Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Lowe, born in 1958, worked for Walbro for 41 years and was promoted several times, becoming the Cass City facility Area Manager in 2014. Cass City evolved from producing carburetors to focus on blow molding and robotics. In 2016, Walbro hired 35-year-old Davidson as General Manager. Davidson testified that Lowe’s understanding of robotics and blow molding was limited, so Lowe relied heavily on two subordinates for equipment maintenance. Davidson removed those subordinates from reporting to Lowe. Lowe was left managing only one portion of the building and conducting general facility maintenance. Lowe alleges that Davidson made several disparaging statements about Lowe’s age. In 2018, Walbro hired Rard as Senior Human Resources Manager. Rard testified that she noticed that Lowe was serving as the Area Manager but had only a few janitors reporting to him. She recommended that Lowe’s position be eliminated. Rard also testified that she received complaints about Lowe engaging in bullying, vulgarity, and sexual innuendoes. Walbro terminated Lowe.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, Lowe’s age discrimination claims under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Davidson’s age-related remarks could lead a reasonable jury to find that Walbro acted on a predisposition to discriminate on the basis of age. Lowe raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the animus was a but-for cause of his termination. Walbro has not demonstrated as a matter of law that it would have terminated Lowe regardless of any age-related animus. View "Lowe v. Walbro LLC" on Justia Law

The Marietta Education Association serves as the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district’s employees. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME (2018), Thompson sued the Association and the Marietta Board of Education, arguing that Ohio’s scheme of exclusive public-sector union representation violates the First Amendment. Under Ohio law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public employees in a bargaining unit upon proof that a majority of the bargaining unit’s members wish to be represented by the union, Ohio Rev. Code 4117.05(A)(1). Public employers are then prohibited from bargaining with individual employees and other labor organizations. Ohio law sets a broad scope for collective-bargaining negotiations. Thompson is not a member of the Association. She objects to its policies but because the union has been designated as her bargaining unit’s “exclusive representative,” the union has a statutory right to represent her. Thompson argued that Ohio’s system of exclusive public-sector bargaining violates her First Amendment rights.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio’s take-it-or-leave-it system is in direct conflict with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME (2018). In deciding Janus, however, the Court did not overrule Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984). Which directly controls the outcome of this case. View "Thompson v. Marietta Education Association" on Justia Law

In 1984, two 17-year-old Caucasian students were car-jacked, sodomized, robbed, and murdered by Taylor and Wade, both African-Americans. A witness picked Wade from a line-up. Wade confessed, naming Taylor as the sole shooter. Convicted, Wade received a life sentence. Taylor’s trial began in 1986, before "Batson," The controlling law about racial animus in peremptory challenges was "Swain." In selecting Taylor’s jury, the prosecutor had nine peremptory challenges; he used four to strike African-Americans, leaving only one African-American on the jury after Taylor’s counsel removed an African-American woman with a peremptory challenge. Taylor’s counsel raised a fair-cross-section challenge. The prosecutor responded, “almost incoherently.” The court rejected the challenge, stating: “I believe the issue being addressed ... [Batson] as to whether it is permissible to exercise your peremptory strikes whichever way you wish to. I don’t know, but the record is clear as to what has been done in this case.” The prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence of Taylor’s guilt. The judge found Wade unavailable to testify pending his direct appeal and allowed the prosecutor to play Wade’s tape-recorded police statement. The jury convicted Taylor. The court sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s Batson and Confrontation Clause claims. On collateral attack, Taylor also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Based on Taylor’s limited argument, the prosecutor’s otherwise non-discriminatory conduct, and the absence of an indisputable pattern of discriminatory strikes, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s denial of Taylor’s Batson claim was not necessarily an unreasonable application of Batson. Even if evidence that Taylor produced at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing had been presented at trial, Taylor could not have prevailed on a Swain claim, so his counsel was not ineffective for failing to produce that evidence. Any Sixth Amendment error was harmless. View "Taylor v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Hepatitis C is a contagious, progressive virus that can lead to cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, and ultimately death. There is no vaccine for hepatitis C. Doctors previously treated the virus using interferons; that treatment brought little success and severe side effects. In 2011, the FDA approved new direct-acting antivirals that halt the progress of hepatitis C and eventually cause the virus to disappear. In 2015, the cost of a single course of treatment using direct-acting antivirals was $80,000-$189,000. By the time of trial, those prices was $13,000-$32,000.A 2016 policy specified that the Tennessee Department of Corrections would provide the antivirals only to infected inmates with severe liver scarring. By 2019, approximately 4,740 of Tennessee's 21,000 inmates had hepatitis. Under a 2019 guidance, every new inmate is tested for hepatitis C. Inmates who test positive undergo a baseline evaluation; an advisory committee of healthcare professionals evaluates each infected inmate and determines his course of treatment. The guidance establishes criteria that make antivirals available to “individuals [who] are at higher risk for complications or disease progression," includes a series of procedural steps for local providers, and provides for continuous care and monitoring of infected inmates, regardless of their treatment plan.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of inmates' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The 2019 guidance showed reasonable medical judgment to care for the class of infected inmates. While the best course of action might be to treat all infected inmates with antivirals, the defendant could not spend more than was allocated and had repeatedly sought budget increases. View "Atkins v. Parker" on Justia Law

Kishore and Santa Cruz seek to have their names placed on the Michigan ballot as candidates for president and vice president, without complying with the state’s ballot-access laws. They contend that the ballot-access requirements, as applied, are unconstitutionally burdensome under the First and Fourteenth Amendments when enforced alongside Michigan’s orders restricting in-person gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in denying injunctive relief. On balance, the state’s well-established and legitimate interests in administering its own elections through candidate-eligibility and ballot-access requirements outweigh the intermediate burden imposed on the Plaintiffs. The court noted that previous litigation reduced the number of signatures required for independent candidates. The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to collect signatures with no restriction from the beginning of their campaign (January 18) to the date of Governor Whitmer’s first Stay-at-Home Order (March 23) and again from the date of the reopening orders (June 1) to the filing deadline (July 16). In all this time, the Plaintiffs have not obtained a single signature on their qualifying petition. View "Kishore v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2013, a fire broke out in the kitchen of Plaintiffs' restaurant. Firefighters put out the fire, but a firefighter, Woelke, died from smoke inhalation. State Police offered to investigate, but the Wayne-Westland Fire Marshal (Adams) and Fire Chief Reddy declined and investigated. Adams found no evidence of accelerants. Investigators representing Plaintiffs’ landlord and insurer also investigated and found the fire's cause to be “undetermined.” The Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration concluded that Woelke's death resulted, at least in part, from the Fire Department’s violations of health and safety regulations. The Department admitted its violations. Meanwhile, according to Plaintiffs, Adams, Reddy and Reddy’s father, retired Fire Chief Reddy Sr., planned to divert attention away from the Department; they agreed to change the cause of the fire to “incendiary” to trigger an arson and homicide investigation. Despite their ensuing activities, no charges were ever brought.Plaintiffs sued the three under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging civil conspiracy, and sued Lieutenant Sanchez, alleging that he falsified his application for a warrant and illegally searched Plaintiffs' homes without probable cause. The court denied their motions to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Reddy Sr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A party who is not a public official may be liable under section 1983 but not entitled to qualified immunity because the reason for affording qualified immunity does not exist. The court affirmed as to the others. Sanchez’s motion to dismiss did not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Adams and Reddy Jr. engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to fabricate evidence and thereby caused Plaintiffs’ constitutional injury. View "Marvaso v. Adams" on Justia Law

Chase was convicted of kidnapping, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, unlawful imprisonment, and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Michigan court imposed two consecutive terms of 25-80 years’ imprisonment on the criminal sexual conduct counts, to be served concurrently with terms for the other counts. Michigan’s sentencing guidelines allowed a sentencing court to depart from the guidelines’ mandatory sentencing ranges upon a showing of “a substantial and compelling reason,” using “prior record variables” and “offense variables.” In Chase’s case, the court increased Chase’s minimum sentencing range based on offense variables that had not been found by the jury, such as serving as a “leader” and causing bodily injury and serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment.Days after Chase’s sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in “Alleyne,” that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact that increases a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence be found by a jury, not a judge. Chase did not raise an “Alleyne” claim on direct appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court did not determine that Alleyne rendered its sentencing scheme unconstitutional until 2015.The Sixth Circuit granted Chase habeas relief, excusing the procedural default. Because there is a reasonable probability that, but for his appellate counsel’s error, Chase would have received relief from the Michigan Supreme Court, he has shown prejudice. A decision upholding the sentencing court’s use of judge-found facts to raise Chase’s mandatory minimum sentence would be contrary to clearly established federal law,. View "Chase v. MaCauley" on Justia Law

Marquardt, a Cleveland EMS captain, posted on his personal Facebook page, concerning the shooting death of 12-year-old Tamir Rice. The posts did not identify Marquardt as a city employee, nor were they made during work hours. The posts stated: Let me be the first on record to have the balls to say Tamir Rice should have been shot and I am glad he is dead. I wish I was in the park that day as he terrorized innocent patrons by pointing a gun at them walking around acting bad. I am upset I did not get the chance to kill the criminal fucker” and referred to Rice as a “ghetto rat..” Marquardt removed the posts within hours and later claimed an acquaintance with access to his phone made the posts while he slept. A termination letter advised Marquardt that his speech violated city policies.Marquardt's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was rejected on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Marquardt’s posts addressed a matter of public concern. The court did not decide whether the posts amount to protected speech, which will require a determination of whether Marquardt’s free speech interests outweigh the interest of the Cleveland EMS in the efficient administration of its duties. Government, when acting as an employer, may regulate employee speech to a greater extent than it can that of private citizens, including to discipline employees for speech the employer reasonably predicts will be disruptive. View "Marquardt v. Carlton" on Justia Law

Although not technically enrolled at the University of Kentucky, Doe hoped to attend the University and was enrolled at a Kentucky community college that allows its students to transfer credits to the University and enroll in the University through a simpler application process. Doe lived in the University’s residence halls, paid fees directly to the University for housing, board, the student government association, student activities, access to the student center, a student health plan, technology, access to the recreation center, and student affairs. Doe alleges that a student enrolled at the University raped her on October 2, 2014. She reported the rape to the University’s police department. Over the course of 30 months, the University held four disciplinary hearings. The alleged perpetrator was found responsible for the rape at the first three hearings. The University’s appeal board overturned the decisions based on procedural deficiencies. At the fourth hearing, the alleged perpetrator was found not responsible.Doe dropped out of her classes and sued, asserting that the University’s deliberate indifference to her alleged sexual assault violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C.1681. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims. Doe has sufficiently shown that there remain genuine disputes as to whether the University denied her the benefit of an “education program or activity,” and has standing. View "Doe v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Less than an hour after a Brown County, Ohio jail officer was captured on video yelling in Goldson’s ear, “I’d like to break your fucking neck right now,” multiple correctional officers apparently discovered Goldson hanging by his neck from a bedsheet tied to the sprinkler escutcheon in his cell, in what the officers now characterize as a suicide. Goldson’s sister claims that Goldson’s hanging was staged. The district court acknowledged that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Goldson was capable of hanging himself, mainly due to the physical layout of the cell and Goldson’s physical characteristics but nonetheless granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence as to a specific theory of how Goldson died. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, reinstating claims against two correctional officers relating to Goldson’s death. The court affirmed with respect to other defendants and claims. View "Bard v. Brown County" on Justia Law