Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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At about 4:30 a.m., an anonymous 911 call reported a break-in at neighboring apartment 103, with screaming, Seven Southfield Police officers responded, entered the building, and heard screaming but could not identify the source; the door to 103 was not broken. The officers determined that the window was not a point of entry; they received no response to intermittent knocking. The dispatcher called the anonymous caller back; the caller said that she “can’t be positive what apartment it was coming from.” After about eight minutes, Mitchell opened the door to 103. She denied that there were any problems. Although none of the officer noticed any injuries on Mitchell or saw any signs of suspicious activity, they pushed their way inside, injuring Mitchell’s knee. Mitchell continued to object to the warrantless entry. The officers arrested Mitchell’s guest, Williams, allegedly employing unnecessary force. The officers found no evidence of illegal activity in the apartment. Charges against Williams for resisting arrest and obstruction of police were dismissed.Mitchell and Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting unlawful entry and excessive force. Williams also asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution. Certain claims were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal of the grant of summary judgment to Williams on his false arrest claim for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of the officers’ qualified immunity motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim and Mitchell’s excessive force claim. View "Williams v. Maurer" on Justia Law

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Tennessee Code 39-15-202(a)–(h) requires that women be informed, orally and in-person by the attending physician or by the referring physician that she is pregnant; of the fetus’s probable gestational age; whether the fetus may be viable; of services “available to assist her”; and of “reasonably foreseeable medical benefits, risks, or both of undergoing an abortion or continuing the pregnancy.” There is a 48-hour waiting period, beginning when the woman receives the mandated information, which can be reduced to 24 hours by court order.The district court declared the waiting period unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal but subsequently, “en banc,” reversed. The facial attack fails as a matter of law. Given Tennessee’s strong “interest in protecting the life of the unborn,” there was a rational basis to enact a waiting period, which is not a substantial obstacle to abortion in a large fraction of cases. The plaintiffs claimed that the law—even if facially valid— is unconstitutional as applied to women who will miss the cutoff date for an abortion because of the waiting period; women whose medical conditions increase the risk of delaying the procedure; and women who are survivors of rape, incest, or violence. But, although the law has been in effect for five years, the plaintiffs failed to identify any “discrete and well-defined instances” where women in these groups faced (or were likely to face) a particular burden because of Tennessee’s waiting period. View "Bristol Regional Women's Center, P.C. v. Slatery" on Justia Law

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Phillips, then 39, was arrested for driving with a suspended license. At the Lansing City Jail, Phillips said he took Lyrica to treat his epilepsy and would need another dose that night Phillips denied being under the influence of other drugs or alcohol but was sweating. Phillips was taken to his cell at 2:15 p.m. Detainees are monitored through video cameras and cell checks, which involve a “physical inspection” of the cell. Video footage shows Phillips swaying, falling, and struggling. A pool of vomit formed around Phillips’s head at 3:23 p.m. No further movement was detected after 3:46 p.m. Several cell checks were recorded but officers did not follow department policy. At 5:11 p.m., when an officer entered his cell, Phillips was unresponsive, EMS transported Phillips to a hospital where he was officially pronounced dead at 5:44 p.m., most likely of “multiple drug intoxication,” having ingested oxycodone, alprazolam, and pregabalin.The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that alleged deliberate indifference to Phillips’s medical needs and failure to train officers, and gross negligence under Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. There was insufficient evidence from which to infer that any of the defendants subjectively perceived Phillips was suffering from a serious medical need, inferred he needed treatment, or ignored his medical needs. The court reversed as to one officer, who had the requisite state of mind for liability. View "Burwell v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

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In 1994, Hall murdered his estranged wife by attacking her in her home, dragging her to the backyard swimming pool while at least one of her children looked on, and drowning her. A Tennessee state court jury convicted Hall of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death, finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to cause death. State courts affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hall unsuccessfully pursued state post-conviction relief, then sought federal habeas relief.The district court denied Hall any relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” claim concerning prison records about the mental illness of a fellow inmate (Dutton) who testified against Hall. Dutton’s prison records were records of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, which was not acting under the prosecutor’s control, so the prosecutor did not know about them, actually or constructively. Brady does not impose an unlimited duty to pursue such an inquiry. Given the initial determination of competence, the opinions of mental health professionals that evaluated Hall throughout his state court proceedings, and no question of mental incompetence being raised during that time, counsel’s performance was not unreasonable in failing to establish that Hall was incompetent to stand trial. The court also rejected an ineffective assistance claim concerning evidence of Hall’s family and social history View "Hall v. Mays" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, captains in Cleveland’s Emergency Medical Service division, belong to the same union; all are black. Each fall, captains bid on their schedules for the upcoming year. The city uses a seniority-based bidding system to assign shifts. The collective bargaining agreement also allows Carlton, the EMS Commissioner, to transfer up to four captains to a different shift that conflicts with a captain’s first choice. The 2017 bidding generated a schedule in which three plaintiffs were slated to work a day shift together; only black captains would staff the shift. Carlton removed Anderson from that day shift and replaced him with a white captain to “diversify the shift[].” Informal discussions failed. Discrimination charges were filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the federal EEOC. A rebidding generated a schedule that again resulted in reassignment to “create diversity.” A local news station ran a story about the shift situation.The captains sued, bringing discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and Ohio law, and a section 1983 claims based on the federal constitution. The district court ultimately rejected all of the claims, reasoning the captains could not show that the shift change subjected them to a “materially adverse employment action.” The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Shifts count as “terms” of employment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and the shift change is not “de minimus.” View "Threat v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

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In 2008, another inmate, Macari, assaulted Himmelreich, who had pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, Himmelreich alleges that Macari was placed in the general population despite making comments about targeting “pedophiles.” Himmelreich filed a Tort Claim Notice with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Himmelreich alleges that Captain Fitzgerald warned him not to complain and threatened to have him transferred. Prison officials subsequently placed Himmelreich in the special housing unit (SHU). Himmelreich claims that Fitzgerald told him it was because of the Tort Claim. Prison officials claim they placed Himmelreich in the SHU for his own protection after he complained of threats from other inmates.Himmelreich’s subsequent lawsuits alleged numerous claims against prison officials, including a “Bivens” claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment based on Fitzgerald’s alleged threats and statements. Fitzgerald unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment only on the ground that there is no Bivens remedy for a First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Fitzgerald’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal concerns neither a final order nor a non-final order entitled to review under the collateral order doctrine. View "Himmelreich v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

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Kensu, a resident of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. He has filed several actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983 during his sentence; he won $325,002 after the jury found that five defendants had been “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need[s].” Since then, Kensu has filed several more suits against MDOC and Corizon, a correctional health care contractor, including putative class actions, some of which remain pending.The complaint, in this case, had 808 numbered allegations plus additional sub-allegations, spanning 180 pages. Although his counsel failed to identify this case as related to any of his earlier actions (in violation of a local rule) the district court determined that it was a companion to Kensu v. Borgerding, and reassigned it. Finding his complaint too long and unclear, the district court dismissed, allowing Kensu to try again. His second effort was still too long and unclear. The district court explained the problems with Kensu’s complaint in more detail and gave him one last chance to amend it. Kensu made his complaint longer instead of reducing it to a plain statement of his grievance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. View "Kensu v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

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Michigan attorneys, like those in most other states, must join an integrated bar association in order to practice law. Taylor, a Michigan attorney, argued that requiring her to join the State Bar of Michigan violates her freedom of association and that the State Bar’s use of part of her mandatory membership dues for advocacy activities violates her freedom of speech. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Taylor’s First Amendment claims as foreclosed by two Supreme Court decisions that have not been overruled: Lathrop v. Donohue (1961) Keller v. State Bar of California (1990). The court rejected Taylor's argument that Lathrop and Keller no longer control because of the 2018 decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees where the Court held that First Amendment challenges to similar union laws are to be analyzed under at least the heightened “exacting scrutiny” standard Even where intervening Supreme Court decisions have undermined the reasoning of an earlier decision, courts must continue to follow the earlier case if it “directly controls” until the Court has overruled it. View "Taylor v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

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In 2016, a Madison student fired a gun and injured four students. Approximately two years later, the School Board enacted a resolution allowing staff to carry concealed weapons. Around the same time, Madison students walked out of class during the school day to protest gun violence; school administration disciplined those students. The plaintiffs began attending Board meetings. At one meeting, three were not allowed to speak for failure to complete a “public participation form,” in person, at least two business days before the meeting. Another plaintiff finished his (under three-minute) speech while a security officer escorted him from the room.The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the Board Policy’s “use of vague and undefined terms” and “the imposition of content-based restrictions on speech.” The district court granted the Board summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The Policy’s restrictions on “abusive,” “personally directed,” and “antagonist” statements discriminate based on viewpoint and were unconstitutionally applied to silence the plaintiff. The antagonistic restriction, by definition, prohibits speech opposing the Board. The plaintiff spoke calmly and refrained from personal attacks or vitriol, focusing on his stringent opposition to the Board’s policy and his belief that the Board was not being honest about its motives. The preregistration requirement is a content-neutral time, place, manner restriction that narrowly serves a significant government interest and leaves ample alternative channels. View "Ison v. Madison Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

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Christina and Dustin lived with Dustin’s parents, Richard and Evalee. Christina filed for divorce. After a physical altercation with her in-laws, Christina left. Christina requested a law-enforcement escort to retrieve her belongings, stating that she was afraid to go alone. Trooper Couch accompanied Christina and followed Christina and her mother inside. Richard and Evalee were disturbed that law enforcement had entered their home. Dustin became hostile and shouted that he did not want Christina, Christina’s mother, or the trooper in his home. Richard called his son-in-law Napier, a Perry County sheriff’s deputy, who soon arrived. As Christina and Couch exited the house, Richard insulted Couch. A fight ensued. Napier disrupted the brawl; Couch deployed his taser to subdue Richard and Dustin. Richard, Dustin, and Evalee were arrested but a grand jury declined to issue indictments. Richard sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for wrongful entry, excessive force, wrongful arrest, deliberate indifference, and failure to train. The district court dismissed the claims against the Commonwealth, the state police, and Couch in his official capacity and granted Couch qualified immunity on the unlawful-entry claim, citing the “community caretaker” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and noting that Couch had Christina’s consent to enter the home. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. A reasonable jury could conclude that Couch’s conduct was in violation of Richard’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from the state’s warrantless entry into his home. View "Clemons v. Couch" on Justia Law