Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

University Park hired Linear as its Village Manager through May 2015, concurrent with the term of its Mayor. In October 2014 the Village extended Linear’s contract for a year. In April 2015 Mayor Covington was reelected. In May, the Board of Trustees decided that Linear would no longer be Village Manager. His contract provides for six months’ severance pay if the Board discharges him for any reason except criminality. The Village argued that the contract’s extension was not lawful and that it owes Linear nothing. The district court agreed and rejected Linear’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that 65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5; 5/8-1-7 prohibit a village manager's contract from lasting beyond the end of a mayor’s term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. State courts should address the Illinois law claims. Linear’s federal claim rests on a mistaken appreciation of the role the Constitution plays in enforcing state-law rights. Linear never had a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain as Village Manager. His contract allowed termination without cause. His entitlement was to receive the contracted-for severance pay. Linear could not have a federal right to a hearing before losing his job; he has at most a right to a hearing to determine his severance pay--a question of Illinois law. View "Linear v. Village of University Park" on Justia Law

College of DuPage hired Breuder as its president. After extensions, his contract ran through 2019. In 2015 newly-elected members of the Board of Trustees, having campaigned on a pledge to remove Breuder, discharged him without notice or a hearing. Board resolutions stated that Breuder had committed misconduct. The Board did not offer him a hearing and refused to comply with clauses in his contract covering severance pay and retirement benefits. Breuder filed suit, citing Illinois contract and defamation law and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Board as an entity moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Breuder never had a valid contract because, under Illinois law, a governmental body whose members serve limited terms may not enter into contracts that extend beyond those terms. Individual Board members moved to dismiss the 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of both motions. The court noted precedent allowing Illinois Community Colleges to grant their presidents tenure beyond the date of the next board election. Rejecting claims of qualified immunity, the court noted that a hearing is required whenever the officeholder has a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” In discharging Breuder, the Board stated that he had committed misconduct. Even a person who has no property interest in a public job has a constitutional entitlement to a hearing before being defamed during a discharge, or at least a name-clearing hearing after the discharge. View "Breuder v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

The Mayor of Chicago appoints the city’s Board of Education, 105 ILCS 5/34-3. Until 1995, the Mayor needed the consent of the City Council; now the Mayor acts independently. Plaintiffs claimed that the system violated the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301 (section 2). School boards elsewhere in Illinois are elected; plaintiffs say that failure to elect the school board in Chicago has a disproportionate effect on minority voters. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Section 2(a) covers any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard” that results in an abridgment of the right to vote; it does not guarantee that any given public office be filled by election rather than appointment, a civil service system, or some other means. Whether having an appointed board is “good government” or good for pupils is irrelevant to the Act. While more minority citizens live in Chicago than in other Illinois cities and do not vote for school board members, neither does anyone else. Every member of the electorate is treated identically, which is what section 2 requires. View "Quinn v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Mayor of Chicago appoints the city’s Board of Education, 105 ILCS 5/34-3. Until 1995, the Mayor needed the consent of the City Council; now the Mayor acts independently. Plaintiffs claimed that the system violated the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301 (section 2). School boards elsewhere in Illinois are elected; plaintiffs say that failure to elect the school board in Chicago has a disproportionate effect on minority voters. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Section 2(a) covers any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard” that results in an abridgment of the right to vote; it does not guarantee that any given public office be filled by election rather than appointment, a civil service system, or some other means. Whether having an appointed board is “good government” or good for pupils is irrelevant to the Act. While more minority citizens live in Chicago than in other Illinois cities and do not vote for school board members, neither does anyone else. Every member of the electorate is treated identically, which is what section 2 requires. View "Quinn v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In his third round of appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Cureton’s convictions and sentences for using a firearm during a crime of violence and related crimes. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Dean v. United States (2017), which disapproved circuit precedents barring judges sentencing defendants under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and other crimes from considering the mandatory minimum sentence under section 924(c) when deciding the sentences for other crimes. On remand, the district judge issued an order explaining that he saw no basis for reducing Cureton’s sentence, focusing on the extraordinary viciousness of Cureton’s crimes, including the kidnapping and torture of the woman who was his victim. The order referred to Cureton’s “extreme” capacity for “violence and depravity” and said that any lower sentence would not be sufficient to serve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The Seventh Circuit then affirmed Cureton’s 444-month total term of imprisonment. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

In his third round of appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Cureton’s convictions and sentences for using a firearm during a crime of violence and related crimes. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Dean v. United States (2017), which disapproved circuit precedents barring judges sentencing defendants under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and other crimes from considering the mandatory minimum sentence under section 924(c) when deciding the sentences for other crimes. On remand, the district judge issued an order explaining that he saw no basis for reducing Cureton’s sentence, focusing on the extraordinary viciousness of Cureton’s crimes, including the kidnapping and torture of the woman who was his victim. The order referred to Cureton’s “extreme” capacity for “violence and depravity” and said that any lower sentence would not be sufficient to serve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The Seventh Circuit then affirmed Cureton’s 444-month total term of imprisonment. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

Brock-Miller pled guilty, with a plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. She received a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. She then challenged her conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. The court declined to hold a hearing and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing. The district court erred when it concluded that her prior conviction under Indiana Code 16- 42-19-18 was a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. 802(44) and that Brock-Miller was eligible for a recidivist enhancement. The court analyzed the wrong version of the state law; there is little to no overlap between the controlled substances listed in the federal definition of “felony drug offense” and the prescription “legend drugs” regulated by the Indiana law. Counsel’s apparent error in identifying the applicable Indiana statute and failure to file a plainly meritorious objection could constitute deficient performance if proved. View "Brock v. United States" on Justia Law

Hicks led an organization that processed, packaged, and sold drugs in Chicago. A jury found him and co-defendants guilty of conspiracy with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Hicks’s presentence report put his offense level at 46, corresponding to a guideline sentence of life imprisonment. An offense level of 42 would have produced a range of 360 months to life. The district judge stated that the proper offense level was probably 45 but the table stops at 43, that it was immaterial to decide the exact offense level, and that the recommended life sentence would be fair given the quantity at issue and Hicks’s leadership role. The judge nonetheless imposed a below-guideline sentence of 360 months because he thought that Hicks was capable of reform. After his unsuccessful direct appeal, Hicks moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective because he did not explain federal conspiracy law and did not discuss the advantages of pleading guilty but had advised him that “there was a strong chance at walking.” The district judge denied Hicks’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that a guilty plea offered without any agreement would have had “no value.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hicks’s argument that his attorney’s performance prejudiced him is too speculative to require an evidentiary hearing. View "Hicks v. United States" on Justia Law

Otis’s amended pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleged that Waterford Officer Demarasse stopped Otis on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Otis claims she alerted the officer that she was “very sick and bleeding” heavily and asked to be taken to a hospital. Demarasse refused and proceeded to administer a field sobriety test; Otis felt she was “about to pass out” and, again, asked to be taken to a hospital. Demarasse allegedly refused, arrested Otis, cuffed her, and drove her to the police station, where Otis claims, she was subjected to additional testing, then taken to jail, where she was held for 12 hours. Her blood sample was negative for alcohol and controlled substances. Otis then "inexplicably" sent the court more than 100 pages of attachments, mostly police reports and medical records, attempting to add the municipalities as defendants Demarasse’s report contradicted Otis’s allegations and recounts driving Otis to Burlington Memorial Hospital. Reports from another hospital establish that, two days later, Otis was diagnosed with “[a]cute blood loss anemia secondary to dysfunctional uterine bleeding.” The court dismissed her action, finding Otis’s allegations “no longer plausible.” The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court erred in concluding that Otis had pleaded herself out of court by attaching the police report, which contained facts different from those in the complaint. Otis’s submissions fairly allege that Demarasse knew about her need for medical attention and responded in an objectively unreasonable manner. View "Otis v. Demarasse" on Justia Law

Thorncreek, a Park Forest townhouse complex, applied to the Village for a permit to use a vacant townhouse as a business office but began to conduct its business from the townhouse without a permit. The Village cited it for zoning violations and operating without the required permit. The Village later filed suit to halt the zoning and operating violations and to redress certain building-code violations. Thorncreek counterclaimed against the Village and 10 officials, claiming civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the Illinois Civil Rights Act. Two Thorncreek "areas" went into foreclosure. Thorncreek blamed the Village’s regulatory overreach in denying a business license, interfering with business operations, refusing to grant a conditional use permit, failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally enforcing a building-code provision requiring electrical upgrades, based on irrational animus against Clapper, the owner, and racial bias against its black residents. A jury found the Village and Village Manager Mick liable for a class-of-one equal-protection violation; found Mick and Kerestes, the director of community development, liable for conspiracy (section 1985(3)); otherwise rejected the claims, and awarded $2,014,000 in compensatory damages. Because the jury rejected the race-based equal-protection claim, the judge struck the verdict against Kerestes. The judge awarded $430,999.25 in fees and $44,844.33 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the judgment against Mick, the admission of evidence concerning Clapper’s wealth, and the admission of Thorncreek’s financial records. View "Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC v. Village of Park Forest" on Justia Law