Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Dearborn pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846.. In 2015, the Seventh Circuit remanded for correction of certain conditions of supervised release. In a second appeal, Dearborn argued that during resentencing the court should have reconsidered its earlier denial of a motion to suppress evidence. He claimed that, in describing the investigation in the search warrant application, the officer did not inform the warrant judge that one of the controlled buys might have occurred one day later than specified in the search warrant application; the police might have used an unduly suggestive procedure in obtaining an identification of Dearborn from an informant; the informants had criminal histories and received compensation for helping the police; and certain audio and video recordings referred to in the application were of poor quality. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Dearborn waived that argument. The court noted that Dearborn did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea and that his arguments “could have been raised earlier” and were irrelevant to the re-sentencing proceedings. Dearborn has not shown that extraordinary circumstances required the district court to reconsider its earlier denial of a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Dearborn" on Justia Law

Cook County criminal defendants could secure pretrial release on personal recognizance; execution of a full deposit bail bond, to be fully returned upon performance of the bond conditions; or execution of a 10% bail bond, 10% of which (the Fee) was retained by the state upon performance of the bond conditions (725 ILCS 5/110-7). In 2014, Platt was arrested and charged with murder. His bail amount was $2 million. Platt executed a bail bond of $200,000. After Platt’s acquittal, the Clerk returned $180,000—his 10% deposit less the 10% Fee of $20,000. In 2015, Illinois amended section 5/110-7 to cap the Fee at $100 in Cook County, effective January 1, 2016. The return of Platt’s bail deposit depended upon the satisfaction of his bond conditions, not upon his acquittal. Platt sued on behalf of a putative class of individuals who paid a Fee of more than $100 during five years preceding January 1, 2016, alleging that retention of the Fee: violated their due process rights, having no rational relationship to the cost incurred in administering bail bonds; violated their equal protection rights; violated the Illinois Constitution uniformity clause; and constituted unjust enrichment. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that Platt did not challenge the process by which the Fee was imposed and alleged only disparate impact, not unequal treatment. The Fee bore a relationship to legitimate governmental interests. View "Platt v. Brown" on Justia Law

King worked for many years in Ford’s vehicle assembly plants. She claims that after transferring to Ford’s Chicago plant in 2010, she was sexually harassed by a supervisor, after which she was reassigned to less desirable tasks, missing out on overtime, and receiving unwarranted discipline. King was fired in 2013 after missing several weeks of work for medical reasons that Ford claims she did not properly document. King sued, asserting sexual harassment and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615, interference, and that Ford retaliated against her for her complaints of sexual harassment and taking FMLA leave, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐2. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of her claims on summary judgment. King argued that she never received the right‐to‐sue letter, so the 90‐day limitations period never began to run, but admitted that she failed to keep the EEOC apprised of her mailing address. With respect to her FMLA claim, the court noted that King did not establish she actually worked at least 1,250 hours in the preceding year. As to her Title VII claim, King’s protected activity consists of her March 2012 EEOC charge and her internal complaints of harassment, the last of which was a call to the anti‐harassment hotline in April 2012; the adverse action on which King focused was her April 2013 firing. View "King v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Consolino is a Cook County Sheriff’s Office correctional officer and a Marine Reservist counterintelligence specialist. Beginning in 1999, Consolino was assigned to the Boot Camp, an alternative sentencing program for non-violent inmates. Consolino’s wife, Trzos, also worked at the Boot Camp, as an administrative assistant. Trzos filed a Shakman complaint that went to arbitration in 2012, asserting that she was transferred for political reasons. Shakman refers to consent decrees entered in an Illinois case challenging government "patronage" employment practices. Consolino testified on his wife's behalf. An arbitrator denied her claims. Around the same time, Consolino was seeking a two-year assignment to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. Based on a mistaken belief that Consolino had been approved for an open position, the FBI sent specifically requested Consolino for the task force. Consolino was subsequently told that the FBI rescinded its offer for failure to follow protocol. Consolino checked with the FBI and requested clarification from the Sheriff’s Office. Receiving no response, Consolino filed a complaint. An Assistant State’s Attorney ultimately concluded that Consolino’s complaint of retaliation was not well-founded. Seven months later, Consolino was reassigned to the jail. Consolino filed suit, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected speech because he testified in his wife’s hearing and later filed a grievance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Consolino produced no evidence that the defendants were personally involved in his transfer or aware of his testimony. View "Consolino v. Towne" on Justia Law

Interstate 90 runs through Campbell, Wisconsin, with a speed limit of 65 miles per hour. Two streets and one pedestrian overpass cross the highway within the town. A traffic survey in 2008 found that 23,000-29,000 trucks and cars pass through the town on I-90 every day. The local Tea Party placed banners on the pedestrian overpass, bearing messages such as “HONK TO IMPEACH OBAMA,” leading the town to enact an ordinance forbidding all signs, flags, and banners (other than traffic-control information) on any of the overpasses, or within 100 feet of the end of those structures. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to the challenge to the 100-foot buffer zone but otherwise affirmed. The ordinance is content-neutral; it does not matter what message any privately placed sign bears. It is a time, place, and manner limit, permitting messages to be conveyed anywhere else in Campbell. A “state or local legislature that attempts to reduce the incidence of sudden braking on a superhighway cannot be thought to be acting irrationally or trying to suppress speech for no good reason.” The town did not try to justify the buffer zone. View "Luce v. Town of Campbell, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Faucett possessed large quantities of child pornography, including 59 sexually explicit photos of his five-year-old granddaughter that he took while she was sleeping. When investigators found the collection on his computer, he initially denied knowledge of it. He later confessed. Faucett pleaded guilty to producing and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B). His presentence report detailed his alcoholism and mental-health issues, including ADHD, insomnia, depression, and anxiety. When he took the pictures of his granddaughter, he had active prescriptions for Adderall (for ADHD) and Paxil (an antidepressant). The defense strategy was acceptance of responsibility. He is serving a 30-year prison term. In a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, he claimed that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him that involuntary intoxication was an available defense and at least should have developed an argument about diminished capacity as a mitigating factor. The district judge denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that neither defense strategy would have had any chance of success. The Seventh Circuit affirmed without addressing whether involuntary intoxication is an available defense in a case like this one. Faucett did not articulate a viable factual basis for the defense even if it would apply. Nor was his counsel constitutionally ineffective for not arguing diminished capacity as a mitigating factor at sentencing. View "Faucett v. United States" on Justia Law

After his arrest, Perry stated that he suffered from seizures as a result of a previous head injury, that his seizures were treated with medication, and that he had not taken his medication. He was placed in a “bullpen” and, 12 hours later, suffered a seizure and was transported to the hospital. After he returned to the jail, the city failed to provide Perry with medical care although he displayed signs of deteriorating health. He was shackled and had a spit mask placed over his face. Officers ignored his cries for help and complaints that he could not breathe and transferred him to the county facility, where nurses decided that Perry was medically unfit to be booked, but provided no medical care and failed to remove the mask, which was seeping blood. When a nurse removed the mask, Perry was not breathing. Despite emergency efforts, Perry died less than 24 hours after his arrest. On summary judgment, the district court rejected his family’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and a Monell claim, alleging that the city had a de facto policy of failing to investigate in-custody deaths and ignoring detainees' medical complaints. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part; the evidence, which includes surveillance footage, would permit a jury to grant relief on the section 1983 claims. Rejecting claims of qualified immunity, the court stated that it was clearly established that a detainee was entitled to objectively reasonable medical care. View "Estate of Perry v. Wenzel" on Justia Law

Orlowski, a 21-year-old inmate, was asleep in his bunk. At 12:28 a.m. and 1:36 a.m. dorm supervisor Alexander patrolled and did not notice anything unusual. Sergeant Manns toured the dorm and did not note anything unusual. At 3:45 a.m., Alexander began awakening inmates for kitchen duty. Alexander saw Orlowski breathing abnormally, making noises, and “his body would make sudden moves.” Green, another inmate, persisted in voicing concern about Orlowski and was put in the “hole.” Alexander thought that Orlowski might have a sleep disorder. Despite efforts to wake him up, Orlowski remained unresponsive. Alexander left him but noted the situation in the logbook and called Manns. Manns denies that Alexander gave him all the information. Orlowski did not wake up for breakfast. At 4:35 a.m., Corrections Manager Ertman read Alexander’s log entry and saw Orlowski. Alexander observed Orlowski at 4:55 a.m. and at 5:48 a.m. At 6:10 a.m., the inmates returned from breakfast. Alexander heard someone shouting “man down!” Alexander called a medical emergency. Orlowski was pronounced dead at 6:54 a.m. He died from a methadone overdose, caused by pills purchased from another inmate. According to medical experts, Orlowski would have fully recovered if he had received medical care between 3:45 and 5:48 a.m. The district court rejected all claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the Eighth Amendment claim. There is a material dispute of fact as to whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Orlowski’s severe medical condition. The court affirmed rejection of a substantive due process claim; there is no evidence that defendants intentionally interfered in plaintiff’s familial relationship. View "Orlowski v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Monroe worked for the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) for more than 21 years. His job involved cleaning up human remains after traffic accidents; he witnessed a co‐worker die after a work‐related accident. He had served in combat in the Gulf War, and, in 2012 Monroe’s sister, who lived with him, died of cancer. Monroe also worked a second job In December 2012, Monroe told his supervisor, George, that he was stressed, burned out, could not sleep, and wanted to be transferred to the day shift. After two requests, he was told that no position was available. In 2013, after Monroe’s subordinates complained to George about Monroe, Monroe disclosed that recently he had been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Although Monroe had received performance reviews indicating that he “exceeded expectations” as late as January 2013, INDOT discharged Monroe for creating a hostile and intimidating work environment. Monroe alleged that he was terminated “on the basis of” his mental disability in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact that INDOT’s proffered reason for discharging him was pretextual or that INDOT treated similarly situated non‐disabled employees more favorably. View "Monroe v. Indiana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police received a tip that a residence was being used as a drug house and secured a no-knock warrant. Entering, the officers saw Lee, beside a table holding a digital scale, a razor blade, sandwich baggies, a cell phone, $157 in cash, and a baggie containing 5.7 grams of cocaine. Officers searched Lee and found $582 and the house keys. Officers recovered two larger bags of cocaine, a loaded handgun, and latex gloves from other parts of the house. Lee claimed to be an innocent bystander, at the house was to help his brother move. Lee was convicted of drug crimes but acquitted of a firearm charge. Lee moved for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve objections, adequately cross-examine witnesses, and develop factual points at trial. Applying the Strickland standard, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Lee’s claim for lack of prejudice, explicitly addressing all but one of Lee’s complaints. Lee unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Under Supreme Court precedent, when a state court rejects a prisoner’s federal claim without discussion, a federal habeas court must presume that the court adjudicated it on the merits unless some state-law procedural principle indicates otherwise, even when the decision expressly addresses some but not all of a prisoner’s claims. Lee did not rebut the presumption, so the state court’s entire decision is subject to deferential review. The Wisconsin court reasonably applied Strickland. View "Lee v. Avila" on Justia Law