Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Two female students at Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS), were videoed by other students engaging in sexual activity with male students at school. One student told school officials that the incident was forcible rape; afraid to remain at the school, she enrolled in a new school. When the other girl’s mother asked that something be done about the circulation of the video, school officials stated that it was a criminal matter and to contact Metro Police; the girl was called names in the hallway and threatened. She finished the school year at home.In a suit alleging violations of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted MNPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Disciplinary records established that MNPS was aware of issues with sexual harassment in the school system before the two students reported their incidents. Many of these incidents involved photos or videos. To hold MNPS is immune from liability as long as no student is assaulted twice, would defeat Title IX’s purpose. With respect to one girl’s treatment after notifying the school of her harassment, a reasonable jury could conclude that, rather than take steps to remedy the violation, MNPS opted to avoid the problem, resulting in her having to homeschool or endure further misconduct. View "Doe v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Hasanaj, a teacher certified in Michigan, was employed by the Detroit Public Schools as a teacher for 10 years under a series of contracts. After about seven years, the District stopped sending him contract renewal notices. Hasanaj received “ineffective” ratings in the three years that followed. The District dismissed him as required by Mich. Comp. Laws 380.1249(2)(j).Hasanaj sued, alleging procedural due process violations because he and defendants “acted with the understanding that he had tenure,” the evaluation ratings violated Michigan’s statutory evaluation system, and now he cannot use his certificate to teach in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit. Hasanaj has not satisfied Michigan’s Teachers’ Tenure Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 38.71-.191, and has no protected property interest in continued employment. Hasanaj has not alleged that he satisfied the statutory probation requirements to acquire tenure. A contract or a tacit understanding cannot override the statutory requirements. It is irrelevant that Hasanaj stopped receiving contract renewal notices, that the three-strikes provision was invoked for firing him, that he was notified that he could appeal to the Tenure Commission, and that the parties stipulated before the Tenure Commission that Hasanaj obtained tenure. Nor was he deprived of his liberty to pursue his profession because he still holds a valid certificate to teach. View "Hasanaj v. Detroit Public Schools Community District" on Justia Law

Burnett was charged with failure to appear for a work-detail program. At Burnett’s arraignment hearing, his behavior was so erratic that the court held Burnett in contempt and sentenced him to jail. A mental health representative advised Sergeant Griffith that Burnett should be placed on suicide watch. While being escorted to a cell, Burnett attempted to break away. Griffith pulled Burnett backward. Burnett continued his efforts. Griffith took him down to the floor with significant force, then knelt over Burnett in an effort to control him. Burnett continued moving. Officer Tessar joined Griffith. Burnett claims that he temporarily lost consciousness. Griffith called for assistance when he noticed that Burnett had a laceration on his head and was bleeding. Other officers and a nurse arrived. Burnett was taken to a hospital, where he received three stitches, then was discharged in good condition. Burnett claims that he suffers from PTSD, migraines, back pain, and personality changes.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The law at the time that Griffith acted did not provide him with fair warning that his actions would violate Burnett’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force; his actions were not so egregious as to obviate the requirement of identifying precedent that places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. View "Burnett v. Griffith" on Justia Law

In 2016, voters elected Kent to the Ohio House of Representatives; she became a member of the House Democratic Caucus. In 2018, she distributed a press release that accused the Columbus Chief of Police of wrongdoing; another press release accused the Department of failing to take child-abuse reports seriously. She attached a letter from the Ohio Legislative Black Caucus to the mayor. Kent submitted the documents to the Caucus for public distribution. Strahorn, then the Minority Leader, prohibited the communications team from posting the press release online and blocked any publication of the release because the attached letter included unauthorized signatures. Strahorn publicly stated that he would not “tolerate a member of the caucus using staff and tax-payer funded resources to fake, forge or fabricate any claim, request or document to further their own political interest or personal vendetta.” The Caucus voted to remove Kent, who lost access to policy aides, communications professionals, lawyers, and administrative staff. Kent was reelected. In 2019, Kent was blocked from attending a Democratic Caucus meeting. Kent did not run for reelection in 2020.Kent filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, alleging that she suffered retaliation for speech protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit, citing legislative immunity. The Caucus is inextricably bound up in the legislative process. “Whatever the lawmakers’ motives, principles of immunity fence [courts] out of the legislative sphere.” View "Kent v. Ohio House of Representatives" on Justia Law

Groom tried to refill a prescription for a drug that treats opioid addiction. A technician informed Groom that he could not use a coupon. Groom grabbed the prescription and left without paying. The pharmacist followed him out, offering a lower-cost drug. Groom kept walking. The dispatcher alerted police officers that a man carrying a large knife had robbed the pharmacy and that the suspect, Groom, ran toward another store. Captain Russ and Officer Lee responded. Russ was familiar with Groom, having heard that Groom suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide. They spotted Groom in a parking lot and exited their vehicles. Russ announced himself. Groompulled a large knife out of a sheath, saying: “Not today David.” Both officers drew their firearms. Groom ignored several commands to drop the knife and walked toward Russ, waving his knife, stopping 30 feet from Russ. He repeatedly told Russ to shoot him. Lee testified that, although Groom at first was “being very belligerent,” he stopped walking and eventually stopped waving the knife. After 20 seconds, Groom took another step. Russ shot Groom. He died from the wound.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court granted Russ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing “[p]recedent involving similar facts” putting this case “beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" to "provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” View "Lee v. Russ" on Justia Law

In 2011, Portis and Thompson committed several robberies. Each pleading guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); they “expressly and voluntarily waive[d]” their rights to appeal their convictions or to challenge their convictions through a postconviction proceeding, “including a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255.” Seven years later, the Supreme Court determined, in Davis, that section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague concerning “crimes of violence,” ultimately requiring the government to prove that a defendant met the requirements of the statute’s elements clause. Davis applies retroactively. After Davis, the Sixth Circuit held that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not count as a predicate “crime of violence” under section 924(c);s residual clause or the elements clause.Portis and Thompson sought habeas relief. The government responded that the men waived their rights to file section 2255 motions and that the robberies (rather than the conspiracy) served as the predicate offenses. The district court denied the motions on the merits. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. The plea agreement, in no uncertain terms, waives each defendant’s right to challenge his convictions in “a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

Morgan was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, ADHD, and depression. While incarcerated at Wayne County Jail, charged with assaulting a prison guard, Morgan suffered from hallucinations, heard voices, and attempted suicide. She was transferred to UCH, a private entity contracted to provide mental health services. Usually, three deputies and two-three UCH employees were present in the UCH ward. Despite blind spots, unlocked bedroom doors, and the necessity that deputies leave the ward to use the restroom, there had never been a reported incident at UCH involving sexual activity between inmates until November 15, 2005. That afternoon, Morgan asked UCH employee Williams for toilet paper. Other staff had left the ward to use the restroom and for lunch breaks. When Williams returned, he discovered Morgan n the room of a male inmate, Miles, apparently engaged in sexual intercourse. Morgan stated that she took “responsibility for everything.” Morgan and Miles declined to continue the investigation. In August 2006, Morgan gave birth to a child, apparently fathered by Miles. Morgan filed suit.The district court granted the county governmental immunity on her state law claims, found that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity, rejected a claim of supervisory liability, and held that Morgan’s Monell claims failed as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of deliberate indifference nor authority for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires men and women to be housed separately. View "Morgan v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Novak created “The City of Parma Police Department” Facebook account to exercise his “fundamental American right” of “[m]ocking our government officials.” He published posts “advertising” free abortions in a police van and a “Pedophile Reform event.” Some readers called the police station. Officers verified that the official page had not been hacked, then posted a notice on the Department’s page, confirming that it was the official account and warning that the fake page was “being investigated.” Novak copied that post onto his knockoff page. Officers asked Facebook to preserve all records related to the account and take down the page. Lieutenant Riley issued a press release and appeared on the nightly news. Novak deleted the page. The investigation continued. Officers got a search warrant for Facebook, discovered that Novak was the author, then obtained an arrest warrant and a search warrant based on an Ohio law that makes it illegal to use a computer to disrupt or impair police functions. Officers arrested Novak, searched his apartment, and seized his phone and laptop. He spent four days in jail before making bond.Indicted for disrupting police functions, Novak was acquitted. In Novak’s subsequent suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officers reasonably believed they were acting within the law. The officers could reasonably believe that some of Novak’s Facebook activity was not parody, not protected, and fair grounds for probable cause. View "Novak v. City of Parma, Ohio" on Justia Law

Boshaw, an openly gay man, began working as a server at Midland in May 2018. In discussing a possible promotion, Boshaw’s supervisor suggested he “needed to change [his] appearance and kind of just act a little more masculine” and to remove his Facebook relationship status. Boshaw changed his hairstyle and deleted his Facebook relationship status but did not otherwise hide his sexual orientation. Boshaw was rapidly promoted three times, becoming front-of-house operations manager. Meanwhile, Boshaw reposted his relationship status and used hashtags referencing his sexual orientation. Boshaw had a cordial relationship with his supervisor, who persuaded Boshaw not to accept an offer from another restaurant. Boshaw’s employment record was not spotless.” After other incidents, Boshaw missed a mandatory meeting and did not show up to work that evening. Midland fired Boshaw due to his “absence and failure to notify management” and “other issues.”Boshaw filed an EEOC complaint, then sued, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), and civil rights conspiracy under the ELCRA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Boshaw’s rapid rise shows that Midland did not delay or deny his promotions because of sex discrimination. Even if Boshaw had made a prima facie showing of retaliatory termination, he cannot show that Midland’s reasons for his termination were pretextual. Boshaw alleged only “isolated incidents,” which are not enough to state a hostile work environment claim. View "Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co." on Justia Law

In 1992, Burns, with five accomplices, approached a car in which four men were drinking and smoking. Looking for a fight, Burns and his accomplices robbed the car's occupants, then began shooting them, killing two. Blackman escaped with a minor gunshot wound. Thomas, despite having been shot several times, survived; his testimony was instrumental in the trials. Burns was convicted on two counts of felony murder, receiving a death sentence for one murder and a life sentence for the other. Seeking habeas relief, Burns claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage and that the Tennessee prosecutor wrongfully relied on inconsistent testimony and knowingly presented false testimony at the guilt stage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has never established that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to introduce, at sentencing, residual-doubt evidence, offered to undermine the prosecution’s case, which led to the conviction. Burns’s counsel did not err by failing to pursue the introduction of residual-doubt evidence at sentencing. Burns’s sentencing counsel did a fair amount of investigation in preparation for the mitigation phase and adopted a strategy of focusing on Burns’s religious background and other signs of good character, which was not unreasonable. Burns fails to establish that the testimony was actually inconsistent or false. View "Burns v. Mays" on Justia Law