Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Lindke and his ex-girlfriend, Moeller, engaged in a child custody dispute. Moeller obtained a domestic personal protection order (PPO) against Lindke, alleging that Lindke beat her repeatedly, threatened her, and sent nude photos of her to her family, friends, and coworkers. Lindke violated that PPO twice. When it expired, Moeller sought a second PPO, claiming that Lindke continued to harass her online. Michigan state court judge Tomlinson granted another PPO. Moeller obtained sole custody, then sued Lindke in state court, alleging that his “continued harassment . . . on social media” violated the 2016 PPO. Judge Tomlinson found that most of Lindke’s online activity was constitutionally protected speech but that his act of “tagging” Moeller in a specific Facebook post violated the PPO.Rather than appeal that decision, Lindke sued Judge Tomlinson and Sheriff King in federal court, claiming that Michigan’s domestic PPO statute violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). Lindke has previously sued a state-court judge in federal court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that no subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the case against Judge Tomlinson and that Lindke failed to state a claim against Sheriff King. View "Lindke v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

Dr. Heyd, the prison's medical officer, treated inmate Murray, who had a heart attack in 2008, before his incarceration, and was hospitalized in 2010 for deep-vein thrombosis in his leg. Murray was prescribed a treatment regimen of Coumadin. He was hospitalized multiple times during 2011 for his deep-vein thrombosis. His hematology-consult team recommended “a fair trial of Coumadin with an (INR) [international normalized ratio] ranging between 2.5 and 3.” In 2012, Murray suffered from a cerebral blood clot that left him permanently blind.Murray filed a “deliberate indifference” claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. His expert declaration from a hematologist stated that Heyd and his staff allowed the INR to fall into subtherapeutic levels, failed to follow the hematology recommendations, and failed to appropriately adjust the Coumadin doses; Heyd failed to personally evaluate Murray when he complained of headaches and nausea, symptoms of cerebral edema.Heyd sought qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is sufficient evidence for a jury to find facts from which the inference of a substantial risk of serious harm to Murray’s health could be drawn, and that Heyd knew of and disregarded that substantial risk. An inmate’s rights to medical care that is not unreasonably delayed and to adherence to a prescribed treatment plan were clearly established at the time of Heyd’s conduct. View "Murray v. State of Ohio Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Trozzi, a pre-trial detainee, reported gastrointestinal health issues related to gastric bypass surgery. Doctors had placed Trozzi on a specialized diet and prescribed antacids to prevent ulcers. Trozzi sought help filling her prescriptions and an adjustment in her diet, twice referring to an ulcer. Nurse Snow scheduled Trozzi to meet with a doctor. During the night before her appointment, Trozzi called for help. Officer Stakich found Trozzi doubled over in pain. Stakich's supervisor instructed that Trozzi be taken to a medical holding cell for observation. Trozzi received an over-the-counter antacid; she had a normal heart rate, blood pressure, and blood oxygen saturation. Snow advised Capron to continue monitoring. Trozzi alleges that she became covered in her own urine, feces, and bloody vomit as she waited in her cell. At the scheduled visit, the doctor sent Trozzi to the hospital, where she underwent surgery for a perforated ulcer.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Trozzi’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. An inadequate-medical-care claim requires proof that the plaintiff had an objectively serious medical need; a reasonable officer at the scene (knowing what the particular officer knew) would have understood that the detainee’s medical needs subjected the detainee to an excessive risk of harm; and the officer knew that his failure to respond would pose a serious risk to the detainee but ignored that risk. The defendants lacked the requisite knowledge. View "Trozzi v. Lake County, Ohio" on Justia Law

Butler County Jail (BCJ) booked Westmoreland on a bench warrant for failure to appear. Westmoreland requested to be separated from fellow inmate St. Clair because St. Clair believed Westmoreland was an informant. Westmoreland was assigned to a general population dormitory with six cellmates that did not share a common area with St. Clair. Westmoreland’s mother called to express concerns that St. Clair was telling other inmates Westmoreland had “told on him.” The next day, St. Clair was permitted to mop floors outside of Westmoreland’s cell and allegedly told Westmoreland’s cellmates that he was a “rat.” Westmoreland's subsequent request to be moved was denied. That night, other inmates attacked Westmoreland, who required two surgeries for his injuries; his jaw was wired shut for several months. The district court rejected Westmoreland’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court applied the wrong standard in evaluating the liability of an individual jail supervisor. A failure-to-protect claim by a pretrial detainee requires only an objective showing that an individual defendant acted (or failed to act) deliberately and recklessly. Whether BCJ is liable for that officer’s actions is contingent on whether a constitutional violation occurred. View "Westmoreland v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

Zheng became a permanent U.S. resident in 2004. He was a professor at the University of Southern California, Pennsylvania State University, and The Ohio State University and performed research under National Institute of Health (NIH) grants. Zheng had financial and information-sharing ties to Chinese organizations and received grants from the National Natural Science Foundation of China. Including that information on NIH applications would have derailed Zheng’s funding prospects, so Zheng clouded his ties to China. By 2019, the FBI began investigating Zheng. Zheng left for China but federal agents apprehended him in Anchorage.Zheng pleaded guilty to making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Rejecting an argument that the research Zheng completed offset the amount of money lost, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 37-46 months and sentenced Zheng to 37 months. On appeal, Zheng argued that his counsel was ineffective by not seeking a downward variance based on Zheng’s immigration status as a deportable alien, which would have an impact on the execution of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, noting that the record was inadequate to establish ineffective assistance for the first time on direct appeal. Nothing in the record shows counsel’s reasons for making certain strategic decisions or why he advanced one argument over another. View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

At the Detroit Detention Center, officers searched Lipford and did not find any contraband. Lipford denied being under the influence of drugs or carrying any medication. At 9:48 p.m., officers placed Lipford in a glass-walled room used to hold multiple detainees awaiting arraignment. Lipford nodded off. He slid to the floor at 11:02 p.m. Lipford laid on the floor motionless until 2:50 a.m. when he was found unresponsive. He was pronounced dead at 3:50 a.m. Hospital staff found cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl, concealed in Lipford’s rectum. The jail’s operating procedures required that officers conduct rounds every 30 minutes; “physically open the cell doors" and ensure that detainees are actually there; and check "that every detainee is living and breathing.” Although Officer Lewis ostensibly made his rounds that night, he did not physically enter the video-arraignment room nor speak with the detainees. Avoiding interaction with detainees was apparently common because detainees would become agitated at officers waking them up.The district court dismissed claims by Lipford’s estate against several defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lewis. The estate did not establish that a reasonable officer in Lewis’s position would have known that Lipford was potentially concealing drugs, subjecting himself to an excessive risk of harm, and that Lewis’s ignoring this risk was objectively reckless. Failure to follow internal policies does not, alone, equal deliberate indifference. View "Hyman v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Based on convictions for cocaine possession and facilitating second-degree murder Bailey was incarcerated until 2005. In 2008, Bailey was convicted for the possession and distribution of crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1). Because Bailey had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment for the (b)(1)(A) offenses. Bailey was also classified as a career offender, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The court imposed a 360-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger certain statutory penalties; the 2018 First Step Act allows courts to apply the change retroactively.Bailey sought a reduced sentence, citing his efforts at rehabilitation, his continuous employment during his incarceration, and his incident-free record in custody. The district court denied Bailey’s request, finding that the First Step Act did not affect Bailey’s guideline range as a career offender and that his sentence was already at the bottom of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court had the authority to reduce Bailey’s sentence, but neither Act required it to do so; not reducing his sentence was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Linda’s daughter, Johnnie Moser, fled to a neighbor’s house one night after Johnnie’s boyfriend (James) physically assaulted Johnnie. The neighbor called the police. Officers Davis and Parton were at the neighbor’s house when Linda approached, visibly upset and worried about her daughter. Parton observed James following behind Linda and moved to arrest him. Linda began shouting that Parton had the wrong man and touched Parton’s arm, despite having been ordered, four times, to sit down. Davis stepped onto the porch, grabbed Linda, took her to the ground, and then pinned her, resulting in a fractured hip and femur. Body-camera footage indicates that Davis could have kneeled on Linda for up to 23 seconds. Linda pleaded guilty to interfering with the arrest of another. Linda sued Davis and the City of Etowah. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Linda, Davis violated her clearly established right to be free from injury-threatening physical force when not actively resisting an arrest. Minimal physical contact does not automatically rise to the level of active resistance. Linda’s subsequent conviction is therefore not determinative of whether Moser actively resisted Parton’s attempt to arrest Ferguson. View "Moser v. Etowah Police Department" on Justia Law