Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Based on convictions for cocaine possession and facilitating second-degree murder Bailey was incarcerated until 2005. In 2008, Bailey was convicted for the possession and distribution of crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1). Because Bailey had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment for the (b)(1)(A) offenses. Bailey was also classified as a career offender, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The court imposed a 360-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger certain statutory penalties; the 2018 First Step Act allows courts to apply the change retroactively.Bailey sought a reduced sentence, citing his efforts at rehabilitation, his continuous employment during his incarceration, and his incident-free record in custody. The district court denied Bailey’s request, finding that the First Step Act did not affect Bailey’s guideline range as a career offender and that his sentence was already at the bottom of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court had the authority to reduce Bailey’s sentence, but neither Act required it to do so; not reducing his sentence was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Linda’s daughter, Johnnie Moser, fled to a neighbor’s house one night after Johnnie’s boyfriend (James) physically assaulted Johnnie. The neighbor called the police. Officers Davis and Parton were at the neighbor’s house when Linda approached, visibly upset and worried about her daughter. Parton observed James following behind Linda and moved to arrest him. Linda began shouting that Parton had the wrong man and touched Parton’s arm, despite having been ordered, four times, to sit down. Davis stepped onto the porch, grabbed Linda, took her to the ground, and then pinned her, resulting in a fractured hip and femur. Body-camera footage indicates that Davis could have kneeled on Linda for up to 23 seconds. Linda pleaded guilty to interfering with the arrest of another. Linda sued Davis and the City of Etowah. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Linda, Davis violated her clearly established right to be free from injury-threatening physical force when not actively resisting an arrest. Minimal physical contact does not automatically rise to the level of active resistance. Linda’s subsequent conviction is therefore not determinative of whether Moser actively resisted Parton’s attempt to arrest Ferguson. View "Moser v. Etowah Police Department" on Justia Law

UT instructor Tyger subjected Wamer, a UT student, to inappropriate touching, comments, and text messages and made inappropriate comments in class. Wamer contacted a UT faculty member; each submitted a complaint to UT’s Title IX Office. Wamer alleges that she was afraid of seeing Tyger on campus and of retribution and that UT stated it would pursue the investigation even if she did not come in for an interview. Three weeks later, UT closed its investigation, taking no action. About five months after the harassment began, a more senior faculty member reported Wamer’s allegations. UT then placed Tyger on paid leave and banned him from campus. Wamer alleges that Tyger then attempted to smear Wamer’s reputation. UT investigators found that Tyger had engaged in sexual misconduct.Wamer sued under Title IX, claiming that UT was deliberately indifferent to the initial reports of sexual harassment, which “unreasonably interfered with Wamer’s participation in and enjoyment of the benefits of UT’s educational programs and activities.” The district court dismissed, applying the elements of a deliberate-indifference claim used in cases of student-on-student harassment and finding Wamer did not allege that UT’s actions post-notice resulted in harassment or made her more vulnerable to further harassment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plaintiff can satisfy the causation requirement by showing that following the school’s unreasonable response, the plaintiff experienced an additional instance of harassment or that objectively reasonable fear of further harassment caused the plaintiff to take specific reasonable actions to avoid harassment, which deprived the plaintiff of educational opportunities available to other students. View "Wamer v. University of Toledo" on Justia Law

Deputy Johns shot and killed Palma after responding to a 9-1-1 call at Palma's home. Johns knew that there was a dispute about the television and that Palma suffered from mental health issues. Arriving, Johns saw Palma standing outside with his hands in his pockets. Palma did not respond to greetings but began walking toward Johns. Johns repeatedly told Palma to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Palma did not respond. Johns radioed for backup with “intermediate” priority. Johns warned Palma he would use his taser. Palma did not stop. Johns tased him twice before Palma fell down. As Palma got up, Johns tased him again. Palma walked toward Johns, still not responding to commands. Johns kept retreating; he believed that Palma’s intention was to “perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” Johns pointed his gun at Palma, who did not stop. Johns first shot Palma’s leg. Palma continued to walk toward Johns, who continued shooting until Palma "no longer came towards [him].” Palma never spoke and never reached toward Johns. Palma was unarmed. The encounter lasted eight-10 minutes.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment of qualified immunity. There are genuine disputes of material fact; a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he shot at Palma. In cases involving mental health crises, officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. View "Palma v. Johns" on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan state court to drug crimes. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, at the bottom of his guidelines range. Johnson later sought state post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective, and seeking resentencing because the judge based his sentence on a fact not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson sought to compel his trial counsel to produce his case files and sit for an interview with Johnson’s new counsel. That interview apparently never took place, but Johnson secured an affidavit from his trial counsel. Johnson did not file that affidavit (or any other evidence) and did not ask for additional discovery, for a date for an evidentiary hearing, or for a ruling on his motion.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition, acknowledging that the state court had not yet ruled on his motion but asserting that special circumstances existed due to “the inordinate delay.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Any delay was attributable to Johnson, particularly his failure to request a state court evidentiary hearing. Johnson’s case is not the extreme instance in which circumstances beyond his control left him “incapable” of remedying the constitutional violations he alleges. View "Johnson v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Russell was a passenger in a car that the East Cleveland Police stopped and searched. They found two handguns, which resulted in a felon-in-possession charge for Russell. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Russell entered a conditional guilty plea.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. To assert a Fourth Amendment claim, Russell must have “standing” to challenge the search; normally a car passenger without a possessory interest in the car lacks such standing. The government failed to object to Russell’s lack of standing before the district court and raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Fourth Amendment standing, unlike Article III standing, is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited or waived. The government’s failure to raise the argument below was a forfeiture, not a waiver because the government took no steps to “expressly abandon” its objection. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government can raise a forfeited argument for the first time on appeal and prevail if it satisfies the plain-error inquiry under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The government satisfied that test. Even if the government did not object, Russell had at least some burden to establish standing. Allowing Russell to benefit from the exclusionary remedy would lead to a rightfully diminished view of the judicial proceeding. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Tiwari and Sapkota sought to establish a home healthcare company that would focus on serving Nepali-speaking individuals in the Louisville area. Kentucky restricts the number of such companies that may serve each county. When the Commonwealth denied their certificate-of-need application, Tiwari and Sapkota filed suit, claiming that the regulation violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to earn a living, serving only the illegitimate end of protecting incumbent home healthcare companies from competition, and lacking a rational basis.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding the requirement. Economic regulations, even those affecting an individual’s liberty to work in a given area, are subject to “rational basis” review. While expressing skepticism about certificate-of-need laws, the court concluded that a legislator could plausibly believe that the regulation has a rational connection to increasing cost efficiency, improving quality of care, and improving the healthcare infrastructure in place. View "Tiwari v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Mills and his ex-wife struggled with drug addictions and neglected their four children. The children’s maternal grandparents obtained custody of the children. Around 10:00 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Mills showed up unannounced at their home, picked up his two-year-old daughter and carried her outside, then drove away with the child. The grandparents called the police. Mills ran out of gas, abandoned his vehicle, and walked up the road carrying his daughter. Officers arrived and ordered Mills to stop, but he ignored their commands. Mills fell and released the girl. Officers engaged in a five-minute struggle with Mills, using a taser, striking Mills with a flashlight, kneeing Mills in the face and head, and repeatedly hitting Mills with a baton. An officer eventually shot Mills twice, killing him. According to the officers and bystanders Mills had threatened to harm the officers, fought them with “super-human” strength, and charged at them. One bystander later claimed that the officers brutally beat Mills although Mills did not resist and that they could have easily handcuffed him.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the officers. The testimonial dispute instead raises a classic jury question. Even accepting the testimony, however, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their initial use of force to recover the child, and the local government is entitled to summary judgment on the federal claim. View "Gambrel v. Knox County" on Justia Law

Wood wore a shirt bearing the words “Fuck the Police” to the county fair. According to Wood, police officers ordered him to leave and escorted him from the fairgrounds because of his shirt. While leaving, Wood made several coarse insults directed to the police and the fairground’s administrator. The officers then arrested Wood for disorderly conduct. After the charges were dismissed, Wood filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, alleging false arrest and retaliation. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity on the false arrest claim and insufficient evidence of retaliation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Wood’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. With respect to the retaliation claim, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the officers were motivated to surround Wood and require him to leave in part because of his shirt. While Wood’s speech was profane, the circumstances did not create a situation where violence was likely to result. Neither proximity nor Wood’s demeanor and volume provided probable cause for arrest. Because there was no probable cause to arrest Wood for disorderly conduct, and because Wood’s right to be free from arrest was clearly established, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Wood v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Washington then age 15, claimed that on January 30, 1989, he encountered Chinn, whom he had met a year earlier and only knew by the nickname, “Tony.” According to Washington, Tony had a gun. He and Tony robbed two men, fatally shooting one. A few days later, police arrested Washington, who confessed and named “Tony” as the killer but could not provide Tony’s last name. Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch, which a newspaper printed. Police arrested Chinn and conducted a lineup for Washington and four other witnesses. Three were able to identify Chinn. Chinn’s classmate and instructor testified that Chinn was present for a midterm examination on the night of the murder, and his classmate testified that Chinn rode home on a bus with her. Chinn’s mother testified that he was at home by 9:30 p.m. and stayed home the entire evening. Some witnesses also considered the shooter to be taller than Chinn.Convicted, Chinn was sentenced to death. The district court denied Chinn’s 2002 petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution suppressed evidence, in violation of “Brady,” that Washington suffered mental disabilities; the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning Chinn’s alleged visit to a law office before his arrest; and Chinn was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer on remand and was sentenced to death without a valid jury recommendation. View "Chinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution" on Justia Law