Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Thorncreek, a Park Forest townhouse complex, applied to the Village for a permit to use a vacant townhouse as a business office but began to conduct its business from the townhouse without a permit. The Village cited it for zoning violations and operating without the required permit. The Village later filed suit to halt the zoning and operating violations and to redress certain building-code violations. Thorncreek counterclaimed against the Village and 10 officials, claiming civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the Illinois Civil Rights Act. Two Thorncreek "areas" went into foreclosure. Thorncreek blamed the Village’s regulatory overreach in denying a business license, interfering with business operations, refusing to grant a conditional use permit, failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally enforcing a building-code provision requiring electrical upgrades, based on irrational animus against Clapper, the owner, and racial bias against its black residents. A jury found the Village and Village Manager Mick liable for a class-of-one equal-protection violation; found Mick and Kerestes, the director of community development, liable for conspiracy (section 1985(3)); otherwise rejected the claims, and awarded $2,014,000 in compensatory damages. Because the jury rejected the race-based equal-protection claim, the judge struck the verdict against Kerestes. The judge awarded $430,999.25 in fees and $44,844.33 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the judgment against Mick, the admission of evidence concerning Clapper’s wealth, and the admission of Thorncreek’s financial records. View "Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC v. Village of Park Forest" on Justia Law

For decades, Elkhart, Indiana’s Concord High School has held a “Christmas Spectacular” concert. In 2015, the Freedom From Religion Foundation wrote a letter expressing concerns about the religious nature of the Spectacular’s second half, which included religious songs interspersed with a narrator reading passages from the New Testament, and a student-performed nativity scene. The superintendent rejected the claim. Plaintiff sued under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. While the suit was pending, Concord volunteered to remove the scriptural reading and add songs representing Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. The judge concluded that the proposal was not adequate and granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the school from performing the proposed version. Concord actually performed a second half that spent about four and a half minutes each explaining and performing a song to represent Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. Images are projected onto screens with each song. For the remaining 20 minutes, students perform numerous religious Christmas songs and a two-minute nativity scene, with mannequins, not student actors. There are no New Testament readings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the 2015 show did not violate the Establishment Clause and a declaratory judgment that the 2014 and proposed versions were unconstitutional, with an award of $10 in nominal damages. Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction was denied. View "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools" on Justia Law

For decades, Elkhart, Indiana’s Concord High School has held a “Christmas Spectacular” concert. In 2015, the Freedom From Religion Foundation wrote a letter expressing concerns about the religious nature of the Spectacular’s second half, which included religious songs interspersed with a narrator reading passages from the New Testament, and a student-performed nativity scene. The superintendent rejected the claim. Plaintiff sued under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. While the suit was pending, Concord volunteered to remove the scriptural reading and add songs representing Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. The judge concluded that the proposal was not adequate and granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the school from performing the proposed version. Concord actually performed a second half that spent about four and a half minutes each explaining and performing a song to represent Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. Images are projected onto screens with each song. For the remaining 20 minutes, students perform numerous religious Christmas songs and a two-minute nativity scene, with mannequins, not student actors. There are no New Testament readings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the 2015 show did not violate the Establishment Clause and a declaratory judgment that the 2014 and proposed versions were unconstitutional, with an award of $10 in nominal damages. Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction was denied. View "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is conducted by a judge, to collect evidence and determine whether probable cause exists to issue a criminal complaint. During the time at issue, a proceeding could subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath, and, issue search warrants; the proceeding could be conducted in secret so that the targets would be unaware of it. A Milwaukee judge commenced a proceeding to investigate alleged campaign‐finance violations and entered a secrecy order. The targets were not notified of the execution of search warrants for electronic records. Eventually a judge concluded that the targets of subpoenas had done nothing wrong--Wisconsin law did not prohibit coordination between campaign committees and outside groups to finance issue advocacy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. The court ordered that the proceedings be closed; a modified order required that all original documents relating to the proceeding be filed with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. All other copies were destroyed. MacIver filed suit on behalf of a putative class, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a)–(c), 2711(3), arguing that the proceeding did not constitute a “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Act's provision that “good faith reliance on … a court warrant or order … is a complete defense” and the defense of qualified immunity. MacIver’s interpretation of the Act was not “clearly established” at the time defendants’ warrants were issued. View "John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Madlock, an African American woman, has worked at WEPCO since 1977. While Madlock was working in the Industrial Billing section, she was not in management, but was a point person for her team of “billers.” In 2011, WEPCO assigned a new management team, to perform a comprehensive review and institute metrics to measure performance. Wrycza, a white woman, became Madlock’s supervisor. The two did not get along. Madlock’s conduct, such as personal phone use, had already drawn the attention of management, and under Wrycza, Madlock’s conduct came under greater scrutiny. Wrycza followed WEPCO’s graduated discipline system to deal with billing errors and Madlock’s use of unprofessional language. Madlock was transferred to a different department, where she worked between two managers. The transfer did not affect Madlock’s title or salary, but co‐workers described it as a demotion and "a total humiliation." Madlock’s new supervisor, Phillips, a black woman, prompted Madlock to file an internal discrimination complaint against Wrycza. Madlock made another billing error. Madlock’s grievances were denied; the Vice President of Customer Service expressed shock at Madlock's errors. Madlock was denied a promotion due to her work record. Madlock sued (42 U.S.C. 1981), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for WEPCO, noting that the transfer caused no material change in Madlock’s employment and was not an adverse employment action. Madlock cannot show a sufficient causal link between her internal complaint and the alleged adverse actions. View "Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Madlock, an African American woman, has worked at WEPCO since 1977. While Madlock was working in the Industrial Billing section, she was not in management, but was a point person for her team of “billers.” In 2011, WEPCO assigned a new management team, to perform a comprehensive review and institute metrics to measure performance. Wrycza, a white woman, became Madlock’s supervisor. The two did not get along. Madlock’s conduct, such as personal phone use, had already drawn the attention of management, and under Wrycza, Madlock’s conduct came under greater scrutiny. Wrycza followed WEPCO’s graduated discipline system to deal with billing errors and Madlock’s use of unprofessional language. Madlock was transferred to a different department, where she worked between two managers. The transfer did not affect Madlock’s title or salary, but co‐workers described it as a demotion and "a total humiliation." Madlock’s new supervisor, Phillips, a black woman, prompted Madlock to file an internal discrimination complaint against Wrycza. Madlock made another billing error. Madlock’s grievances were denied; the Vice President of Customer Service expressed shock at Madlock's errors. Madlock was denied a promotion due to her work record. Madlock sued (42 U.S.C. 1981), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for WEPCO, noting that the transfer caused no material change in Madlock’s employment and was not an adverse employment action. Madlock cannot show a sufficient causal link between her internal complaint and the alleged adverse actions. View "Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Indianapolis police received a report that Koster was vomiting and having trouble breathing. Koster’s apartment-complex manager gave responders keys to Koster’s apartment in case Koster could not answer the door. Officer Murphy unlocked the door. Koster yelled: “Don’t come in!” and “I will shoot you." Koster was sitting in bed with a gun in his hand, swallowing pills. Murphy tried to convince him to put down the gun. SWAT members arrived. Koster asked to speak with his medical advocate, but the negotiator said that would be too dangerous while Koster held the gun. Koster asked for his brother, an Indianapolis officer. Someone left him a voicemail. Koster declared that he would “fire a warning shot” and pointed his gun at the officers. One officer fired a beanbag round. Officer Gray fired three bullets at Koster’s head; two hit him. Koster died at a trauma center. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the officers raised a qualified-immunity defense, The district judge granted summary judgment to Murphy but not Gray, reasoning that a reasonable officer would have believed that Koster’s immediate detention was necessary in order for him to receive medical attention and assistance, but that Gray used greater force than was reasonable because he did not take cover or wait for the less-lethal option. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Gray did not violate Koster’s Fourth Amendment right by defending himself and other officers once Koster pointed a gun. View "Sanzone v. Gray" on Justia Law

IC, the subsidiary of a Canadian corporation, hired plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, age 55, as a management trainee. He completed the program and served in multiple management positions. With a 2011 promotion, plaintiff reported to Clermont, a Canadian citizen. In 2012, Clermont was investigated for abusive workplace behavior. Plaintiff alleged that, because of Clermont’s behavior, he experienced physical symptoms and was taken to the hospital. Plaintiff requested reassignment. Clermont contacted Human Resources about “performance issues” with plaintiff and was told of plaintiff’s complaints. No transfer occurred. Plaintiff filed a complaint, referring to a “hostile work environment” and retaliation. Clermont wrote a letter about plaintiff's unsatisfactory performance. In 2013, as part of a company‐wide reorganization, Clermont was reassigned to Canada. Plaintiff’s position was eliminated. He took a clerical job. For the first time, plaintiff referenced the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–34 (ADEA). Efforts to place plaintiff in management were unsuccessful. Plaintiff complained Clermont’s letter was “retaliatory” and claimed that he applied to 82 management positions and that many of those positions were filled by substantially younger candidates. Plaintiff filed suit, under the ADEA and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IC. Nothing in plaintiff’s complaints about Clermont suggested discrimination based on age or national origin. The evidence indicates the same events would have transpired if plaintiff had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same. View "Skiba v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2010, Kirklin drove Jones and McCallister to rob a bank and gave Jones firearms. The two left with stolen money but were arrested near the scene. Kirklin was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence. His 171-month sentence included an 84‐month consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); such sentences vary based on whether the defendant was responsible for merely carrying or using the weapon, or for brandishing it, or for discharging it. Video evidence showed that Jones and McCallister had brandished weapons. The court did not instruct the jury to make a specific finding as to whether the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kirklin was responsible for the brandishing but made that determination at sentencing. The Supreme Court's 2002 Harris decision held that whether a firearm was brandished was a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense, and need not be submitted to the jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Three months after Kirklin’s sentencing, the Court granted certiorari in Alleyne, eventually holding that juries must make factual determinations that increase mandatory minimum sentences and that brandishing is an element of the conduct criminalized by the seven‐year mandatory minimum and must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Kirklin’s sentence and later upheld a denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Kirkland's attorney’s performance was not objectively unreasonable for failing to anticipate the overruling of Harris and failing to object to having the court make the factual finding. Given the strength of the evidence against Kirklin, even after certiorari was granted in Alleyne, a defense lawyer might have made a reasonable strategic decision not to challenge the brandishing issue. View "Kirklin v. United States" on Justia Law