Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Haze was ticketed for disorderly conduct after he clashed with Milwaukee Police Officer Kubicek outside the Bradley Center on the night of a Bucks game. Kubicek suspected that Haze was involved in scalping and was intoxicated. Haze successfully contested the ticket, then sued Kubicek for damages alleging that the officer unlawfully stopped him, falsely arrested him, used excessive force, and targeted him based on his race. After a two-day trial, a jury found that the stop was unlawful (because it was not supported by adequate suspicion) but was not the proximate cause of any compensable injury and exonerated Kubicek on the other counts. The judge awarded $1 in nominal damages for the unlawful stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Haze’s argument that he was entitled to summary judgment on his claim for false arrest was procedurally foreclosed. Rejecting an argument that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, the court stated that the lawfulness of the stop and the lawfulness of the officer’s use of force were distinct inquiries subject to different legal tests; an unlawful stop does not make an officer’s later use of force per se unreasonable. The jury’s verdict was vindication enough on the unlawful-stop claim. View "Haze v. Kubicek" on Justia Law

In 1995, fire consumed Bunch’s home, killing her three-year-old son. Kinard, an ATF forensic chemist analyzed samples from the house; his draft report stated that no accelerants were present where the Indiana Fire Marshal’s investigators thought the fire had begun (the boy’s bedroom and the living room). Although samples from other spots tested positive for heavy petroleum distillates, Kinard concluded that these results were “consistent with the presence of kerosene, for which there was an innocent explanation.” Bunch alleges that the investigators communicated their disappointment to Kinard, who agreed to fabricate findings. The official report confirmed the presence of accelerants in the locales identified by the investigators and said that the heavy petroleum distillates were highly suspicious. The investigators submitted only the official version to state prosecutors. The existence of the draft report was not revealed. Convicted of felony murder based on that report, Bunch was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. In a 2006 petition for post-conviction relief, Kinard’s draft report was revealed. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed Bunch’s conviction, based on the “Brady” violation and significant advances in fire science. Bunch sued under the Federal Torts Claims Act, claiming malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court concluded that the intentional-tort exception to the FTCA's general waiver of immunity applied, that the exception to that exception for law-enforcement officers did not apply, and granted the United States summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the record was not developed fully enough to support that conclusion; further proceedings must occur before the immunity issue can finally be resolved. View "Bunch v. United States" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Little was shot to death at a gas station in 1991. Martinez and Luna claimed to have seen a man around the station at the time. Weeks later, Snow was arrested for robbing a different gas station. According to officers, Snow repeatedly asked about the Little investigation. Luna viewed a lineup and stated that Snow looked like the man he saw; Martinez made no identification. In 1999, Snow was indicted. Approached by the police, Snow provided false identification and fled. Claycomb, charged as Snow’s getaway driver, was tried first and acquitted. Snow told the judge that his appointed attorneys were unprepared for trial and unsuccessfully sought a continuance. Martinez identified Snow at trial. Luna did not. Twelve other witnesses testified that Snow indicated that he was involved in the crime. Snow and his wife testified that he was at home on the night in question. The jury found Snow guilty of first-degree murder. State courts denied Snow’s direct appeal. The Exoneration Project filed an unsuccessful post-conviction petition citing new evidence that one of Snow’s attorneys had since been disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding some claims procedurally defaulted. It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that counsel’s failure to introduce certain evidence did not affect the outcome of the case, that the attorney’s personal problems did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel that evidence allegedly withheld in violation of “Brady” was not material. View "Snow v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Andrea (age 16), Deadra (19), and William (18) Hurt were arrested after their uncle, Golike, was found dead beside the Ohio River. Golike had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and, days before his death, had been released from prison, where he was on suicide watch. Deadra and William “confessed.” Several critical “facts” that William offered were facially impossible, Andrea was never charged. Charges against Deadra were dropped after she spent four months in jail. William was prosecuted but not convicted on any charge. He spent eight months in jail The siblings filed a civil suit against those involved in their arrests and prosecutions based on the interrogations, the decisions to arrest all three, and alleged fabrication of evidence. The district court rejected most of the defendants’ claims of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to Deadra’s claim of fabricated evidence and a substantive due process claim. The interviews may have been abusive, but were not conscience-shocking. The court otherwise affirmed. Taking the inferences in the Hurts’ favor, a jury could reasonably conclude it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to believe there was probable cause. There was adequate circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy violate the Hurts’ constitutional rights. A trier of fact could find that the officers deliberately coerced confessions by using threats. The rule forbidding such conduct has been established for decades. View "Hurt v. Vantlin" on Justia Law

After complaints about his professionalism, Indiana University Hospital required Dr. Hamdan, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, to participate in a peer-review process, which resulted in disciplinary letters. Hamdan successfully appealed. The hospital ultimately voided the letters. Nonetheless, Hamdan resigned and relinquished his hospital privileges. Hamdan sued the hospital for discriminating against him based on race. Hamdan was not a hospital employee and could not sue under Title VII, so he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, intended to protect the ability of newly-freed slaves to enter and enforce contracts. Hamdan alleged discrimination in his contractual relationship with the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict for the hospital, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing the hospital to ask Hamdan impeachment questions relating to his prior work at other hospitals. The court noted Hamdan’s testimony that his reputation was “untarnished” before he received the disciplinary letters. The Seventh Circuit also rejected an argument that the court erred in permitting the hospital to try to impeach him with questions about matters that were confidential under the peer-review statutes of Indiana, Louisiana, and Michigan. Even if the state laws applied, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing impeachment questions about incident reports. View "Hamdan v. Indiana University Health North Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) requires states to permit "overseas voters" to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections, 52 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1). An “overseas voter” resides outside the U.S. and would otherwise be qualified to vote in the last place in which the person was domiciled in the U.S. Illinois law provides that “[a]ny non‐resident civilian citizen, otherwise qualified to vote," may vote by mail in a federal election. "Non‐resident civilian citizens" reside “outside the territorial limits" of the U.S. but previously maintained a residence in Illinois and are not registered to vote in any other state. Former Illinois residents, now residing in the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, challenged the laws as violating their equal protection rights and their right to travel protected by the Due Process Clause. The territories where the plaintiffs reside are considered part of the U.S. under the statutes, while other territories are not. The district court held that there was a rational basis for the inclusion of some territories but not others in the definition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the Illinois statute but concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the UOCAVA, which does not prevent Illinois from providing the plaintiffs absentee ballots and does not cause their injury. The plaintiffs are not entitled to ballots under state law. View "Segovia v. United States" on Justia Law

Officers Garcia and Murphy observed Sanchez fail to stop his van as required at intersections and fail to maintain his lane; his sliding door was completely open. Garcia activated his siren and lights. Sanchez did not stop. Sanchez eventually stopped and exited his van, stumbling. Garcia noted that Sanchez, driving on a suspended license, smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and was mumbling vulgarities. Sanchez refused instructions and took a swing at Garcia. Garcia performed an emergency takedown. The officers found an open beer can and marijuana in the van. Sanchez claimed Garcia struck him unprovoked. At the police station, an officer observed Sanchez lying on the floor, smelling of alcohol and mumbling profanities, and requested medical assistance. Paramedic Ragusa detected the odor of alcohol, but found Sanchez able to answer questions. Ragusa made a notation ruling out battery as a cause of Sanchez’s injuries. After he declined treatment, Sanchez was returned to the jail. The lockup keeper noted that Sanchez did not appear visibly intoxicated. Sanchez was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction and denied post-conviction relief. In federal court, Sanchez claimed excessive force and that Garcia lacked probable cause for arrest. The court instructed the jury that it must take it as conclusively proven that Sanchez was driving under the influence and allowed introduction, without objection, of Murphy’s deposition testimony, with Murphy’s accounts of what Garcia said, and of Ragusa’s paramedic’s report. The court excluded the lockup report. The jury ruled in favor of Garcia. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a new trial was not required. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Baer admitted that he murdered a 24-year-old woman and her four‐year‐old daughter in their home. He did not know the victims. Convicted of two murders, robbery, theft, and attempted rape, he was sentenced to death. He filed a direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, asserting prosecutorial misconduct. His convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Baer filed unsuccessful state post‐conviction proceedings alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on his convictions but granted relief with respect to the death penalty. The Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling was unreasonable under “Strickland.” Evidence of Baer’s mental health and drug use were the cornerstone of Baer’s defense, and defense counsel’s sole strategy for avoiding a death sentence was ensuring that the jury considered and gave effect to that evidence. Yet, Baer’s trial counsel failed to object to instructions that effectively blocked consideration of this crucial mitigating evidence. Counsel also deficiently failed to object to a pattern of prosecutorial prejudicial statements. “The record reflects that the trial judge missed numerous opportunities to stop or clarify the prosecutor’s statements and his absence was noticeable throughout trial.” View "Baer v. Neal" on Justia Law

Easterling, a Wisconsin inmate with convictions for sexually assaulting a minor and armed robbery, sued correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that they violated his constitutional rights to due process and freedom of association by denying him visits with his daughter in 2004 and 2013. Easterling, having inquired about visitation in 2013, was told that he would first have to complete a sex offender program that was not then available. Instead of filing a formal request, Easterling filed suit. The court dismissed the claims based on 2004 as time‐barred. With respect to the claims based on 2013, it entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that other defenses blocked that claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claims arising out of actions taken in 2004 were barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The remaining defendants permissibly denied him visits in 2013 because he did not use the correct procedure to request them. Easterling’s “information requests” in 2013 were not formal “denials” of visitation; the warden Haines and the probation officer were not liable for violating Easterling’s rights. View "Easterling v. Thurmer" on Justia Law