Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2008 Indiana University hired Haynes, who is black, as an assistant professor, funding most of his salary through the Strategic Recruitment Fund, which facilitates "recruitment of underrepresented minorities and women into the professoriate.” Haynes had a six-year probationary contract. Tenure candidates are evaluated on research, teaching, and service and must be “excellent” in one area and “satisfactory” in the others. In 2013, Haynes submitted his tenure dossier, selecting research as his "excellence" performance area. The committee voted 6–3 against tenure. The dean wrote that “the committee questioned the extent of Dr. Haynes’[s] impact based on low citation numbers and low numbers of publications in high-quality journals” and that Haynes’s “evaluations ha[d] been mixed[] and particularly low in the online courses” and failed to show “significant improvement.” The university-wide Tenure Advisory Committee voted unanimously against tenure; 18 of 27 faculty members found his teaching unsatisfactory and 19 found his research not excellent. Haynes sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University, upholding the exclusion of Haynes’s proffered expert reports for lack of “specialized knowledge.” A plaintiff needs compelling evidence that “clear discrimination” pervasively infected the tenure decision; this case was “not a close one.” Regardless of the finer points of academic tenure and its intersection with anti-discrimination law. Haynes lacks any evidence that the University denied tenure because he is black. View "Haynes v. Indiana University" on Justia Law

After a chase and takedown, a Milwaukee Police Department (MPD officer remained on top of Williams after he was handcuffed. Williams stated, repeatedly that he could not breathe, even after the officer shifted his weight. The officer’s radio transmission was recorded, and Williams can be heard complaining that he could not breathe. Williams, a 22-year-old African American man in good physical shape, went limp when the officers lifted him up. Williams subsequently began sweating and breathing heavily and, when he regained consciousness, would complain of being unable to breathe. Officers did not call for help until several minutes after he was discovered to have no pulse and to have stopped breathing. Williams apparently died in the squad car, leaving three children. The cause of death is disputed. The estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court denied a defense motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an individual analysis of each officer’s claim of qualified immunity. The court noted material issues of fact concerning whether the officers were on notice of Williams’s serious medical condition; each officer had a different degree of contact with Williams and had different assigned responsibilities with respect to the apprehension of Williams and investigation of the alleged armed robbery. View "Estate of Williams, v. Cline" on Justia Law

Cotton was visiting his sister, Kimberly when he scuffled with three men. Cotton was beaten and shot; he died from the gunshot wounds. Milton and another were tried separately as parties to first‐degree reckless homicide. Four eye‐witnesses testified: Kimberly, her son James (age 18), Howard, and Jones. James initially stated that he saw the scene after the shooting. At trial, James testified to having seen both the beating and the shooting. He identified Milton first in a photo array, in a post‐indictment lineup, and at trial. Howard testified that he saw the fight through a window. He identified Milton in a lineup but could not identify anyone from a photo array. Jones testified that he could hear the argument from his home, but changed his story about identifying the perpetrators. The prosecution also presented a bullet casing found outside Milton’s home that matched a casing found at the shooting and a bandana found in Milton’s bedroom that matched a bandana described by Jones and Howard. One expert testified that the bullet casings came from the same gun; a detective opined that the comparison would be inconclusive without the actual gun, which was never recovered. Milton had participated, without counsel, in a live lineup viewed by the witnesses, despite having invoked his right to counsel. Wisconsin courts rejected his claims on appeal, stating that Milton did not meet the “burden to show that he did not waive his right to counsel at the lineup.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The jury was aware of variations in witness testimony and still voted to convict. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), it lay within the bounds of reason to conclude that the evidence was so compelling that the probability of an acquittal if the lineup were suppressed, was negligible. View "Milton v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2002, a Wisconsin jury convicted Reynolds in a fatal carjacking. He unsuccessfully sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on alleged violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. He claims the state stopped paying his state‐appointed lawyer during his direct appeal and that he received ineffective assistance during his direct appeal and trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if his denial‐of‐counsel claim were not procedurally barred, his attorney did not abandon Reynolds. After being told by the State Public Defender that he would not be paid any more for working on Reynolds’s case, the attorney continued to represent Reynolds for free in the state court of appeals, completing the briefing there and seeking review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court rejected an alternative argument that Reynolds was denied the effective assistance of counsel when the Public Defender’s Office created a conflict of interest by ceasing to pay his lawyer while also informing him that he would no longer receive new case assignments. The state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in holding that a missed opportunity to raise an equal protection challenge to the state carjacking statute in an already-untimely fashion was not an “adverse effect”; Reynolds’s claim cannot meet the stringent standard of section 2254(d)(1). View "Reynolds v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Oshkosh inmate Lanaghan reported to Health Services on November 21 and was treated only for a rash. He received four further treatments but increasingly experienced problems with activities of daily living, and was rushed to the hospital on December 6. Diagnosed with a rare muscle disease, he returned a week later with medication. His conditions worsened. He was no longer eating or sleeping; he could not sit up, lay down, or move. On December 20, he attempted to prepare an inmate complaint form regarding inadequate treatment. In a wheelchair, he was transported to Oshkosh’s dayroom, for assistance, unable to write. All of the recreational tables were occupied. Denied permission to use a study table, Lanaghan was returned to his cell where no visitors were allowed. On December 28, he was hospitalized, for approximately two months. Lanaghan returned to Oshkosh in March 2012 but did not file any grievance. He later decided to file suit and learned that he had to first file an inmate complaint. His July 2 complaint was rejected as untimely. The institutional examiner testified that his condition would have been good cause to extend the filing period but not until July.His civil rights suit was rejected under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies within 14 days, as required by Wisconsin law. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Whether a grievance procedure is unavailable does not depend whether the defendants engaged in affirmative misconduct, but whether Lanaghan was not able to timely file the grievance through no fault of his own. Concluding that nothing prevented him from filing the grievance immediately after he returned to Oshkosh holds Lanaghan responsible for failing to follow a procedure of which he was not aware and which was not in the handbook. View "Lanaghan v. Koch" on Justia Law

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Thompson's 1982 murder and conspiracy to commit burglary convictions. Thompson filed a state post-conviction petition in 1992. In 1997, the final of several public defenders withdrew. Thompson’s petition languished until 2001 when he requested a copy of the record. The public defender would not represent Thompson because his prior attorneys had “found no meritorious issues.” In 2005, Thompson requested leave to proceed pro se then hired an attorney. Court-ordered DNA tests were completed, but apparently, no hearing was held. The proceedings again fell into limbo. In 2012, Thompson retained a new attorney, who filed another amended petition. The state again raised the defense of laches. The parties stipulated that the delay had prejudiced the state. Thompson argued that the delay was the fault of attorneys who had abandoned him. Indiana courts rejected Thompson’s petition. Thompson sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court dismissed, finding that Thompson’s claims were procedurally defaulted, without addressing the potential distinction between laches based on a prefiling delay and laches based on delays in prosecuting an action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. When the state court dismissed the petition there was not yet a firmly established rule in Indiana that laches applies to delays to an already-filed action; precedents dealt only with delays in filing a post-conviction petition. Thompson’s petition is not barred by an adequate and independent state ground. View "Thompson v. Brown" on Justia Law

Arnold was convicted of repeated sexual assault his son, M.A., who testified that in 2004-2005, when M.A. was 13-14 years old, Arnold engaged in mutual masturbation with him. Arnold had five prior convictions, including for two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child. M.A. (17 at the time of trial) had six prior convictions and/or juvenile adjudications of delinquency. Arnold was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. After the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Arnold’s conviction, M.A. signed a notarized, witnessed affidavit, recanting his testimony. At the time that M.A. reported the assaults, M.A. was under the supervision of a juvenile court and participating in a treatment program, based on adjudications that M.A. himself had sexually assaulted children. M.A. represented that he had falsely accused his father to ensure his successful discharge from the program. Arnold sought a new trial. A federal district court dismissed, as untimely, his habeas corpus petition, filed beyond the one‐year deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1); Arnold alleged that his actual innocence supported an equitable exception. The Seventh Circuit granted relief, rejecting an argument that M.A.’s recantation could not meet the standard for relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence, however credible a factfinder might determine it to be. The court remanded for a hearing at which the credibility of M.A.’s recantation can be assessed with the probable impact that the recantation would have had on reasonable jurors. View "Arnold v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

New arrivals at the jail must surrender their possessions. A class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 charged that the Sheriff did not do enough to prevent guards and other employees from stealing or losing those belongings. Evidence showed that the loss-or-theft rate had been falling as the Sheriff implemented additional controls. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury’s rejection of the suit. The thefts are a crime, a tort, and a Due Process Clause violation (depriving prisoners of property with no process) but the class did not contend that the Sheriff personally stole anything or even tolerated a known thief; no guard is a defendant. Failure to prosecute thieves does not violate the Constitution; a guard’s negligence does not violate the Constitution. The jury concluded that the Sheriff had taken “reasonable measures.” The court upheld a jury instruction that the Sheriff could be found liable for violating the Fourteenth Amendment if there was a widespread custom or practice which allowed plaintiffs’ property to be lost or stolen, that was the moving force behind plaintiffs’ losses, and the defendant was deliberately indifferent to those losses. Another instruction said: “The Office of the Sheriff ... need not have formally approved the conduct so long as Plaintiffs prove that a policy-making official knew of the pattern and allowed it to continue.” The court noted a problem with state remedies, but state remedies are not a constitutional entitlement. View "Elizarri v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

Unbeknownst to Burton, her license was suspended. Zion Officer Meyers spotted her driving, verified that there was an active warrant for her arrest, and activated his emergency lights. Burton saw his lights but claims she was afraid to pull over because, in 2008, Officer Richardt pulled Burton over, and, while she was handcuffed, used a taser on her. The Department sustained Burton's allegations of unnecessary force. Burton sued, obtaining a settlement. Instead of stopping, Burton drove toward her home, following all traffic laws, wanting friendly witnesses. The officers knew that Burton was heading home. Richardt, the officer involved in the 2008 incident, joined the pursuit. Burton stopped near her friend, with his pit bull. Meyers approached Burton’s driver’s side door. Burton exited through the passenger door because, she alleged, the other door was not functioning. Richardt ran and brought Burton to the ground by incorrectly executing a “straight-arm take-down.” The dog bit Richardt's leg but immediately released without causing damage. Sergeant Arrington placed his knee on Burton’s back as he handcuffed her then dragged her away.Burton sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,. The court excluded evidence regarding the 2008 incident. The jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The fact that Burton had been previously subjected to excessive force was not propensity evidence and could not be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404. The court must weigh the probative value against the potential prejudice, considering ways in which prejudice can be mitigated. Excessive force amounts to whether the officers’ force, given the facts and circumstances known to them at the time, was reasonable. View "Burton v. City of Zion" on Justia Law

In 2013, while Koger was serving a 300-day sentence in the Cook County Jail, Lyons sent him at least 10 books, plus magazines and newspapers. More than 30 books were seized from Koger’s cell for violation of Jail policy. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Lyons and Koger claimed that limiting inmates to three pieces of reading material violated the First Amendment. The district court rejected the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to Lyons, who lacked standing because Koger received everything she sent, but vacated as to Koger. The court noted that Koger challenged the policy, rather than the particular seizure, and that the policy provides for no pre-deprivation process. View "Lyons v. Dart" on Justia Law