Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Officers were dispatched to the Campbells’ residence after a 9-1-1 dispatcher received two hang-up calls from the residence. Officer Fox knocked on the door. He did not announce himself as law enforcement. Through the closed door, Mark asked “you got a gun?” and later stated, “I got one too.” Fox drew his gun. Mark opened the door. Mark says he may have had a cell phone in his hand. Both officers contend they thought Mark had a gun. Video footage does not resolve the dispute. Fox fired two shots. Mark fell to the floor and kicked the door shut. He yelled to his wife to call 9-1-1 because somebody was shooting at them. Although Fox fired eight shots, no one was hit. Other officers arrived and apprehended Mark. No firearms were found in the home. Mark was charged with aggravated assault; the charges were ultimately dismissed.The Campbells sued Fox in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity summary judgment. Fox’s actions constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment; a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to leave a house while an officer repeatedly fired at the door. Accepting the Campbells’ version of the facts, a reasonable jury could find that Fox’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable. View "Campbell v. Cheatham County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

On November 17, 1997, an Ashtabula Police dispatcher advised officers that Jones, who had outstanding felony warrants, had been spotted. Days earlier, Jones had told his cousin that he “was facing a lot of time” and “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest him.” Officer Glover found Jones, who pulled a revolver from his pocket and fired several shots at Glover. Jones kicked Glover in the chest, then fled the scene. Officers apprehended Jones and recovered the weapon, which used hollow-point bullets. Officer Glover died the following morning.Jones was convicted of murder. During the penalty phase, Jones’s counsel presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Jones with Antisocial Personality Disorder and testified that Black men with this disorder (including Jones) would commit more murders—he claimed that about one in four “African-American urban males” suffered from the disorder, and the only treatment was to “throw them away, lock them up.” The jury recommended and the court imposed the death penalty. The district court denied Jones’s petition for habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The issue of whether Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because his attorneys failed to prepare expert witnesses properly, as shown by the psychologist’s racialized testimony, was not procedurally defaulted. On de novo review of the merits, the court held trial counsel performed ineffectively and Jones is entitled to a new sentencing. View "Jones v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Walker Officer Dumond began pursuing Meadows after he passed Dumond on the highway while traveling nearly 90 miles per hour. During the subsequent traffic stop, which was captured on dash-camera footage, Dumond instructed Meadows to keep his hands out of his vehicle and to open the door to his vehicle. Dumond and Meadows shouted back and forth as Meadows attempted to open his door. Once Meadows exited the vehicle, Dumond grabbed Meadows and slammed him to the ground. On the ground, Dumond kneed Meadows to try and roll him over, and Officer Wietfeldt punched Meadows multiple times. Wietfeldt fractured Meadows’s wrist while handcuffing him.Meadows sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers appealed the denial of their summary judgment motions based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court stated that on interlocutory appeal, it is bound by the district court’s determination that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dumond and Wietfeldt did not perceive Meadows as refusing to comply or resisting arrest. The dash-camera footage does not “blatantly contradict” the factual issues identified by the district court. View "Meadows v. City of Walker, Michigan" on Justia Law

A physician group fired Post, a nurse-anesthesist, months after she suffered an accident. The group’s subsequent bankruptcy impeded Post’s efforts to hold it liable for employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She instead sued the hospital at which she worked. Although the hospital did not employ her, Post argued that two statutes allow her to enforce the ADA’s employment protections against non-employers.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital. The ADA “interference” provision makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of” an ADA-protected right. 42 U.S.C. 12203(b) does not allow plaintiffs with disabilities to sue entities that are not their employers. A nearby subsection clarifies that the provision incorporates remedies that permit suits only against employers. The civil-conspiracy provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) authorizes a damages suit when two or more parties “conspire” to “depriv[e]” “any person or class of persons” of “the equal protection of the laws” or the “equal privileges and immunities under the laws” but does permit a plaintiff to assert a conspiracy claim against an entity that is not the plaintiff’s employer for the deprivation of an ADAprotected employment right. View "Post v. Trinity Health-Michigan" on Justia Law

Corrections officer Johnson found Zakora in his bunk, dead from accidental fentanyl toxicity. Earlier, another prisoner allegedly told Johnson and/or Mobley to check on Zakora. Mobley worked the night shift before Johnson’s shift started. Both officers stated in unrebutted affidavits that they had no knowledge that Zakora possessed, ingested, or intended to ingest illegal drugs. Mobley stated that he did not speak with Zakora during his shift, and no one advised him to check on Zakora; Johnson stated he discovered Zakora only seconds after a prisoner said that Zakora was not “doing too good.” Two other prisoners in the small unit were hospitalized from drug overdoses in the days before Zakora’s death, but no immediate investigation was undertaken. After Zakora’s death, a drug-detection dog gave positive indications of contraband in the unit.Zakora’s overdose, according to his Estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, was the consequence of a longstanding problem of drug smuggling into Lakeland, orchestrated by an unidentified female corrections officer; an unidentified prisoner allegedly informed inspectors about the drug-smuggling ring. The estate claimed failure to protect Zakora, failure to promptly investigate other drug overdoses, and deliberate indifference to Zakora’s serious medical needs. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, in part, The allegations state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim and a claim for supervisory liability against two defendants. The court did not consider qualified immunity. View "Estate of Zakora v. Chrisman" on Justia Law

In a parking lot, Officer Powers approached Shumate’s daughter (Amy) to question why her license plates did not match her car’s registration. Amy did not have insurance and was not allowed to drive home. After Amy called Shumate for a ride, Powers and Amy began to argue about retrieving items from the car. Shumate arrived and immediately began to argue with Powers; the two had had prior hostile interactions. About 47 seconds after Shumate arrived, Powers fired his Taser. Shumate fell backward, screaming in pain. Powers claims Powers straddled the prone Shumate, yelling “stop resisting,” though the video indicates no resistance. Powers deployed his Taser again. Powers apparently punched and kneed Shumate, again deployed the taser, and employed palm-heel, backhand, and knee strikes. Shumate was treated at a hospital and eventually pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of being a disorderly person. Powers was disciplined for “rudeness to a citizen” (Amy).In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part; neither qualified nor state law immunity shields Powers from liability. The right to be free from being tased and subjected to physical force (alleged punching, knee strikes, kicking, and hitting) while not actively resisting and while being non-violent was clearly established before 2019, Powers was on “notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” View "Shumate v. City of Adrian" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, two jail officers, and dismissing Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that Defendants caused his injuries, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that either defendant violated his constitutional rights.Plaintiff was booked into Boone County Detention Center on nonviolent drug charges and was placed in a cell with Jordan Webster, a fellow detainee. Webster attacked and beat Plaintiff during the night. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from the risk of harm posed by Webster. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm by failing to protect him from Webster. View "Stein v. Gunkel" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to suppress, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the circumstances of this case.Defendant entered a conditional plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant subsequently brought this appeal challenging the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop leading to the search of his car and unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to warrant a prudent person in believing Defendant had violated 4511.431(A); and (2) the officer had probable cause to detain Defendant, investigate the source of a marijuana odor, and continue search the entire vehicle for marijuana. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for relief from his first-degree murder conviction, holding that there was no merit to any of Appellant's claims on appeal.In his section 2255 petition, Appellant claimed that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel (IAC). The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on Appellant's IAC claim concerning an alleged conflict of interest, a Brady claim, an IAC claim regarding the investigation at the guilt stage, and a final IAC claim regarding the presentation of mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error. View "Gabrion, II v. United States" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that, in Tennessee, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can establish cause to excuse a defendant's procedural default of a substantive claim of ineffective assistance at the motion-for-a-new-trial stage of the proceedings.Appellant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and criminal impersonation. The jury sentenced Appellant to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a habeas petition, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court with respect to the guilt phase of Defendant's trial; (2) held that Appellant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase, requiring remand with instructions to grant habeas on this claim as to the penalty phase; and (3) vacated the district court's findings that Appellant failed to overcome his procedural default on certain claims; and (4) reversed the court's finding that the Martinez-Trevino exception to procedural default cannot excuse a procedural default when the underlying ineffective assistance occurred in a motion for a new trial. View "Rogers v. Mays" on Justia Law