Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A North Carolina social services department received a tip that Michael had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with his four-year-old stepdaughter. Michael and his family subsequently moved to Kentucky, where Family Services told detectives that Michael was possibly sexually abusing the children. All three children were placed into foster care.Before each interview, Michael received and waived his Miranda rights. He admitted to touching “between [Dorothy’s] legs and in her vagina area.” The detectives later said: “You’re going to continue to not have any contact with your children just until you admit to everything.” Michael said that he’d “like to talk to a therapist or something other than social services.” The detectives continued, saying: “You’re going to continue the rest your [sic] life without seeing your children because you want to bottle this up.” During a second interview, Michael admitted to multiple acts of sexual abuse that he had previously denied.Michael unsuccessfully moved to suppress the incriminating statements as coerced under “Miranda.” The Kentucky Supreme Court found that four of the officers’ statements “were delivered in a threatening manner” but noted that Michael had already admitted to three instances of sexual abuse. That court, the federal district court, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Michael v. Butts" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services supervises Tennessee’s foster care system, subcontracting much of its day-to-day work to private foster care agencies, including Omni. In 2016, Mikel took custody of “AK,” then 12 years old, and “SK,” then nine years old, as a foster parent. Mikel says that she had planned to adopt the girls. Omni approved Mikel’s home as a foster home and oversaw Mikel’s relationship with the girls. In 2017, when Mikel submitted her adoption papers, Omni removed the girls from Mikel’s custody, alleging emotional abuse. Mikel says that she never abused the girls, that Omni’s removal was pretextual and in violation of Tennessee law, and that neither Omni nor the Department gave her notice or an opportunity to be heard before commencing the removal process.After unsuccessfully appealing Omni’s removal administratively and in state court, Mikel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages and injunctions. The district court dismissed, holding that Tennessee’s sovereign immunity blocked Mikel’s suits against the Department and its director in her official capacity, that Mikel had not properly served process on the director in her individual capacity, and that Mikel failed to state a claim against Omni under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mikel lacked a constitutional liberty interest in her status as a foster parent. View "Mikel v. Quin" on Justia Law

In 2006, Watkins confessed to killing Varner. In jail, he refused to eat and urinated on himself. After four pretrial psychological evaluations, Watkins’s problematic behavior continued at trial; the judge removed him to a secured room. Watkins was convicted. In 2008, Watkins filed a pro se habeas petition but did not pay the filing fee or seek to proceed in forma pauperis. His petition was dismissed. In 2010, Watkins filed a “motion for equitable tolling,” alleging sentencing errors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct. The court stayed the federal case, pending exhaustion of his claims in state court.In 2014, after state courts rejected his claims, Watkins filed a “supplemental” federal petition, with additional claims. The district court construed Watkins’s petition as a motion to amend his 2010 petition and awarded habeas relief based on counsel’s failure to request another competency evaluation after his trial outbursts. The court reasoned that the claim related back to Watkins’s 2010 petition under Federal Rule 15 because both petitions raised ineffective-assistance claims and equitably tolled the limitations period due to Watkins’s mental-health struggles. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the ineffective-assistance claim in the amended petition did not “relate back” to the generic 2010 ineffective-assistance claim and that Watkins was not entitled to equitable tolling.On remand, Watkins argued, for the first time, that his amended petition related back to the 2008 petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amended petition will “relate[] back to the date” of the original petition if the new claims arose from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as the old ones. A subsequent new suit does not “relate back to the date” of the petition in a dismissed suit. View "Watkins v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

Detective Kopchak, investigating drug trafficking, observed Rivers leaving a house, driving a red Nissan Ultima to sell drugs to an informant, and returning to the same house. After days of surveillance, investigators determined that Rivers lived at the house, and executed a search warrant. Kopchak again observed the Nissan, looked through its window, and allegedly observed a cigar wrapper, a piece of paper in the center console, and a small plastic bag that he identified as “a bag of dope.” Lieutenant DiPenti verbally indicated that he also saw the “bag of dope.” Officers found Loines and others in Rivers’ residence and read them their Miranda rights. Loines volunteered that car keys, belonging to the Nissan, were his. The car was towed for an inventory search. Officers took a picture of the car’s center console, showing a small plastic bag underneath a cigar wrapper, with a lottery ticket beside it. Officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm, two bags of suspected narcotics, and a scale. Police did not obtain a warrant to search the automobile.Loines, charged with drug crimes under 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and a firearm offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. The Sixth Circuit reversed; the “bag of dope” was not in plain view, there was no probable cause to search the vehicle, and the government did not satisfy the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "United States v. Loines" on Justia Law

Around 11:14 a.m., Deanna called 911, claiming that she feared for her life because her husband was “threatening [her] with guns,” was on “new medication from the doctor,” and had “tremendous guns” in their house. Deputy Swick arrived knowing that Puskas had weapons and observed stuff scattered across the lawn and Puskas holding a rifle. Puskas put the rifle down. Swick told Puskas multiple times to get on the ground. Puskas walked toward the house instead. He stopped, picked up a bag, and pulled out a shotgun, and told Swick to “run.” From his vehicle, Swick reported that Puskas had a shotgun. Puskas dropped the shotgun. Sunbury Police Officers arrived, tried to verbally engage Puskas, and requested a negotiator. Deputy Gibson arrived, with a canine, Cash. Puskas ignored the officers and continued meandering around the yard, tossing a shirt at the officers. Gibson released Cash. Puskas ran toward the house. Cash initially targeted the shirt. Gibson refocused Cash. The officers followed Cash with their guns drawn. Puskas darted behind a tree and picked up a pistol case. Someone yelled, “he’s got a pistol.” Puskas pulled out a revolver. The officers shot him at 11:38 a.m. Puskas died at the hospital.Deanna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force in deploying Cash and shooting Puskas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. Body camera footage confirms that their actions were reasonable under the circumstances. View "Puskas v. Delaware County., Ohio" on Justia Law

Indicted in Florida and Connecticut, Villa cooperated with prosecutors. Meanwhile, Villa was indicted in Kentucky. Villa was unaware of those charges when he pled guilty (represented by Perez) in the other cases. Those courts sentenced him to concurrent terms of 140 and 98 months. The Kentucky prosecutor, Judd, emailed Meier (Villa’s attorney) a proposed plea agreement, which assumed no further cooperation but stated that if Villa were willing to cooperate further, Judd would consider recommending a concurrent sentence. Later, Villa spoke to Meier and Perez in a three-way phone call. Meier allegedly did not mention Judd’s offer. Villa met with Judd, an FBI agent, and an investigator. Judd told Villa that the government wanted him to testify against a co-defendant but did not mention the possibility of a cooperation agreement. Villa pled guilty without an agreement and was sentenced to 77 months, consecutive to his other sentences.Villa moved to set aside his sentence, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. When Meier provided the case file, Villa allegedly discovered that Judd had mentioned a cooperation agreement and a concurrent sentence. Villa moved to amend his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, attaching an affidavit in which he said that Meier never told him about Judd’s offer and that he would have accepted it, plus an affidavit from Perez. The government submitted an affidavit from Meier, asserting that he told Villa about Judd’s offer.The district court denied Villa's motion, reasoning that Judd’s wanting Villa to testify against Rodriguez-Hernandez should have put Villa on notice of a potential agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The district court expected too much of an uncounseled defendant conversing in his second language with a federal prosecutor. Nothing about Villa’s meeting with Judd resolved the factual dispute presented by the affidavits. View "Villa v. United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs distribute pamphlets to and try to engage with, women entering abortion clinics, hoping to persuade the women not to end their pregnancies. Louisville-Jefferson County ordinances provide that no one shall “knowingly obstruct, detain, hinder, impede, or block another person’s entry to or exit from a healthcare facility” and imposes a prophylactic 10-foot “buffer zone” around the entrance of any “healthcare facility,” forbidding any nonexempt individual from “knowingly enter[ing]” or “remaining . . . within” it “during [a] facility’s posted business hours.” The law exempts persons entering or leaving a healthcare facility persons using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to a healthcare facility solely for the purpose of reaching a destination other than the facility, municipal agents acting within the scope of their employment, and employees or agents of a healthcare facility acting within the scope of their employment.”The Sixth Circuit enjoined the enforcement of the buffer zone provision as likely violating the First Amendment. The County did not demonstrate that it was “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” One abortion clinic has reported problems but the ordinance covers every hospital, clinic, and dentist’s office in the area. The court noted that the “obstruction” provision of the ordinance addresses the same concerns. View "Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County., Kentucky Metropolitan Government" on Justia Law

Blount who is Black, worked for Stanley for 21 years, most recently as a forklift operator. Blount was warned multiple times against using his phone on the plant floor, in violation of safety policies. On January 31, 2018, Taylor reported that Blount was driving a forklift toward her with “neither of his hands on the wheel” because he was manipulating his smartwatch. Blount offered no explanation. Stanley credited Taylor’s account and took steps to terminate Blount. Blount’s union interceded and Blount signed a last-chance agreement, which provided that any additional safety violations within two years would result in Blount’s immediate termination. A few months later Taylor reported seeing Blount using his cell phone in his lap while sitting on an idling forklift. Blount denied the conduct. Stanley, after an investigation, fired him. Blount’s union withdrew a grievance when Blount refused to provide his phone records. As a separate matter, Blount had filed an EEOC complaint in 2015 that was dismissed in 2016.Blount sued under Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging that he was fired because of his race and in retaliation for his 2015 EEOC complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment. Stanley offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason—serious safety violations—for firing Blount, which was not a pretext for intentional discrimination. Blount’s proferred comparators, white employees who were not terminated, were not similarly situated. There was no evidence connecting Blount’s protected conduct and his termination. View "Blount v. Stanley Engineering Fastening" on Justia Law

Warren, Ohio, police officers responded to a call about an unknown disturbance at a gas station in the early morning hours. They found Jones playing loud music from his SUV in the parking lot. Jones turned off the music. While the officers drove around the building to investigate, Jones drove away. Officers followed Jones, pulled him over, and told him that they had stopped him for a noise ordinance violation. The officers then smelled marijuana and searched the car, finding hidden compartments containing two firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Jones was convicted on four gun-and-drug-related counts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stop of Jones’s car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits officers to warrantlessly arrest—to seize—a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The search of Jones’s SUV revealed loaded firearms in close proximity to drugs, plastic baggies, and a digital scale; sufficient evidence supports the conviction for possessing the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The court rejected an argument that nine comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Bergman crossed the center line, drove into an oncoming truck, and killed its two occupants. Scientists testified that she had prescription drugs (oxycodone, a muscle relaxer, and Adderal) in her system, along with alcohol, at the time of this crash (and at the time of several prior accidents). The state’s expert opined that these drugs impaired her driving. The state relied on her prior incidents to prove that she knew the risks of getting behind the wheel after taking prescription drugs. Bergman claimed that she should have been provided an expert toxicologist at her trial for driving on a suspended license, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and second-degree murder. In its 1985 “Ake” decision, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide psychiatric experts to indigent defendants who have a credible insanity defense.A Michigan court held that Ake did not require the state to provide Bergman with a defense toxicologist because she failed to show a sufficient need for one notwithstanding the state’s expert evidence. The Sixth Circuit rejected Bergman’s federal habeas petition as not meeting the stringent standards for relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), given the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity over Ake’s scope. View "Bergman v. Howard" on Justia Law