Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Hudson was shot and killed in his Louisville apartment. Detective Roberts sought DNA testing for items at the murder scene. DNA on a hat came back “consistent with a mixture” from Lester, Baker, and an unknown person. Lester and Baker had been implicated by a witness. The case went cold. In 2012, Roberts interviewed Sullivan, an inmate who had contacted the police years before about the murder. Sullivan had dated Hudson and had been friends with Jasmine (the woman living with Baker,). She stated that Jasmine had told her that Baker killed Hudson “over money.” Roberts then interviewed Jasmine, who stated that, on the day of the murder, she, Baker, and “Desean” went to Hudson’s apartment. The men emerged from the apartment with bandanas covering their faces. Baker confessed that he murdered Hudson. Jasmine could not recall “Desean’s” last name and pronounced his first name differently from how Lester pronounces it. She identified Lester’s photo array picture as “Desean.”At trial, Jasmine distanced herself from her identification of Lester. The jury acquitted Lester. Baker was convicted after a second trial. Lester had spent 20 months in jail and three months in home confinement. After his acquittal, he sued Roberts and the Louisville Metro Government.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary-judgment rejection of malicious-prosecution claims against Roberts. The Fourth Amendment and Kentucky law required only probable cause for Lester’s pretrial detention and prosecution. Jasmine’s earlier identification of Lester, combined with corroborating evidence like DNA, met that standard. View "Lester v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Hampton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. His 204-month sentence was eventually reduced to 180 months based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. Hampton sought a further reduction by way of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Hampton had to exhaust all administrative rights, or, alternatively, wait 30 days after the warden’s first “receipt of [his] request.” Hampton sought administrative relief but filed his motion with the district court before the warden’s 30-day response period had run. The court opted to hold the motion “until the 30-day window ran” and later denied Hampton’s motion “for the reasons stated” in the government’s brief, without further explanation.The Sixth Circuit remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, district courts facing defendant-filed motions seeking release under section 3582(c)(1)(A) should analyze whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances merit a sentence reduction and whether the applicable section 3553(a) factors warrant such a reduction. It is not clear whether the court denied Hampton’s motion based upon permissible grounds advanced by the government under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—that Hampton failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances—or instead denied Hampton release due to a strict application of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, which the government invoked, but which is no longer a mandatory step Hampton must satisfy. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

An unknown person flagged down Knoxville Officer Whitehead, claiming that Dibrell was selling drugs out of his Chrysler at a Walgreens. Whitehead relayed this tip to three officers who went to the Walgreens and blocked in the Chrysler. An officer patted Dibrell down for weapons and told him to “hang tight.” Officers conversed with Dibrell for about three minutes. Whitehead arrived with his police dog, which alerted to the smell of drugs. The officers searched the Chrysler and found bottles containing hydrocodone, oxycodone, and alprazolam pills. The drugs did not match the bottle labels. Officers searched Dibrell and found more oxycodone pills and $800. A Tennessee state trial court denied his motion to suppress the drugs and money, reasoning that the officers had not detained Dibrell before the dog sniff. An appellate court vacated Dibrell’s convictions, finding that the officers seized Dibrell before the dog sniff and that the anonymous tip did not give them reasonable suspicion to do so.In Dibrell’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the city and the officers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Dibrell was detained (seized) without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he committed a crime, Dibrell’s challenge to his initial seizure was untimely under rules governing the accrual of a section 1983 claim. His malicious-prosecution claim fails because the state had probable cause to initiate the criminal case once the officers found the drugs. View "Dibrell v. City of Knoxville" on Justia Law

When Anders purchased Star in 2015, Star had been contracted to conduct tows for the Michigan State Police for 15 years and was on the state’s non-preference tow rotation list for Monroe County. The state police’s internal affairs division approached Anders regarding tickets to sporting events that Anders had provided to state troopers. Anders supplied a list of 18 state troopers to whom he had given tickets. Each trooper who accepted tickets was reprimanded. The troopers and others were unhappy that Anders disclosed the names. Cuevas, the commander for the Monroe County Post, informed Anders that he was removing Star from the non-preference tow rotation list. Trooper Hall pressured the Area Towing (Anders's other company) staff to reschedule its auctions. Sollars, the mayor of Taylor, Michigan, required that Area use Fiore, which was under federal investigation, for heavy-duty tows, or lose the contract. Anders was recorded on a federal wiretap speaking to Fiore. Anders revealed to federal agents that he had to work with Fiore to avoid losing the Taylor contract. Sollars vetoed a resolution to allow Area to remain on a month-to-month contract, allegedly because Anders provided information to the FBI. Ramik, a city council member, contacted Fox News, which aired a story in which Ramik accused Anders of stealing from the city.Anders and his companies filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and Equal Protection violations. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on Area’s claim against Hall. Hall’s alleged “constant pressure” was not an adverse action. The court vacated the denial of qualified immunity on Anders’ Equal Protection claim against Cuevas as insufficiently pleaded but affirmed the denial as to the retaliation claim. The court affirmed the denial of immunity for Sollars and Ramik. View "Anders v. Cuevas" on Justia Law

Kubala worked for Trumbull County as a “fiduciary” employee; he was not under civil-service rules and could participate in partisan political activities. Kubala reported to Smith, who holds an elected position. Kubala claims that Smith sexually harassed him and created a hostile work environment related to Kubala’s supposed homosexuality. Kubala told Laukart, the office manager, about Smith’s comments. Laukart replied that Smith could not be controlled. Kubala claims that Kubala running for political office against Smith’s wife and his attendance at certain political functions triggered an adverse employment action. Smith allegedly told Kubala not to attend certain political functions. Kubala testified that Smith’s attorney asked Kubala if he wanted to change his job status to “classified” because he would be “protected.” Kubala interpreted it as a threat of retaliation because the change would end his involvement in local politics. Kubala’s resignation letter stated he was resigning because the work environment was harming his physical and mental health. Kubala was under the care of a physician and a therapist to cope with the harassment and high blood pressure, which Kubala attributed to his harassment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Kubala’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Kubala failed to show that Smith violated his First Amendment rights because the alleged threat is too ambiguous. The district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over Kubala’s state sexual-harassment claim, which shares no common nucleus of operative fact with his constitutional claim. View "Kubala v. Smith" on Justia Law

Elias pled guilty to drug possession and distribution conspiracy; in 2017, she was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. She is confined at FPC Alderson, with a projected release date of November 2024. Elias filed a pro se “Emergency Motion for Immediate Release Due to COVID-19” in April 2020. In June, with appointed counsel, she filed a supplemental motion for a reduction of her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that her hypertension exacerbated her risk of serious injury or death if she were to contract COVID-19. Elias requested that the warden file a compassionate-release motion and appealed the denial, satisfying the exhaustion requirements.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate release motions under the First Step Act. In determining that there were not “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the district court properly considered the CDC guidance, which then did not include hypertension; reviewed a scientific journal which stated that “there is as yet no evidence that hypertension is related to outcomes of COVID-19”; examined the BOP’s webpage and noted there were no reported cases at FPC Alderson; and concluded that speculation that COVID-19 could spread to FPC Alderson was insufficient to justify Elias’s release. View "United States v. Elias" on Justia Law

The Health Department issued a resolution closing every school in the county—public, private, and parochial—for grades 7-12, effective December 4, to slow the spread of COVID-19. In the same county, gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and a large casino remained open. Christian schools filed suit, arguing that the closure of their schools amounts to a prohibition of religious exercise in violation of the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit, applying strict scrutiny, enjoined enforcement pending appeal, concluding that the closure burdens the plaintiffs' religious practices. The court noted that the schools employed “strict social distancing and hygiene standards” and that “little in-school transmission has been documented.” The court acknowledged that the resolution allowed schools to open for religious education classes or religious ceremonies and that the Department has not targeted the plaintiffs or acted with animus toward religion. The plaintiffs argued that the exercise of their faith is not compartmentalized and pervades each day of in-person schooling so that “a communal in-person environment” is critical to the exercise of their faith. The resolution treats the schools less favorably than it does “comparable secular facilities.” The court rejected an argument that it could consider only the secular actors (other schools) regulated by the resolution. The relevant inquiry is whether the “government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,” has imposed greater burdens on religious conduct than on analogous secular conduct, including gyms, salons, offices, and the Hollywood Casino, which remain open. View "Monclova Christian Academy v. Toledo-Lucas County. Health Department" on Justia Law

Gabriel Taye, an eight-year-old Carson Elementary student, tied a necktie to his bunk bed and hung himself. Two days earlier, another Carson student attacked Taye in a school bathroom, knocking Taye unconscious for more than seven minutes. The incident was one of 12 "bullying" incidents spanning from Taye’s first-grade year at Carson until his death. The Plaintiffs allege that the then-principal and assistant principal (Jackson and McKenzie) misrepresented the severity of and outright concealed several bullying incidents involving Taye. The Plaintiffs uncovered information about these incidents after Taye’s death. The Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, also alleging state law tort claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, failure to report child abuse, and spoliation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jackson and McKenzie’s motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Jackson and McKenzie behaved recklessly; they are not entitled to governmental immunity under Ohio law. Jackson and McKenzie knew the full extent to which Taye was subjected to aggression and violence by his classmates. They had video footage of several of the violent incidents Taye experienced at school. Carson's behavior logs also document other routine aggressive and violent behavior among the student population. View "Meyers v. Cincinnati Board of Education" on Justia Law

Silvestre-Gregorio, then age 16, entered the U.S. illegally in 2001. He was detained within weeks. At his removal hearing, he did not have an attorney but was assisted by an interpreter and a social worker. The interpreter spoke Spanish; Silvestre-Gregorio spoke little English and some Spanish; his native tongue was a regional dialect of Guatemala. He answered open-ended questions in Spanish, including where he was born and how he crossed the border. The IJ had to repeat some questions and explained to Silvestre-Gregorio his ability to appeal and his right to be represented by retained counsel. The IJ asked several times whether he would like time to find an attorney. Silvestre-Gregorio declined, saying that he wanted to finish his case that day. Silvestre-Gregorio was removed from the U.S. in June 2001. Silvestre-Gregorio returned to the U.S. in 2002. He accumulated convictions for domestic assault, public intoxication, theft, DUI, and driving without a license.In 2018, he was charged with unlawful reentry of a removed alien, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Silvestre-Gregorio argued that his 2001 removal violated his right to due process and could not be the basis for a section 1326 conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Silvestre-Gregorio could understand the interpreter during his removal hearing and did not have a constitutional right to government-provided counsel or to be notified of discretionary relief (voluntary removal). View "United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio" on Justia Law

Theriot drove the vehicle from which Matthews shot an AK-47, killing a pregnant woman and injuring three others. Theriot admitted to getting the gun, which he illegally owned. One witness testified that Theriot made the decisions on where to go that night and intentionally drove his truck to the house and slowed down when he drove by. After the shooting, Theriot wiped the gun clean of prints; he was the last person seen with the gun. He urged witnesses to lie for him.In a Michigan state court trial, a jury convicted Theriot of second-degree murder, three counts of assault with intent to commit murder, assault of a pregnant individual causing death to fetus, and felony-firearm, The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Theriot leave to appeal.In a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Theriot argued that the state trial court violated his constitutional rights when it prohibited him from questioning witnesses about his demeanor after the shooting (allegedly violating his right to present a defense and his right to confrontation) and prohibited him from admitting jailhouse telephone call recording excerpts into evidence (allegedly violating his right to present a defense). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief without reaching the merits. Theriot procedurally defaulted his claims and did not persuade the court to excuse his default. View "Theriot v. Vashaw" on Justia Law