Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Tomes pleaded guilty to drug, firearm, and money laundering charges and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. In 2020, Tomes sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that COVID-19, coupled with his increased susceptibility to serious illness because of chronic asthma, constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for release and that the law has changed since his sentencing, so he would receive a shorter sentence today. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 “limits the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for compassionate release” and Tomes had not “identified any medical ailments that are so severe they would justify release.” The Bureau of Prisons was taking precautionary measures to prevent an outbreak and Tomes did not show that the Bureau could not treat him if he got sick. The court also rejected his contention that his rehabilitation, strong family support, and apparently inequitable sentence were extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The court “considered each of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors” and found that they did not favor release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. even if a district court wrongly constrains itself to section 1B1.13 to define extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, its decision may be upheld if the court uses section 3553(a) as an independent reason to deny relief. The First Step Act provision cited by Tomes did not apply to his sentence. View "United States v. Tomes" on Justia Law

Taylor robbed a bank at gunpoint. He led the police on a high-speed chase, killed an innocent driver, shot another driver, and abducted a woman and her child. Taylor was convicted of killing a person while avoiding an arrest for bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(e); Taylor’s convictions were affirmed; the Sixth Circuit held that the government did not need to prove Taylor’s intent to kill. In 2005, Taylor moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(a). The district court denied the motion as time-barred. In 2018, Taylor sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing intervening case law to establish the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of section 2255 relief and to establish his eligibility for habeas relief under section 2241; arguing that these cases vindicated his earlier contention that proof of intent to kill was necessary for conviction. Taylor claimed actual innocence based on lack of intent.The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the application for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. If a prisoner can file a section 2255 motion but “fail[s]” to do so or is unsuccessful, a court “shall not . . . entertain[]” his application for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 unless it “appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The "saving clause" is a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction. Taylor’s claim of actual innocence has no basis in the cited precedent. View "Taylor v. Owens" on Justia Law

Muskegon Detective Schmidt, an undercover agent, asked a suspected drug dealer, Conkle, to buy some cocaine. The two drove to a house that belonged to White. Schmidt watched Conkle walk into White’s house and reemerge, after which Conkle handed Schmidt three grams of cocaine. About 40 days later, Conkle again took Schmidt to White’s house. In a nearby alley. Schmidt handed Conkle pre-marked cash. Conkle drove by himself to White’s house. Another detective watched as Conkle entered the house, reemerged, and traveled back to Schmidt, where he completed the sale, Schmidt applied for a search warrant within 48 hours of Conkle’s second purchase, citing the two purchases, his training and experience of 17 years, and his confirmation that the home belonged to White. A Michigan state judge approved a “no-knock” warrant. The search uncovered over 20 grams of cocaine, over 30 grams of “crack” cocaine, a stolen semi-automatic handgun, an AR-style rifle, and over $2,500 in cash. The government charged White with being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm to further drug trafficking, possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances, and brandishing a weapon to further drug trafficking.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a motion to suppress. The issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. The key remedy for unjustified no-knock entries is a section 1983 action for money damages, not the exclusion of the evidence. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear’s COVID-19 response included a “Mass Gathering Order” that prevented groups of more than 10 people from assembling for purposes including community, civic, public, leisure, faith-based, or sporting events; parades; concerts; festivals; conventions; fundraisers; and similar activities.” Locations permitted to operate normally included airports, bus and train stations, medical facilities, libraries, shopping centers, or "other spaces where persons may be in transit” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores.” The ban on faith-based gatherings was enjoined in previous litigation.Plaintiffs alleged that the Order, facially and as applied, violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. While Governor Beshear threatened the plaintiffs with prosecution for holding a mass gathering at the state capitol to express their opposition to his COVID-19-related restrictions, he welcomed a large group of Black Lives Matter protestors to the capitol and addressed those protestors, despite their violation of the Order. The district court preliminarily enjoined the Order's enforcement. Governor Beshear withdrew the Order. The Sixth Circuit held that the withdrawal rendered the appeal moot. To the extent that the plaintiffs claim that a threat of prosecution for their past violations keeps the case alive, the court remanded for the district court to determine whether further relief is proper. View "Ramsek v. Beshear" on Justia Law

In 1994, Kendrick fatally shot his wife outside a Chattanooga gas station. He insisted that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired without Kendrick pulling the trigger. Before trial, officer Miller accidentally shot himself in the foot while handling the rifle, A jury convicted Kendrick of first-degree murder. In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Kendrick raised 77 claims alleging either ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) or prosecutorial misconduct. He succeeded in the Court of Criminal Appeals on two IAC claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to both, holding that counsel’s decision not to adduce the testimony of a firearms expert was not constitutionally deficient performance nor was counsel’s failure to introduce Miller's favorable hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception.In federal habeas proceedings, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. Kendrick’s counsel was not constitutionally deficient in failing to admit Miller’s “excited utterance” statements that he did not pull the trigger when he shot himself but “took great pains to inform the jury that the weapon apparently misfired’ for Miller. It was within the bounds of a reasonable judicial determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of firearms experts. View "Kendrick v. Parris" on Justia Law

John Doe was expelled from the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine (CHM) for allegedly sexually assaulting two women, Roe 1 and Roe 2, on the night of the school’s formal dance. An outside consultant had determined that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women. CHM convened a panel, which affirmed those findings without an in-person hearing. While this process was ongoing, the Sixth Circuit held that universities must offer an in-person hearing with cross-examination in cases where the fact-finder’s determination depends on witness credibility.CHM then gave Doe an in-person hearing, conducted over the course of three days before a Resolution Officer selected by the university. Doe was permitted to testify and, through his attorney, to cross-examine Roe 1 and Roe 2. The Resolution Officer did not require Roe 1 to answer every question that Doe’s attorney posed. Both Doe and his attorney were present throughout the entire hearing. After considering the credibility of the witnesses, the Resolution Officer again found that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s suit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title IX. Doe received ample due process throughout the course of his three-day hearing. View "Doe v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

Bethel is serving a capital sentence at CCI. Following Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy, CCI officials implemented a policy prohibiting “orders for printed material placed by third parties through unapproved vendors.” An inmate’s family or friends could only place orders on their behalf through an approved vendor; orders from unapproved vendors had to “be initiated by the inmate and approved by CCI.” If an inmate received a package from an unapproved source, the inmate could return the package at the inmate’s expense or have it destroyed. Officials withheld books from Bethel that were not ordered by Bethel; he received notices explaining why the books were withheld and offering him the option of having the books returned or destroyed. Bethel later learned that other inmates had received religious books, which were initially withheld for being ordered by a third party but were exempted after being reviewed by the chaplain.Bethel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an Establishment Clause claim but remanded Free Speech and Procedural Due Process claims and later affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The “publisher only” policy was neutral and supported by the legitimate penological interest of preventing the entry of contraband into the prison; there were reasonable alternative means for Bethel to acquire these books. Bethel received sufficient process following the withholding of his books through written notice, the grievance procedure, and the ability to return the book. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because they did not violate Bethel’s clearly established rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. View "Bethel v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2004, Kimball was convicted of multiple drug-trafficking, weapons, money-laundering offenses, soliciting murder, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus 15 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In April 2020, Kimball sought compassionate release, asserting that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release because he is at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on his age (67) and medical conditions (hypertension, heart problems, high cholesterol, and gout) and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting Kimball’s argument that the time he has already served—approximately 17 years—is sufficient to serve the section 3553(a) goals because his offense did not involve any “actual violence” and he is statistically unlikely to re-offend based on his age. The court noted that when it affirmed his effective life sentence, he was the “undisputed kingpin and mastermind” of a “massive cocaine-trafficking conspiracy.” The district court’s order noted that its decision rested at least in part on the section 3553(a) factors; courts may deny relief under those factors “even if ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons would otherwise justify relief.” Even if the district court “mistakenly limited itself to the commentary’s list of extraordinary and compelling reasons," that would not entitle him to relief. View "United States v. Kimball" on Justia Law

Reedy, a Michigan prisoner, was a 47-year-old African American, serving a DUI sentence. His cellmate, Hensley was a 53-year-old much larger Caucasian, convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a child. Reedy claims that in June 2016, he told Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Wade about Hensley's threats against his life. In July, Reedy told prison counselor West “that [his] bunkie had threatened [him] and we needed to move.” West allegedly responded, “I’ll get back with you,” but never did. Days later, Reedy and Hensley went together to West’s office. Reedy claims he “reiterate[d] [his] fear” West allegedly replied, Hensley "ain’t going to do nothing.” West claims Reedy remained silent, while Hensley stated, “You guys got to move this motherfucker” or “whatever happens . . . is going to be onto [you].” West claims that he told the men to work it out and that Reedy returned later and said that “everything was good.” The next morning, Hensley used a softball-sized rock in a laundry bag to beat Reedy while he was sleeping.In Reedy’s Eighth Amendment “failure to protect" lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court dismissed the other prison officials and, with respect to West, concluded that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Reedy as to both an objective, substantial risk of serious harm to Reedy before the assault and that West was deliberately indifferent to that risk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Reedy, he has not created a triable issue of fact to support an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. View "Reedy v. West" on Justia Law

In March 2005, Miles was indicted for murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and being a persistent felony offender. Eight months later, law enforcement sent a hat recovered at the crime scene to a lab for DNA testing. The court granted the prosecutor several continuances, waiting for the DNA results for the hat. Miles himself filed an unsuccessful speedy-trial motion, arguing that the DNA testing was a “stall tactic.” The hat was negative for Miles’ DNA. Miles’s trial began 21 months after he was indicted.On appeal, the issues concerned a gun, found under Miles’s mattress but not linked to the shootings, and Miles’s nicknames. Miles appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, arguing that the 21-month delay between his indictment and trial violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Applying the four-factor test established by the U.S. Supreme Court, that court affirmed his convictions.In Kentucky habeas proceedings, Miles argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s references to the gun and to the prosecutor’s use of his nicknames. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that there was not a reasonable probability that the verdicts would have been different if his counsel had objected to the gun or nickname references. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Miles’s petition for federal habeas relief; the district court appropriately deferred to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reasonable resolutions of Miles’s claims. View "Miles v. Jordan" on Justia Law