Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Williams was charged with two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank robbery, section 2113(a), (d); and three counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of those crimes, section 924(c). On the firearm counts alone, he faced a statutory minimum of 57 years in prison. The government offered a plea deal that would reduce his sentencing exposure by more than 39 years. After sending the terms to Williams’s attorney, the prosecutor emailed the proposal to Judge McCuskey pursuant to the judge’s standard practice. The judge replied by email, stating that the deal was “exceedingly fair” and “[o]nly a fool would refuse.” Williams pleaded guilty. The judge sentenced him to 18 years in prison pursuant to the agreement. A year later Williams moved to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that the judge impermissibly participated in plea negotiations in violation of FRCP 11(c)(1) and the Due Process Clause. He alleged ineffective assistance based on his lawyer’s failure to raise that violation and request recusal. A new judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 11(c)(1) forbids any judicial participation in plea negotiations, but this violation was harmless. That Williams would not have taken the plea deal but for the judge’s email is “not remotely plausible.” The government’s case was rock solid and the plea deal substantially reduced Williams’s prison exposure. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Owens, an Illinois prisoner, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that 43 prison employees and the Illinois Department of Corrections obstructed his access to courts in violation of the First Amendment. Owens alleges that at four different correctional facilities, over the course of seven years, he had insufficient access to the law library and his excess legal storage boxes, was unable to send mail required to prosecute his cases, and was denied supplies. The district judge dismissed several claims and defendants and later entered summary judgment for the remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Owens’s strongest claim for relief, that prison officials declined to advance him funds for legal mail in 2006-2010. was untimely. The court noted that “Owens—no stranger to the courts in this circuit—again filed an omnibus complaint against unrelated defendants and with claims arising from alleged conduct at four different prisons. As we have told him before, this scattershot strategy is unacceptable under Rule 20(a)(2) … and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b), (g).” View "Owens v. Evans" on Justia Law

Freeman, charged in Illinois state court with kidnapping and murder, moved to proceed pro se although the state had announced its intent to seek the death penalty. The judge denied his request, finding that he did not possess the necessary experience and abilities. Freeman proceeded to trial with the public defender and was convicted. While acknowledging that the right to self-representation cannot be denied based on limited education and legal abilities, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial, finding that Freeman's request was not unequivocal. The Seventh Circuit granted Freeman’s habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court holdings were contrary to and unreasonable applications of the Supreme Court’s 1975 holding, Faretta v. California. A judge’s inquiries into a defendant’s technical legal knowledge are not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to defend himself. Nothing in the record indicates Freeman took vacillating positions on his desire to represent himself. Neither a request to proceed pro se that is accompanied by a request to appoint standby counsel nor dissatisfaction with counsel makes a self-representation request equivocal. It was improper for the court to require Freeman to justify why he wished to proceed pro se beyond what he had explained in his motion. View "Freeman v. Pierce" on Justia Law

In 2010, before her baby was born, Sebesta had both physical problems and a psychotic break. She had a history of mental illness. A hospital social worker harbored concerns about Sebesta’s ability to care properly for her newborn daughter and contacted the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which conducted an investigation. Although DCFS employees pressured Sebesta to accept certain at-home services, they never removed Sebesta’s daughter from her custody. A year later, Sebesta brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state common law, accusing the medical and DCFS defendants of violating her federal substantive due process right to familial integrity, by their acts of reporting, investigating, and “indicating” her. She also claimed invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Neither the hospital worker nor the DCFS employees stepped over any constitutional line. They reasonably dealt with a sensitive situation in which they had to decide what would serve the child’s best interest. View "Sebesta v. Davis" on Justia Law

Arun Gopalratnam purchased an HP laptop computer that contained a DynaPack battery pack with Samsung lithium-ion battery cells. Months later, the Menomonee Falls Fire Department responded to a major fire in a basement bedroom of the Gopalratnam’s home. After the fire was extinguished, firefighters discovered Arun deceased on the floor of the room. Am autopsy classified smoke inhalation as the cause of death, with no evidence of pre-fire injury or disease, and no drugs or alcohol in Arun’s system. Special Agent Martinez concluded that the fire originated in the basement bedroom where Arun’s body was located. Martinez excluded multiple potential sources of the blaze (electrical and gas meters, electrical distribution panels, gas-fueled furnaces, electrical plugs, light switch, and ceiling light fixture) but could not ascertain the fire’s ultimate cause. He did not eliminate a possible mattress fire. The remains of Arun’s HP laptop, cell phone, and the laptop battery cells, were in the debris. In the Gopalratnams’ suit, alleging negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty, the plaintiffs claimed that a defective battery cell in Arun’s laptop caused the fire. The district court granted motions to exclude plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on causation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court applied the proper legal standard: The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. The experts failed to account for other possible explanations. View "Gopalratnam v. ABC Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, Perry pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, based on his prior convictions for attempted murder and attempted armed robbery. The career offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a), used a definition of a “crime of violence” that included a “residual clause” that mirrored the “violent felony” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Perry challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2017, however, the Supreme Court rejected such challenges because the Guidelines are only advisory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Perry’s argument that the law of the Seventh Circuit did not make the Guidelines sufficiently advisory in 2007. Courts are free to reject the Guidelines based on sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Once the Supreme Court declared the Guidelines advisory, they remained advisory notwithstanding some erroneous applications in the district and circuit courts. Appellate courts cannot change constitutional law established by the holdings of the Supreme Court. If Perry believed he was sentenced under a mandatory guidelines regime contrary to Supreme Court precedent, he could have appealed. View "Perry v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Morgan Stanely in a civil rights action. Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated on the basis of her sex and that Morgan Stanley allowed her coworkers to create a hostile work environment. The court held that plaintiff was not entitled to a trial on her discrimination claim because she presented no evidence that her sex influenced the decision to terminate her and she presented no evidence of discrimination based on the cat's paw theory. The court also held that plaintiff was not entitled to a trial on her hostile work environment claim because the statute of limitations restricted the allegations that the court could consider as part of her claim and the remaining conduct did not create a hostile work environment. View "Milligan-Grimstad v. Morgan Stanley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Jewish inmates at prisons operated by the Indiana Department of Corrections, were transferred from one DOC facility to another (Wabash Valley) in order to maintain a kosher diet. Plaintiffs allege that Liebel, the DOC Director of Religious and Volunteer Services, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by failing to delay that transfer until the new facility offered opportunities for Jewish group worship and study. At the time of the transfer, the DOC was unable to recruit Jewish volunteers to Wabash Valley to lead worship or train inmate leaders. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Liebel summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Liebel did not violate clearly established law. Plaintiffs cited no case holding that the Free Exercise Clause provides prisoners the right to group worship when outside volunteers were unavailable to lead or train inmates or holding that a prison official violates the Free Exercise Clause by transferring inmates to a facility that does not provide congregate worship and study, or by failing to delay a transfer until the new facility provides congregate worship and study. View "Kemp v. Liebel" on Justia Law

Brothers Daniel and John operated companies that offered remodeling services in Chicago. Through subcontractors, they performed legitimate work for clients who paid in cash, but they padded their profits by duping elderly, unsophisticated homeowners into refinancing their homes to pay substantial sums for work they never intended to finish. The Circuit Court of Cook County permanently enjoined both John and a company the brothers owned from engaging in home-repair in Chicago; the brothers circumvented the injunction by creating a new company and installing an employee as its nominal president. They falsified contracts to hide their fraudulent activity. The brothers were convicted of wire fraud and each was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed their sentences in 2014. They filed separate pro se collateral challenges under 28 U.S.C. 2255, each contending that their attorneys were constitutionally ineffective. The district judge denied both section 2255 motions without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit granted Daniel a certificate of appealability, then rejected his claims that his attorneys rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to raise a “Batson” objection to the exclusion of potential jurors based on race and hire an expert witness to testify about the amount of loss attributable to Daniel for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "Sullivan v. United States" on Justia Law

Halbach disappeared in 2005. Her family contacted police. Officers focused on Avery Auto Salvage in Two Rivers, Wisconsin, the last place she was known to have visited. Avery, who lived on the property, had called Auto Trader magazine, for whom Halbach worked, to request that she photograph a minivan that he wished to sell. The police suspected that Avery’s 16‐year‐old nephew, Dassey, who also lived on the property, might have information about Halbach and called Dassey into the police station. After many hours of interrogation over several days, Dassey confessed that he, with Avery, had raped and murdered Halbach and burned her body. Before trial, Dassey recanted. There was no physical evidence linking him to the crime. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. After unsuccessful state appeals and post‐conviction proceedings, Dassey sought federal habeas relief, claiming that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel and that his confession was not voluntary. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed the district court in granting relief. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The state courts’ finding that Dassey’s confession was voluntary was not beyond fair debate, but was reasonable. View "Dassey v. Dittmann" on Justia Law