Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function. View "Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services" on Justia Law

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McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to offenses involving drugs or guns. He received a below-Guidelines sentence and did not appeal. Ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to file a notice of appeal.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Review of an attorney's conduct is “highly deferential.” The district court’s finding that McCormick did not instruct counsel to file an appeal is “plausible on the record as a whole.” McCormick acknowledged telling his counsel that he wanted to appeal only if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was treated fairly” at sentencing. Neither condition was met. Counsel testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an appeal. The district court had to decide between two plausible stories, so its choice could not have been clearly erroneous. The court rejected McCormick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for consulting him before sentencing rather than after and was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. The Constitution does not impose any such obligation. The court’s colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights. McCormick may have expected an appeal, but the government did not promise that and did not breach its agreement. View "McCormick v. United States" on Justia Law

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Christian Identity, a religion that is “explicitly racist,” believes that Caucasians are “God’s chosen people.” After the Michigan Department of Corrections refused to recognize Christian Identity as a religion for purposes of its prison system, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA). The district court affirmed the denial. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied the first two parts of the three-part RLUIPA test, but remanded for the Department to sustain its “heavy burden” under a strict scrutiny analysis to show that its refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion furthered a compelling governmental interest, and that its denial was the least restrictive means of furthering such a compelling interest. On remand, the district court concluded that the Department met its burden.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Department failed to satisfy its burden of showing that its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Alternatives, other than simply accepting or rejecting recognition, were available and included in the Department’s policies, but were never considered. Christian Identity was not designated as a security threat group and there was testimony that Christian Identity advocated for nonviolence and would permit non-Caucasians to attend its services. The Department presented evidence regarding Christian Identity as a whole, but not concerning the plaintiffs. Without an individualized inquiry, the decision-making process was deficient. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law

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Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review. View "Amaya v. United States" on Justia Law

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In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify. View "Corridore v. Washington" on Justia Law

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Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law

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In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

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Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

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H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

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During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law