Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Simpson, convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1), moved for a new trial, alleging that his counsel was ineffective by: failure to interview and call witnesses with potentially exculpatory evidence (Simpson’s mother, Donna, and Lintzenich and Hoffstot, who previously had accompanied Burdell and Simpson on drug buying trips); failure to effectively cross-examine government witnesses; inaccurate assessment of the government’s case, including advising Simpson to reject a plea bargain; and failure to prepare Simpson to testify. Simpson attached an affidavit asserting that he had told counsel that he wanted the women to testify and notarized letters: Donna stated that Burdell told her at the time of Simpson’s arrest that Simpson was “tak[ing] the rap for [Burdell].” Lintzenich heard Burdell and another say that Simpson took the rap, never saw Simpson sell heroin or buy drugs, and stated he “purchased [h]eroin for personal use only.” Hoffstot stated that he had witnessed “Burdell buying the [h]eroin” on other trips and that Simpson did not “deal[]” heroin. The district court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding “no reasonable possibility” that the proposed testimony would have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Simpson alleged sufficient facts to support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. View "United States v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Clark, who had a long history of alcoholism and depression, committed suicide five days after entering the custody of the Green Lake, Wisconsin, County Jail. The officers on duty at the time of his death did not know that Clark had a high risk of committing suicide. When he entered the jail, however, he was assessed as having a maximum risk of suicide. The intake staff who were aware of that risk—Officer Walker and Nurse Kuehn—had not initiated the jail’s suicide prevention protocol. Clark’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied motions by Walker and Kuehn, seeking qualified immunity. The court found numerous issues of material fact regarding Clark’s suicide risk, the defendants’ knowledge of that risk, and who was responsible for initiating the suicide protocol and stated that it was clearly established that inmates have the right to be free from deliberate indifference to a known risk of suicide. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment. Nurse Kuehn was not entitled to qualified immunity as a private medical contractor. It was clearly established that Clark had a right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious risk of suicide. View "Estate of Clark v. Walker" on Justia Law

Lake County had cash flow of $51 million in 2007. In 2009, it was operating at a deficit; by 2013 its general fund was more than $1 million in the red. The county’s self-insurance fund had a balance of $10 million in 2007; that balance was wiped out by 2013. The county offered retirement incentives to employees age 65 or older. Under one package, retirees were entitled to five years of supplemental health insurance (secondary to Medicare coverage) through Aetna and could return to work, part-time, as at-will employees. In 2013, Aetna informed the county that if retirees working as part-time employees remained on the plan, the plan would no longer qualify for special exemptions under federal law and the county’s costs would skyrocket. The county notified all rehired retirees who were covered by the Aetna supplement that their employment would end. Some sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The key criterion that distinguished the terminated employees from other county employees was not their age but rather their participation in the Aetna plan. The county’s action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest: preserving supplemental insurance coverage for its retirees while avoiding further financial hardship. View "Carson v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were cited for violating Carmel City Ordinance 8-2, which incorporated Indiana’s traffic regulations. Some paid a fine. Some had a default judgment entered against them. Some were convicted; others entered into deferral agreements. None appealed or otherwise challenged the outcome in Indiana’s courts. In a separate case, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the ordinance violated Indiana’s Home Rule laws. Plaintiffs then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights through misuses of the traffic justice system. The district court dismissed, finding that certain plaintiffs lacked standing; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear most of the claims; plaintiffs had abandoned various other claims; and the other claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with respect to plaintiffs who admitted guilt, were convicted, or had default judgments. Federal district courts are not authorized to review state-court decisions unless Congress has passed appropriate legislation. The “deferral agreement” plaintiffs had no constitutional claims. Those alleging injuries arising from traffic stops that preceded and were unrelated to the traffic judgments described damages too speculative or that cannot be separated from the state-court traffic judgment. View "Lennon v. City of Carmel" on Justia Law

Murphy was an inmate in the Illinois Vandalia Correctional Center when correctional officers hit him, fracturing his eye socket, and left him in a cell without medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law theories. The court reduced a jury award of damages to $307,733.82 and awarded attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, rejecting an argument that state-law sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims. The Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law claims against a state official or employee who has violated statutory or constitutional law. The court reversed and remanded the attorney fee award. Under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d), the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award, and the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage. Murphy then sought attorney fees for the appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition. Murphy’s only success on appeal came on a purely state-law issue affecting damages awarded only under state law; a section 1988(b) award is not appropriate for that work. Plaintiff has already won—in the district court—both damages and a fee award for all of his attorney’s successful efforts thus far under federal law. View "Murphy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Davis and Haslip entered a Kansas bank. Davis approached Ashenfelter, requesting change. Haslip approached Anderson’s window, drew a handgun, and demanded money. Davis told Ashenfelter to open the drawers at both teller stations. After Ashenfelter opened the teller drawers, Haslip directed the employees to get into the vault. Davis, according to Ashenfelter, “hung back a little bit.” Haslip closed the vault. The employees pressed an alarm. Haslip and Davis fled in a stolen car but were captured. Police recovered $13,000 and two handguns from the car. Davis proposed a jury instruction regarding liability for aiding and abetting Haslip’s use of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), requiring “knowledge that a gun would be carried or used.” The district court instead provided a general aiding and abetting instruction. Convicted, Davis was sentenced to 322 months’ imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed and his subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion was unsuccessful. The jury instruction was not raised on appeal or collateral attack. In 2014, the Supreme Court held that aiding and abetting in this context requires advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun. Davis sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that he did not have advance knowledge and that Haslip exploited his “diminished capacity.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Davis guilty of aiding and abetting. If a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed, the jury can infer that he had advance knowledge that the gun would be used. View "Davis v. Cross" on Justia Law

Alamo worked for the Chicago Fire Department. He alleges that in 2009, after a transfer, other firefighters began harassing him, calling him “spic” and “f--king Puerto Rican,” and stealing Alamo’s food. Alamo also alleges that the number of times he was assigned to work at different locations was excessive when compared to assignments given to non-Latino colleagues. His supervisor, Lieutenant Bliss, did not remedy the behavior. At one point, Alamo called 911 about a “chest bump” incident but did not press charges because of pressure from the Chief. The next day, Alamo experienced chest pain, dizziness, and a migraine. A physician diagnosed him with a work-related chest contusion, work-related stress, and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder and ordered medical leave. The Medical Section Chief stated the Department would not pay for treatment. After Alamo had been on medical leave for six months, he obtained written authorization to return to work without restrictions, but the Department required additional documentation. Alamo filed a charge with the EEOC. The Department continued to request additional records. Alamo filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and against Bliss, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims. The complaint describes an investigation into his fitness to work that was so onerous that it could not be completed in four months and sufficiently alleged retaliation. View "Alamo v. Bliss" on Justia Law

Facing the possibility of two life sentences, Schneider pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his minor daughter, 18 U.S.C. 2243(a)(1). The court warned Schneider five times that it could impose a sentence as high as 15 years’ imprisonment and that if the guidelines range turned out to be “closer to five years or above,” that, alone, would not be a reason for Schneider to withdraw his guilty plea. Schneider said he understood; the district court accepted his plea. After a change in appointed lawyers, Schneider unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea following the release of the PSR, which recommended that Schneider receive a five-level upward adjustment as a “repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.5. The district court sentenced him below the guidelines range to 96 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his plea was involuntary. Schneider filed a collateral challenge, arguing that his trial lawyer was ineffective for advising him that he met the statutory elements of the offense of sexual abuse of a minor and for not explaining that his prior conduct could be considered during sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, noting Schneider’s efforts to get his daughter to recant, and the testimony of his first attorney about his statements to Schneider. The district court’s findings on direct appeal are the law of the case; Schneider’s claims are implausible. View "Schneider v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and lived on a 400-acre estate and horse farm in Barrington Hills, Illinois, leasing the horse farm, “Horizon Farms,” to their company, Royalty Farms, LLC, which managed the farm’s operations. Their mortgage was foreclosed in 2013. The Forest Preserve District of Cook County bought the property at the foreclosure sale. Royalty Farms was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding, but the court entered a Dispossession Order, directing Plaintiff to vacate the property. The Forest Preserve District apparently tolerated the continued presence of several horses while plaintiff continued visiting the property daily to care for them. After nine months Plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted for criminal trespass. She was acquitted because the judge could not conclusively determine that she had been told not to enter the property. A year later she filed suit, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Regardless of whether Plaintiff entered the property as an employee of Royalty Farms, there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for criminal trespass; she acknowledged receiving an emailed warning and defying it and she was aware of the court order. View "Squires-Cannon v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County" on Justia Law

In 1992, Oaks was indicted in Illinois for the murder of his girlfriend’s three‐year‐old son. Oaks had no income or assets. His family provided $2,000 to retain an attorney, who asked for state funds for expert witnesses: an investigator, a forensic pathologist, a mitigation expert, and a psychiatrist. The court denied the request. The lawyer withdrew, asserting that the ruling made him unable to represent his client “in good conscience.” The court appointed a public defender. Oaks was convicted and sentenced to death. Oaks did not raise the choice of counsel in his direct appeal. Oaks first raised that issue in a pro se post‐conviction petition filed in state court and asserted that his appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. The court appointed post‐conviction counsel, who filed an amended petition that did not raise either the choice of counsel claim or the appellate counsel claim. The trial court then dismissed the petition as moot and lacking merit. Oaks filed a federal habeas petition, raising the choice of counsel issue and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel issues. The district court denied the petition. The court held and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that those claims had been procedurally defaulted and lacked merit. View "Oaks v. Pfister" on Justia Law