus driver remembered picking up Allen near English’s home around six a.m. that day. Allen was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief.Allen claimed he was denied due process because a juror, Worthington, initially indicated that she was not sure that she could be impartial. Worthington stated her brother had been killed two years earlier, that the man charged with the murder was acquitted, and she did not feel justice was done. The judge asked whether she could reach a verdict based solely on the evidence; Worthington said she could. Allen’s counsel stated that witnesses from the coroner’s office who testified at her brother’s trial would testify at Allen’s trial. Worthington stated that she was a bit anxious but denied that her reaction might substantially impact her ability to concentrate on Allen’s case. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the finding that Worthington was unbiased was supported by her testimony and that the judge could legitimately validate her statements because he saw and heard her.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The determination of whether to seat a juror is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court precedent. View "Allen v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Howse claims Officers Hodous and Middaugh stopped in front of his home in an unmarked vehicle. Middaugh asked Howse if he lived there, got out of the vehicle, and told Howse to put his hands behind his back. Howse disobeyed and began screaming. Howse claims Middaugh grabbed Howse and threw him down. The officers tried to handcuff Howse, who resisted, “stiffening up” his body.The officers claim they saw Howse lingering suspiciously at a house that appeared to be boarded up. Middaugh suspected that Howse might be engaged in criminal activity and, when Middaugh reached the porch, Howse clenched his fists and assumed a fighting stance. The officers allege that Howse struck Hodous in the chest and tried to rip off Middaugh’s flashlight and handcuff case, so Middaugh used a leg sweep to take Howse down to arrest him.Middaugh charged Howse with assaulting a police officer. The stated eventually dismissed the charges. Howse sued the officers and the city, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. It is not clearly established that officers cannot tackle a non-compliant suspect and use additional force if he resists arrest, so the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Howse admitted that he tried to make it difficult for the officers to arrest him, which provided probable cause. View "Howse v. Hodous" on Justia Law

Jones worked as a FedEx security officer, watching an X-ray monitor to detect weapons in packages being loaded on aircraft. Jones failed to detect a weapon. FedEx terminated his employment 12 days later, allegedly because he failed to detect that weapon. According to Jones, an African American, the consequences for failing to detect a weapon were harsher for him and another African American than they were for white officers. Jones filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC on April 25, 2018, 252 days after his termination. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice. Jones filed a Title VII action. FedEx argued that Jones failed to file his race-discrimination charge within 180 days of his termination as required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(e). Jones argued that the “filing deadline is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis” and that the Tennessee Human Rights Commission categorically prohibits racial discrimination.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his case, citing the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision, EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Company concerning states that have “fair employment practices agencies” in work-sharing agreements with the EEOC. Jones, a pro se litigant, was excused for not raising that argument before the district court; the court noted that Jones allegedly relied on the EEOC's advice that the 300-day filing period would apply. View "Jones v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

For many years, Small worked as an electrician at Memphis Light (ML). In 2013, he suffered an on-the-job injury that required him to change positions. Small expressed interest in becoming a revenue inspector. ML offered him work as a service dispatcher. Without another offer, Small accepted that position. Small raised concerns that the position would conflict with the practice of his religion (Jehovah’s Witness). Small had Wednesday evening and Sunday services and community work on Saturdays. ML denied his requests for reassignment, explaining that the accommodations would impose undue hardship and that its union required shifts to be assigned based on seniority. ML suggested that Small swap shifts with his co-workers or use paid time off. Later, ML offered Small the option to “blanket swap” shifts for an entire quarter. Small remained in the dispatcher position.In 2017, Small sued for disability and religious discrimination. The district court granted ML summary judgment. Small moved to enforce an alleged settlement agreement between the parties. The court found that the parties had never agreed to a settlement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. ML offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not giving Small a position as an inspector--its determination that Small physically could not do the work. ML did not have to offer any accommodation of his religion that would impose “undue hardship” on its business. The evidence indicated that the parties never agreed on the material terms of a settlement. View "Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water" on Justia Law

Paulus, a cardiologist at KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. Audits indicated that in multiple cases Paulus reported a higher degree of blockage in his patients’ arteries than their angiograms reflected, inserted a stent, and billed insurers. Before Paulus was indicted, the government informed him that its consultants had reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 were unnecessary and that KDMC’s consultants had reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures and found 75 angiographic films with minimal blockage. A jury convicted Paulus of healthcare fraud and making false statements relating to healthcare.Before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” indicating that KDMC's independent experts had reviewed 1,049 of Paulus’s cases and flagged 75 procedures as unnecessary. KDMC offered to refund Medicare for those procedures. Paulus knew that KDMC had identified 75 of his procedures as problematic but did not know that KDMC had reviewed 974 other procedures that it apparently found non-problematic. The government had planned to use the Letter at trial but KDMC objected. After an ex parte hearing, the district court held that the information was inadmissible and ordered that the parties not disclose any more information about the KDMC Review. The district court denied Paulus’s motion for a new trial, sentenced Paulus to five years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $1,156,102.23 in restitution.The Sixth Circuit vacated. KDMC's attorney-client privilege claims did not justify and ex parte hearings and the evidence withheld from Paulus violated his Fifth Amendment rights under “Brady.” The Letter had “potential exculpatory value” and Paulus lacked a readily available means to get the missing details. Paulus was prejudiced and “it doesn’t matter how blameless” the prosecution was. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Ashford was driving while intoxicated, speeding at over 100 miles per hour and changing lanes without a turn signal. An officer followed him, using his lights to indicate that Ashford should pull over. Ashford did not comply. Backup cruisers arrived and forced him to stop. Ashford complied with instructions to show his hands but ignored instructions to turn his engine off. Officer Raby and his police dog, Ruger, arrived. Raby reached through the window, unlocked Ashford's door, and pulled it open. The officers told Ashford to step out of the vehicle. He did not comply. Ashford’s SUV was in drive and his foot on the brake was the only thing stopping it from lurching forward into a police cruiser. Ashford claims he was afraid to retract a hand into the passenger compartment to turn the key. Ashford tried to explain this to the officers. Officers warned him that Raby would use the dog. Raby commanded Ruger to attack. Raby stepped in, grabbing Ashford’s arm and lowering it for Ruger to bite. Raby and Ruger pulled Ashford out of the car. At a hospital, Ashford was treated for puncture wounds and superficial injuries to his forearm. Ashford sued Raby under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Raby based on qualified immunity. Existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, View "Ashford v. Raby" on Justia Law

Ogle works for the Ohio Department of Taxation. He is not a member of the union that represents the Department’s employees in collective bargaining. Under state law, the union may require non-members to pay “fair share” fees to defray the cost of collective-bargaining activities, Ohio Rev. Code 4117.09(C). In 2016-2018, the state deducted these fees from his pay without consent. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in “Janus,” that compulsory “fair share” fees violate the free-speech rights of public employees, overruling its 1977 “Abood” decision authorizing such fees. Ogle filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the union, seeking a refund of the fair share fees he and others paid. In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit joined two other circuits in holding that public-sector unions that collected “fair share” fees in reliance on Abood may assert a good-faith defense to section 1983 lawsuits that seek the return of those fees. The Sixth Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of Ogle’s suit. Despite section 1983’s silence about defenses or immunities, the historical context from which the statute emerged indicates that a narrow good-faith defense protects those who unwittingly cross a line in reliance on presumptively-valid state law. View "Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Association" on Justia Law

Any Ohio registered voter may cast an absentee ballot, starting about a month before election day, but the state requires voters to request an absentee ballot by noon, three days before election day. The lone exception is for unexpectedly hospitalized electors, who may request an absentee ballot until 3 p.m. on election day. Police arrested the plaintiffs the weekend before election day 2018. Foreseeing their confinement through the upcoming election, they sued for access to absentee ballots on behalf of themselves and a class of similar individuals, with an Equal Protection claim, challenging the disparate treatment of hospital-confined and jail-confined electors, and a First Amendment claim. The trial court permitted the plaintiffs to vote in November 2018 but declined to extend that relief to the class. The district court then granted the plaintiffs summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The burden on the plaintiffs’ right to vote is intermediate, somewhere “between slight and severe.” They are not totally denied a chance to vote by Ohio’s absentee ballot deadlines, so the laws survive if the state’s justifications outweigh this moderate burden. The state identified several counties that do not have adequate resources to process late absentee ballot requests from unexpectedly jail-confined electors without foregoing other duties necessary to ensure the orderly administration of Ohio’s elections. View "Mays v. LaRose" on Justia Law

Franklin was convicted of arson (18 U.S.C. 844(i)), using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c), possessing an unregistered firearm or destructive device; and possessing firearms while unlawfully using a controlled substance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Franklin filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Franklin later sought authorization to file a second section 2255 motion, in which he would argue that his section 924(c) conviction should be vacated because his arson conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition. Davis established a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Lower courts may determine the retroactivity of new rules when “[m]ultiple cases . . . necessarily dictate" retroactivity. The Supreme Court’s 2016 “Welch” decision explained that decisions announce a substantive rule and are retroactive when they “alter[] the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” In Davis, the Court narrowed section 924(c)(3), concluding that its second clause was unconstitutional. Arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) does not qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against a building, including one owned by the arsonist, Franklin’s section 924 conviction must have been based on section 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated. View "In re: Franklin" on Justia Law

When the Sieferts’ child started experiencing suicidal thoughts, they took the teenager to Children’s Hospital near Cincinnati. After about a week, the Sieferts’ insurance company determined that Minor Siefert had no medical problems and denied further coverage. The Sieferts decided to bring their child home but the doctors and social workers resisted. For four weeks, the Sieferts wrangled with the hospital and county about getting their child back. Only after the Sieferts signed a voluntary safety plan did the child leave the facility. The Sieferts sued the county, its employees, the hospital, and its doctors, alleging substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court dismissed the hospital and county defendants.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The Sieferts adequately pled procedural due process violations “[e]ven a temporary deprivation of physical custody requires a hearing within a reasonable time.” The issue of their consent was not appropriate for summary judgment. The hospital may be considered a state actor in these circumstances. Children’s and Hamilton County worked together, collaborating and communicating about Minor Siefert’s situation. Rejecting substantive due process claims, the court stated that the defendants’ opting to err on the side of protecting the child at the expense of depriving the parents of their parental rights for a month is not conduct that shocks the conscience. The Sieferts’ claims against the county entities must fail under “Monell.” View "Siefert v. Hamilton County" on Justia Law