Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Michael, age 16, and three other young men attempted to rob a Rockford pizzeria at gunpoint. Pobjecky, an off‐duty police officer waiting for a pizza, shot and killed Michael. Video recordings captured part of the incident, which involved a struggle for a gun. Michael’s participation in the struggle was disputed. He was apparently crawling when Pobjecky shot him. Wounds showing that three bullets entered Michael’s back contradict Pobjecky’s claim that he shot as Michael advanced toward Pobjecky. All three surviving assailants were convicted of felony murder. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims by Michael’s estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Pobjecky’s use of deadly force was reasonable and justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pobjecky did not know that Michael was unarmed; he was in close quarters with multiple, moving, potentially armed assailants, who forced him to make split‐second, life‐or‐death decisions. The incident lasted only about 45 seconds from the moment the first assailant entered the pizzeria to the moment Pobjecky locked the door. It was objectively reasonable for Pobjecky to stay inside the locked pizzeria awaiting help. It would be objectively unreasonable to demand that he venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, to administer treatment to Michael. View "Horton v. Pobjecky" on Justia Law

Michael, age 16, and three other young men attempted to rob a Rockford pizzeria at gunpoint. Pobjecky, an off‐duty police officer waiting for a pizza, shot and killed Michael. Video recordings captured part of the incident, which involved a struggle for a gun. Michael’s participation in the struggle was disputed. He was apparently crawling when Pobjecky shot him. Wounds showing that three bullets entered Michael’s back contradict Pobjecky’s claim that he shot as Michael advanced toward Pobjecky. All three surviving assailants were convicted of felony murder. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims by Michael’s estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Pobjecky’s use of deadly force was reasonable and justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pobjecky did not know that Michael was unarmed; he was in close quarters with multiple, moving, potentially armed assailants, who forced him to make split‐second, life‐or‐death decisions. The incident lasted only about 45 seconds from the moment the first assailant entered the pizzeria to the moment Pobjecky locked the door. It was objectively reasonable for Pobjecky to stay inside the locked pizzeria awaiting help. It would be objectively unreasonable to demand that he venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, to administer treatment to Michael. View "Horton v. Pobjecky" on Justia Law

Hudson was shot and killed; the gun was not recovered. Riley was charged with first-degree murder and being an armed habitual criminal. The judge severed the armed habitual criminal count and proceeded with the murder trial. In finding Riley not guilty of murder, the jury found that the prosecution had not proven “that during the commission of the offense of first-degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.” Three of the same witnesses testified at the armed habitual criminal trial before the same judge. The parties stipulated that Riley had two qualifying prior convictions, leaving the judge to decide only whether Riley possessed a gun. Defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in the stories of the state’s witnesses and noted that none of them could describe the gun allegedly possessed by Riley, despite identifying him as the shooter. The judge found Riley guilty. On direct appeal, the court ruled that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting Riley as an armed habitual criminal because whether he had possessed a gun was not decided at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his collateral estoppel claim. View "Riley v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Officers Bohlen and Rohde saw Avina near a Milwaukee high school with others, including known Mexican Posse street gang members. The assistant principal told the group to leave school property. They crossed the street. When school was dismissed, they began to harass pedestrians, yelling and flashing gang signs. The officers instructed them to leave the area. The group moved one block down, stood in front of a house that belonged to Avina’s cousin, and continued to harass pedestrians. After 15 minutes, the officers told them to disperse or be arrested. Most entered left. Avina rode his bike back to the school’s lawn. The officers decided to arrest him for trespassing. They could have issued a simple citation but believed that he would continue to loiter. They instructed Avina to get off his bike and put his hands behind his back. He cooperated. They escorted him to their squad car where Bohlen’s handling caused Avina’s arm to break. In Avina’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewed in the light most favorable to Avina, the record establishes that he was fully cooperative when Bohlen moved his arm with enough force to break it, which does not support the conclusion that Bohlen was placing Avina in handcuffs with objectively reasonable force. View "Avina v. Bohlen" on Justia Law

Three Menard Correctional Center officers were preparing inmates to walk from the cell house to dinner when Wilborn rushed out of his cell and attacked Johnson. Bennett and Lloyd took Wilborn to the ground and ordered him to “cuff up” and claim that Wilborn violently resisted. The officers’ testimony was generally consistent; they denied striking Wilborn after they had restrained him. Wilborn testified that he was compliant and in handcuffs when Ealey used pepper spray and that the officers continued to beat him after restraining him. His former cellmate supported his story. Medical staff examined Wilborn but later that day Wilborn was transferred to Tamms Correctional Center. Tamms nurses evaluated Wilborn, recorded his cuts and bruises, gave him acetaminophen, and noted that Wilborn’s shoulder appeared abnormal and that he complained of dislocation. They scheduled Wilborn to see a doctor first thing the next day. Wilborn remained in the infirmary overnight, in pain. The next morning, the doctor sent Wilborn to a hospital, where another doctor reduced Wilborn’s dislocated shoulder about 24 hours after the fight. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Wilborn acted pro se. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the nurses because Wilborn failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court upheld findings that the officers were more credible than Wilborn and his witnesses and the entry of judgment in favor of all remaining defendants. View "Wilborn v. Ealey" on Justia Law

In this complaint brought by an Indiana prisoner, the Seventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court on Plaintiff’s complaint that two prison guards punched him, put him in a chokehold, and placed a plastic bag over his head, all in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district judge concluded that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(a). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that summary judgment on nonexhaustion grounds was improper because the record did not clearly show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Mason" on Justia Law

While on the lookout for a serial bank robber, Chicago police officers misidentified Swanigan as the perpetrator, arrested him, and detained him for approximately 51 hours without a probable-cause hearing. He was released when the prosecutor decided not to press charges. Police later found the actual culprit. Swanigan sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and sued the city, raising Monell claims. The judge stayed the Monell suit to allow the suit against the officers to proceed separately. A jury found for Swanigan on a single claim—for unconstitutionally prolonging his detention—and awarded $60,000. The judge dismissed the suit against the city entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal as premature. Swanigan filed an amended complaint alleging constitutional injuries stemming from: a departmental “hold” policy by which the officers kept him in custody; a policy of requiring detainees to participate in lineups; and a policy regarding the contents of the closed case file that continued to label him as the bank robber. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Swanigan cannot recover twice for the prolonged detention. His other claims have no basis in federal law. The Constitution does not address unreliable police lineups that do not taint a trial nor reputational harm from misleading police reports. Swanigan lacks standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief because the challenged policies are unlikely to harm him in the future. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

While on the lookout for a serial bank robber, Chicago police officers misidentified Swanigan as the perpetrator, arrested him, and detained him for approximately 51 hours without a probable-cause hearing. He was released when the prosecutor decided not to press charges. Police later found the actual culprit. Swanigan sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and sued the city, raising Monell claims. The judge stayed the Monell suit to allow the suit against the officers to proceed separately. A jury found for Swanigan on a single claim—for unconstitutionally prolonging his detention—and awarded $60,000. The judge dismissed the suit against the city entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal as premature. Swanigan filed an amended complaint alleging constitutional injuries stemming from: a departmental “hold” policy by which the officers kept him in custody; a policy of requiring detainees to participate in lineups; and a policy regarding the contents of the closed case file that continued to label him as the bank robber. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Swanigan cannot recover twice for the prolonged detention. His other claims have no basis in federal law. The Constitution does not address unreliable police lineups that do not taint a trial nor reputational harm from misleading police reports. Swanigan lacks standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief because the challenged policies are unlikely to harm him in the future. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In a complaint described as “disjointed and murky at best,” Catinella alleged that he worked for Cook County, 1994-2013, and in 2009, was promoted to a supervisory position. In 2013, Catinella was questioned regarding a bidding process and refused to sign documents relating to the probe. During this interview, investigators asked Catinella if he was carrying a weapon. Catinella admitted that he had a knife, which he gave to his lawyer. Months later, Catinella’s coworkers filed a grievance complaining that Catinella was getting extra work privileges. Catinella was placed on emergency leave with pay pending an investigation. Days later he was placed on emergency suspension for unspecified “major causes.” An investigator produced witnesses to an alleged threat by Catinella to “shoot up the workplace.” The witnesses gave inconsistent accounts. Catinella was charged with disorderly conduct and released on bond. A report concluded that Catinella possessed a weapon while at work. At a pre-disciplinary meeting, Catinella was not allowed to confront witnesses. Cook County fired Catinella for possessing a weapon and making a threat of violence. The disorderly conduct charge was dropped. Catinella sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process and alleging race-based retaliation under 42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The complaint does not show how this “whirlwind of alleged unfairness” violates any federal constitutional or statutory provision. View "Catinella v. Cook County" on Justia Law