Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Winfield was convicted of attempted murder. On direct appeal and post-conviction review, the Illinois appellate courts rejected Winfield’s challenges to his conviction and 30-year prison sentence. By agreement of the parties, a federal district court later reviewed Winfield’s conviction under a less deferential standard than called for after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), and granted Winfield habeas relief. In a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the state then sought to reverse its concession that the pre-AEDPA standard applied, which the district court denied as waived. The state had previously agreed that the Illinois courts had not considered the merits of Winfield’s ineffective assistance claim, then changed its position. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing AEDPA case law and principles of state comity. The state’s original agreement that a pre-AEDPA standard of review applied did not, alone, necessarily amount to an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Although waiver may be appropriate for some defenses or arguments available under AEDPA, such as the statute of limitations, the same is not true section 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review. View "Winfield v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were white and Hispanic members of Chicago Mayor Daley’s protective services detail, Unit 542. Each held the rank of patrol officer but was assigned to the security-specialist position, and received a sergeant’s pay. Daley announced that he would not seek reelection. Rahm Emanuel began his mayoral campaign. Several police officers volunteered to provide campaign security. Emanuel was elected Mayor. Six of the volunteers were appointed to Emanuel’s transition detail. Emanuel told Interim Police Superintendent Hillard that his permanent detail should reflect the city's diversity and be “bare bones.” Hillard reduced the detail from 21 officers and two commanders to 16 officers and one commander and began his search with officers serving Daley. Hillard claimed that he relied on his command team’s recommendations. He selected five officers working on Emanuel’s transition detail. The final detail contained seven white, five Hispanic, and five black officers. The department reassigned Plaintiffs as patrol officers. Plaintiffs alleged patronage hiring in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983; violation of the “Shakman” consent decrees; race discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Equal Protection Clause (42 U.S.C. 1983) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. All of the claims were either dismissed or rejected at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence supported a finding that city officials did not consider political factors when appointing Emanuel’s detail and the court did not err in excluding evidence of historic discrimination. View "Houlihan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

While investigating a tip that illegal drugs were being sold from a south-side convenience store, Chicago Police Officer Brown sucker-punched a store employee for no apparent reason. As the dazed employee attempted to stagger away, Brown continued to beat and kick him for about two minutes. The beating was caught on the store’s surveillance camera. At his trial for willfully depriving the employee of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force inflicted by a law-enforcement officer, Brown sought to introduce expert testimony from a former Chicago police officer that Brown’s actions were consistent with departmental standards. The judge excluded the expert witness, reasoning that departmental policy was immaterial to the Fourth Amendment inquiry and that the expert’s proposed testimony might include an improper opinion about Brown’s state of mind. The jury found Brown guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Expert testimony about police standards may appropriately assist the jury in resolving some excessive-force questions, but sometimes evidence of this type is unhelpful and irrelevant, particularly when no specialized knowledge is needed to determine whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. The misconduct alleged here was easily within the grasp of a lay jury. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Hicks admitted to sexually molesting his former stepson, during a recorded phone call from a police station. During the call, before the confession, the victim repeatedly threatened to harm Hicks and to tell Hicks’s other minor son about the abuse. Hicks’s counsel played the entire recorded conversation to the jury. Later, the prosecutor referred to an earlier case in which Hicks had pleaded guilty after being accused of similar conduct. He asked the jury if it was “fair” that Hicks had been permitted to plea bargain to misdemeanors and receive probation and “Is that what should have happened here or should we deal with this?” Hicks’s counsel did not object. Hicks was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. After a failed state collateral challenge, he sought federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the state court unreasonably determined that Hicks’s counsel was credible when he testified that Hicks told him that he did not feel threatened during the call, Hicks did not suffer prejudice from the tape’s admission, because the other evidence of his guilt was sufficient to sustain his conviction. The court stated that it was “very troubled by the state court’s finding” regarding the prosecutor’s statements and defense counsel’s failure to object, but Hicks did not fairly present that claim to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and procedurally defaulted on the claim for relief. View "Hicks v. Hepp" on Justia Law

In 1998, Dr. Wilson’s terminally ill patient was within hours of death. He was in pain and suffocating. Wilson concluded that the only possible palliation was unconsciousness. As Wilson was injecting a drug, the patient’s heart stopped. The coroner classified the death as murder. The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation summarily suspended Wilson’s medical license. The Department held a hearing in 2000. The coroner’s finding of homicide had been withdrawn; Wilson was not charged. His license was nonetheless suspended for five years. He sued in state and federal courts. Rather than staying proceedings, the federal court dismissed. Four times a state judge vacated the suspension. The Department reinstated its decision three times. Without a new hearing or explanation, the Department entered a new five-year suspension in 2007, and another in 2013. In 2014, the state court held that Wilson should not have been suspended for even one day. The Department did not reinstate Wilson’s license because he had not practiced during the last 17 years. In 2014 Wilson sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations had been running since 1998. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A federal challenge to a state administrative agency decision is not subject to an exhaustion-of-remedies rule but a claim never accrues until the plaintiff “has a complete and present cause of action”. The court noted the district court’s 1999 holding that Wilson could not litigate in federal court while state proceedings were ongoing; his section 1983 claim for damages did not accrue until 2014. View "Wilson v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

At 1:10 p.m. on March 12, 2009, Mordi, a Nigerian student at Southern Illinois University, and a passenger were traveling on Interstate 57. An Illinois state police car, driven by Trooper Zeigler, signaled for Mordi to pull over. Mordi complied. Zeigler approached and asked why the license plate was inside the windshield and stated that the car’s hood was not closed all the way. Zeigler asked Mordi about an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in a misdemeanor marijuana case. After issuing a warning citation, Zeigler asked Mordi if he could search the car; Mordi said no. About 20 minutes into the stop, Zeigler radioed for a drug‐sniffing dog, which arrived 10 minutes later and alerted. The officers found crack cocaine in Mordi’s bag in the back seat. Mordi pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute the cocaine and is serving a 120‐month sentence. In 2012, Mordi filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court screened Mordi’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and dismissed all claims except those against three officers, which relied on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Seventh Circuit held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. The district court dismissed all claims against all parties and denied a motion to reconsider its section 1915A order. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Mordi’s Fourth Amendment claims that the officers engaged in impermissible racial profiling and unlawfully prolonged the stop may proceed. View "Mordi v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

The University of Indiana South Bend employed Professor Grant, an African-American, in 1999. In 2008, several students complained to University administration that Grant inappropriately canceled classes, used obscene language in class, dismissed two students from his course without following proper procedure, and had permitted a nonemployee to grade student work and access academic records. During an investigation, Grant filed affirmative action complaints against the investigators. Students went to the South Bend Tribune with their concerns. The investigation uncovered discrepancies in Grant’s work history. The University dismissed then-tenured Professor Grant in 2011 for “serious misconduct” based on misrepresentations in his curriculum vitae. The district court rejected all of Grant’s 26 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Grant’s claims that the University: discriminated against him on the basis of race; retaliated against him for his complaints against two University officials; denied him due process of law; defamed him in the South Bend Tribune; and breached a contract created by the University’s handbook. View "Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University" on Justia Law

While Governor Scott Walker was making controversial changes to Wisconsin’s public union laws, Archer drafted the law and advocated its passage. At the same time, the Milwaukee County State’s Attorney’s Office was investigating allegations of misconduct against Archer and several of the governor’s close associates, concerning missing charitable funds, using Wisconsin’s unique “John Doe” procedure, which permits the prosecutor, under the supervision and direction of a judge, to conduct a secret investigation, Wis. Stat. 968.26. Archer alleges that she was targeted because of her work on the union bill and her affiliation with Governor Walker. Although Archer was never charged with wrongdoing, she filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against prosecutors and members of the investigative team. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, citing qualified immunity. The warrant was valid and Archer stated no claim about the execution of the search; officers may detain the occupants of a location to be searched when they execute a valid warrant if they have a valid reason for doing so. There is no clearly established rule of law under which an official pursuing a lawful investigation, based on probable cause, has been found liable under the First Amendment. View "Archer v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

In November 2012, Freedom hired Reed, an African-American, as a Broker Liaison, reporting to Bidstrup and Sperry (both white). The regular hours for the Downers Grove office were 8 a.m.-5 p.m.. Some employees worked other schedules with permission or to accommodate accounts in other time zones. Freedom’s attendance policy stated that seven absences, late arrivals, or early departures in a 12-month period could trigger disciplinary action, including termination. In January 2013, Bidstrup sent an email to all employees, reiterating that policy; days later she verbally warned Reed about violating the policy. Days later, Bidstrup issued a written warning after Reed arrived at 9:30 a.m. From February 14-April 1, Reed was absent at least eight days. From March 6-April 10, he clocked in late 11 times. On April 9, Bidstrup sent another reminder email. Reed continued to violate the attendance policy. Other employees complained about covering Reed’s work, Reed unsuccessfully applied for an Underwriter position and was denied opportunities to work from home. In 2013, a decline in business prompted a reduction in force across the country. Reed was terminated because of his attendance and disciplinary history; he had less seniority than others in the office. The remaining Liaisons were eventually terminated; no replacements were hired. The office closed in 2014. Reed sued under the Illinois Human Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Freedom. Reed had no evidence that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated non-African-Americans, failed to show that the denials of his request to work from home and of promotion were adverse employment actions, and could not prove hostile work environment. View "Reed v. Freedom Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Around 8:30 p.m., Milwaukee officers responded to a complaint by a store employee that a Mercury Grand Marquis drove around the store’s parking lot five times. Officer Newport believed this was consistent with preparation for a robbery. He knew that this store had been robbed recently, with firearms. The store closed at 9 p.m. and would soon be empty. Newport observed a Mercury Marquis about 30 feet from the store's entrance, parked next to a Chevrolet Malibu, driven by Green. Newport claims, and Green disputes, that Lindsey, the Marquis driver, stood next to the Malibu's front passenger door, leaned inside, and stood back up. Newport suspected that Lindsey had concealed a weapon. The officers told the men to put up their hands and directed Green to exit the vehicle. Newport claims, and Green disputes, that Green exited with his right arm kept tight to his body while his left swung freely and that after asking Green to raise his arms, Green raised only his left arm. Newport grabbed Green’s wrist but Green resisted. Newport proceeded to pat him down and discovered a handgun in Green’s waistband. Green sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The court ruled that the investigatory stop violated a clearly established constitutional right, and denied qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Newport had a plausible reason to suspect that Green was armed and dangerous. View "Green v. Newport" on Justia Law