Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Tennessee Code 39-15- 202(a)–(h) requires the woman be informed, orally and in-person by the attending physician or by the referring physician that she is pregnant; of the probable gestational age of the fetus; whether the fetus may be viable; of the “services ... available to assist her during her pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have the abortion”; and of “[t]he normal and reasonably foreseeable medical benefits, risks, or both of undergoing an abortion or continuing the pregnancy to term.” The law establishes a 48-hour waiting period that begins when the woman receives the mandated information, which is reduced to 24 hours in the event of a court order. The effect of the waiting period is that a woman seeking an abortion in Tennessee must make at least two visits to the clinic, except in the case of a medical emergency that prevents compliance.The district court declared the waiting period unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement but declined to rule on the equal protection claim. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal. The district court’s factual findings compel the conclusion that Tennessee’s waiting period unduly burdens women’s abortion rights, under any of the cited precedents. Defendants—who bear the burden of persuading the court that a stay is warranted—did not challenge those factual findings. View "Bristol Regional Women's Center v. Slatery" on Justia Law

At a Michigan gun show, Turaani attempted to buy a gun. When the dealer ran Turaani’s name through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, he received a “delay” response, requiring the dealer to wait three days before completing the sale. The next day, FBI agent Chambers visited the dealer to see what information Turaani had provided and explained that “we have a problem with the company” Turaani “keeps.”. He showed photographs of Turaani with another person of apparent Middle Eastern descent, whom the dealer did not recognize. Days later, Turaani contacted the dealer, who reported the visit from the FBI. While he “technically could sell the gun,” the dealer stated that he was “no longer comfortable doing so.” Turaani sued the FBI's Director, Chambers, and the director of the Terrorist Screening Database, citing the Privacy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the stigma-plus doctrine, and 42 U.S.C. 1981.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of standing. Turaani focused on his “right to obtain a weapon” and the direct and indirect injuries that flowed from the dealer’s decision not to sell him one but the dealer’s decision not to sell the gun was an independent choice that the government did not require. Turaani failed to show that his injury was traceable to the FBI’s actions. There was no coercion; making an inquiry, and passing along ambiguous information, “is a distant cry from forcing action.” View "Turaani v. Wray" on Justia Law

Cretacci, a Coffee County Jail detainee, claims he was injured during a 2015 inmate protest, that the jail failed to distribute essential supplies after that protest, and that he was injured again in 2017 when he did not comply with an order to get on the ground. Cretacci's attorney, Justice, intended to file his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint electronically. On the evening before the limitations period expired on Cretacci’s claims stemming from the 2015 incident, Justice realized he was not admitted to practice law in the district encompassing the jail. The next day, Justice drove to the Winchester courthouse. That courthouse does not have a staffed clerk’s office; documents cannot be filed there. Justice took the complaint to Cretacci at the jail and told him to deliver it to an officer immediately because he could take advantage of the prison mailbox rule, which assesses the timeliness of inmate filings on the day they are handed to jail authorities. Cretacci did so.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that two claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that there were no constitutional violations underlying the remaining claims. The prison mailbox rule does not apply to prisoners who are represented by counsel; that rule is premised on the relaxed procedural requirements traditionally afforded to pro se prisoners who have no choice but to rely on the prison authorities to file their pleadings. View "Cretacci v. Call" on Justia Law

Schwamberger, a former deputy director of the Marion County Board of Elections sued the Board and its former director, Meyer, asserting, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the defendants’ actions constituted First Amendment retaliation, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Each Ohio County Board of Elections must have four members divided equally between the two major parties. The deputy director (Schwamberger) and the director (Meyer) are always members of opposite political parties, R.C. 3501.091, and deputy directors serve at the pleasure of their county boards. Schwamberger was terminated for impermissibly commenting on the election process, and therefore on policy and political issues related to her deputy-director position, after attempting to complain about errors in the 2018 election to the Board.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Schwamberger’s suit. Schwamberger’s speech proximately caused her termination but that speech implicated policy concerns; she was a policymaking employee, so her speech was unprotected. Schwamberger has not demonstrated a property interest in her position. Under Ohio law, she was an at-will employee who served at the pleasure of the Board. Even if the Board did act “arbitrarily” regarding her discharge, its actions do not create a constitutional claim. View "Schwamberger v. Marion County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Hanna was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. He exhausted state remedies, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied in 2009. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hanna’s claim that he was deprived of effective assistance in mitigation because his counsel failed to present a psychologist to testify about organic neurological defects and his troubled childhood. In 2019, Hanna sought leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and moved to remand his pending petition, arguing that his second-in-time petition is not successive under section 2244(b).The Sixth Circuit denied both requests, rejecting Hanna’s argument that his new claims could not have been raised in his first petition because his previous habeas counsel suffered a conflict of interest. Hanna’s underlying claims of ineffective assistance in mitigation were raised in the previous petition. Hanna seeks to add new evidence. Hanna has also not shown that he meets the requirements of section 2244(b)(2). Hanna does not claim that his new petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law; he seeks an evidentiary hearing to prove certain facts and all of his claims relate to trial counsel’s representation in mitigation. Mitigation evidence categorically does not meet section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s requirement that the new facts establish actual innocence. In addition, Hanna’s claims were procedurally defaulted or have been adjudicated in unchallenged state court decisions. View "In re Hanna" on Justia Law

Ohio law mandates that the Ohio Elections Commission (OEC) be composed of three members from each of the top two political parties in the state, and an additional seventh member who cannot have any political affiliation, Ohio Rev. Code 3517.152(A)(1). The Libertarian Party of Ohio and its former chairman challenged the law as violating their First Amendment right to associate for political purposes.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. The court applied the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which prevents the government from denying a benefit on the basis of a person’s constitutionally protected speech or associations. Under precedent involving government employment, the issue is “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” OEC Commissioners fall within the category of positions that are filled by balancing out political party representation, or that are filled by balancing out selections made by different governmental agents or bodies. It is “appropriate” for Ohio to consider political affiliation to serve its stated interest in maintaining partisan balance among the members of the OEC. View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Wilhem" on Justia Law

During the early morning hours of October 20, 2017, McShann was asleep in the driver’s seat of a locked, running car with his right hand resting on a pistol in his lap and music blaring from the car stereo. Officers, responding to a complaint, determined that the car was registered to a woman whom they were unable to contact. Seconds after officers roused him from sleep, McShann stopped complying with their orders that he keep his hands up and away from the gun. He grabbed the gun and swung it toward the driver-side door, where two officers were positioned. Fearing for their safety and that of their fellow officers, the officers opened fire, killing McShann. After the shooting, the officers immediately called for medical assistance and attempted first aid.The district court concluded the use of deadly force was reasonable and granted the officers summary judgment on excessive force claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, by McShann’s estate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert’s testimony that “[t]he lack of damage to the gun provides clear evidence that Mr. McShann was not holding the gun when he was shot in the hand” did not create a genuine issue of material fact. Such speculation is not enough to controvert consistent officer testimony. View "Jordan v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2015, Sherwood pleaded guilty to transporting visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and possessing child pornography and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Sherwood moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting that the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with his age and medical conditions together constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed in favor of release. The district court denied Sherwood’s motion, stating: “[Sherwood] has failed to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community. Not only was he convicted of possession of child pornography, but he was convicted of transportation as well.”The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, the policy statement in U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is no longer an independent basis upon which a court may deny a defendant-filed motion for release. Because Sherwood was denied relief exclusively due to his failure to satisfy section 1B1.13(2)’s requirement that a defendant not be a danger to the community, the district court must apply the remaining section 3582(c)(1)(A) factors. On remand, the court may consider Sherwood’s history and characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community, and the nature and circumstances of his offense. View "United States v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In 2017, Quintanilla pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and illegally reentering the U.S. after having been removed subsequent to a felony conviction. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and did not appeal. In April 2020, Quintanilla sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Court-appointed counsel asserted that Quintanilla has underlying medical conditions that put him at high risk, including diabetes, obesity, and hypertension; that his facility, FCI Oakdale, was among those hardest hit by the pandemic; and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release. The government argued that he had not demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reasons and that he is a danger to the community, so his release would be inconsistent with section 3553(a).The district court denied the motion, stating on a form order that it had considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors and policy statements and conducted a “complete review” of the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Quintanilla’s request for compassionate release and the denial thereof reflects a “conceptually simple” matter suitable to resolution via a form order; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Quintanilla’s motion. View "United States v. Quintanilla-Navarro" on Justia Law

In 1975, schoolteacher and drug dealer Ingram was robbed and shot dead in her Detroit home. Watkins’s 20-year-old high school classmate, Herndon, testified that he and Watkins robbed and murdered Ingram together. Detroit Evidence Technician Badaczewski testified that a hair found on Ingram’s clothing matched Watkins's hair sample. After Watkins’s conviction, Herndon repeatedly recanted. In sworn affidavits, letters, and testimony, Herndon attested that Wayne County Prosecutor Healy and Detective Schwartz threatened to charge him with Ingram’s murder and another murder if Herndon did not implicate Watkins and testify at Watkins’s trial. Watkins’s efforts to overturn his conviction had no success for four decades.In 2017, Watkins presented new evidence that Badaczewski’s hair analysis methods were seriously flawed. The Michigan court dismissed the case against Watkins without prejudice. Months later, Watkins filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Healy, Schwartz's estate, Badaczewski, and Detroit.The district court denied Healy’s motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider most of Healy’s arguments but held that Healy is not entitled to absolute immunity and that Healy forfeited the issue of qualified immunity at this stage. Even considering Healy’s equitable contentions that it would not be “fair” to hold him to today’s standards, the 1975-76 standards of prosecutorial immunity were the same: a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman’s.” View "Watkins v. Healy" on Justia Law