Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In July 2013, Brown was sentenced to 300 days’ imprisonment for violating the terms of his probation. The Illinois circuit court specifically stated that Brown should be released in September 2013, after accounting for good‐time credit. In August 2013, Cook County Jail personnel informed Brown that he would not be released until March. In September 2013, Brown filed a state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but jail staff allegedly failed to transport him to court. On December 16, 2013, the petition was finally heard. The court determined Brown should have been released in September and immediately released him on a $50,000 bond. In January 2014, the court released the bond. Brown filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, alleging violations of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments based on false imprisonment and inhumane conditions and a violation of Illinois state law based on false imprisonment. The district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because Brown was released from prison more than two years before he filed his claim, the suit was time-barred. The court rejected Brown's claim that the time he spent released on bond was a continuation of the false imprisonment View "Brown v. Dart" on Justia Law

Robinson, an Illinois inmate, alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that Pontiac Correctional Center guards beat him and taunted him with racial slurs as punishment for filing grievances. The district court dismissed, reasoning that some of Robinson’s allegations about the altercation conflicted with his disciplinary conviction for assaulting the guards. The court recognized that Robinson’s suit would not be barred if he argued that the guards used more force than was reasonably necessary to subdue him, but concluded that Robinson “plead[ed] himself out of court” by insisting that he did nothing to provoke the beating. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the district court abused its discretion in declining to recruit counsel for Robinson. Though there is no automatic right to recruitment of counsel in civil cases, a pro se litigant’s requests for counsel are entitled to careful consideration. The district court found that Robinson made reasonable efforts to obtain counsel. Robinson stated that he has only an eighth-grade education and stays “heavily medicated” with psychotropic drugs but the district court did not address or conclude that it disbelieved Robinson’s explanation that another inmate helped him draft the documents that the court looked to for evidence of his capacity to litigate. View "Robinson v. Scrogum" on Justia Law

After being asked to leave a party, Adorno shot a gun into the crowd. During voir dire, the judge stated: Illinois does not define reasonable doubt, but any of you who may have sat on a civil jury there’s a preponderance of the evidence, reasonable doubt is the highest burden of proof in our country and in our [s]tate. Those of you who may have sat on civil cases, preponderance of the evidence, if you look at this like a scale, all you have to do is tilt it. So the definition of preponderance of the evidence is, it’s more likely than not that the event occurred. Again, Illinois doesn’t define reasonable doubt. That’s up for you to decide in words, but in analogy to the scale thing, you would have to tip it like this. Adorno was convicted of attempted murder. On appeal, Adorno argued that the impromptu statement invited the jury to convict on less than the reasonable-doubt burden of proof. The Illinois Court of Appeals rejected the claim without reference to federal law. Adorno sought federal habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed a grant of relief. Even if the “Richter presumption” that the state court adjudicated the federal claim does not apply and de novo review is applied, Adorno’s claim fails. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted him on less than the reasonable-doubt standard. View "Adorno v. Melvin" on Justia Law

The Cosgriffs reside in South Beloit, Roscoe Township, Winnebago County, Illinois. They installed a $50,000 pool at their home. When township employees came to the home to reassess its property value after the pool addition, one of the Cosgriffs’ dogs bit one of the employees. That employee and Roscoe Township sued the Cosgriffs. The Cosgriffs started a petition campaign encouraging taxpayers to notify the township that its employees should not trespass on private property. The Cosgriffs’ next property assessment was significantly higher than their last. The Cosgriffs challenged the increased assessment before the Winnebago County Board of Review, which ruled in favor of the Cosgriffs and substantially reduced the assessment. The Cosgriffs then sued Winnebago County and individual defendants, alleging that the defendants acted unconstitutionally when they increased the Cosgriffs’ property assessment because the Cosgriffs spoke out against township employees trespassing on private property. The district court dismissed the Cosgriffs’ 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, reasoning that comity principles barred federal courts from hearing these claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because the Cosgriffs challenge the administration of a local tax system under section 1983, their claims fall outside the scope of the statute. Available state remedies are plain, adequate, and complete. View "Cosgriff v. Winnebago County" on Justia Law

Marybeth Lauderdale served as acting superintendent and superintendent for the Illinois School for the Deaf (ISD), 2006-2010. During her last year as superintendent, she was paid a total of $88,048. Reggie Clinton was superintendent for the School for the Visually Impaired (ISVI), 1998-2003 and again, 2008-2010. When Clinton returned to ISVI in 2008, he received a 1.9% salary increase from his most recent salary at the Arcola School District. He was paid, at the end of his tenure at ISVI, $121,116 per year. After Clinton resigned, the Illinois Department of Human Services, which oversees ISD and ISVI, created one combined superintendent role to cover both schools and offered Lauderdale the role. Lauderdale wanted to be paid as much or more than Clinton had been paid but eventually accepted a salary of $106,500. Lauderdale sued, alleging sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court concluded no reasonable juror could find the pay discrepancy was a product of sex discrimination and that the discrepancy resulted from budget concerns and from the application of the Illinois Pay Plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record indicated that the pay discrepancy was not based on sex. View "Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Marybeth Lauderdale served as acting superintendent and superintendent for the Illinois School for the Deaf (ISD), 2006-2010. During her last year as superintendent, she was paid a total of $88,048. Reggie Clinton was superintendent for the School for the Visually Impaired (ISVI), 1998-2003 and again, 2008-2010. When Clinton returned to ISVI in 2008, he received a 1.9% salary increase from his most recent salary at the Arcola School District. He was paid, at the end of his tenure at ISVI, $121,116 per year. After Clinton resigned, the Illinois Department of Human Services, which oversees ISD and ISVI, created one combined superintendent role to cover both schools and offered Lauderdale the role. Lauderdale wanted to be paid as much or more than Clinton had been paid but eventually accepted a salary of $106,500. Lauderdale sued, alleging sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court concluded no reasonable juror could find the pay discrepancy was a product of sex discrimination and that the discrepancy resulted from budget concerns and from the application of the Illinois Pay Plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record indicated that the pay discrepancy was not based on sex. View "Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Frentz, a long-time alcoholic who was taking medication to deal with delirium tremens, was arrested for the murder of his housemate. He claimed to be suffering hallucinations and filed notice that he would pursue a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. After consulting with an expert, his attorney did not pursue the defense. Frentz was convicted of the murder and associated drug charges. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed. His state postconviction petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing the insanity defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his petition. Frentz sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Indiana court did not unreasonably apply federal law in denying Frentz’s postconviction petition. Counsel’s decisions were consistent with researching and deciding for strategic reasons not to pursue the insanity defense: Frentz changed his story several times, suggesting attempts to fabricate a cover story, rather than confusion or an inability to remember what had happened. The testimony of jailhouse informants, if credited, indicated a callous disregard for the victim's life and suggested that Frentz had attempted to conceal his crime, beginning almost immediately after the shooting when he reportedly drove his truck up and down the road (as corroborated by other witnesses). A jury could have relied on this evidence in disbelieving any claim of mental incapacity. View "Frentz v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2008, Yeoman attempted to fire a gun during an attempted robbery. He was apprehended minutes later. Yeoman pled “no contest” to attempted first-degree intentional homicide and is serving a 25-year sentence in a Wisconsin prison. On appeal he argued that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Yeoman’s car, that the officers failed to honor Yeoman’s invocation of his right to remain silent, and that the searches of his car and his person were unreasonable. Before filing his federal petition for habeas corpus relief, he exhausted some but not all of his claims in the Wisconsin courts. In state habeas proceedings, he had not raised claims that his post‐conviction lawyer was ineffective. In federal district court, Yeoman requested a stay, to hold his petition in abeyance so that he could return to state court and exhaust his remedies there. The court declined to enter the stay after concluding that Yeoman lacked good cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that, although Yeoman’s claims were not plainly meritless, and he had not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay, Yeoman’s strategic decision, based on a misapprehension of the law, did not constitute good cause for failure to exhaust. View "Yeoman v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Golla, who has a law degree, alleged, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the Office of the Chief Judge engaged in intentional reverse racial discrimination by paying Taylor, an African‐American male, a significantly higher salary than Golla, a white male, despite working in the same department and performing the same duties under essentially the same title. Golla started working in the Office in 1983. He was fired in 1995 but reinstated 10 months after he filed a complaint with the EEOC. Under a settlement agreement, Golla was reinstated at a pay position and title, Law Clerk I, which he retained until he resigned in 2013. When asked during his deposition whether anyone in the workplace made racial comments toward him, Golla answered, "nothing direct racial." He claimed his African-American supervisor made comments that were demeaning. The district court rejected Golla’s claim, finding no direct evidence of reverse racial discrimination that resulted in the pay disparity and that Golla failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination under the indirect method of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence as a whole was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Golla was paid at a lower pay grade than Taylor because of his race View "Golla v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County" on Justia Law

Around 9:00 p.m., as Mr. White was escorting guests outside, an unknown teenager (Hyles) charged uninvited into the White family’s Chicago home. Minutes later, police officers who were chasing Hyles pushed past White and followed Hyles into the house with guns drawn. White either fell or was pushed down. Officers found Hyles huddled in a basement room and arrested him, but they did not leave the house. Instead, they searched the house. Police claim that Mrs. White signed a consent; she claims she thought she was signing a complaint for trespass. The Whites sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages related to the entry and search of their home. After a trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the officers on three claims. The jury ruled for the defendants on the remaining four claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s credibility determinations concerning whether GPS data supported the police account of the incidents. While finding the admission of the transcript of Hyles’s guilty‐plea proceedings “unusual,” to establish the factual events that supported probable cause, the court noted that the Whites invited error by insisting that the entire transcript be read. View "White v. Hefel" on Justia Law