Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

When Pennewell’s incarceration began, he was blind in his left eye. Pennewell complained of pain and vision abnormalities in his right eye. An optometrist referred him to the University of Wisconsin Eye Clinic. After a transfer to another prison. Pennewell submitted health services requests, indicating that his right eye was deteriorating; he was transported to UW where he was diagnosed with a retinal detachment that required emergency surgery. After surgery Pennewell continued to experience vision problems and was diagnosed with a macular tear that required surgery. His surgery resulted in Pennewell being blind for several weeks. Pennewell was not assisted by prison staff in using the restroom or showering and had to get his own meals. Pennewell continued to experience serious problems with his right eye and filed several complaints. He was transferred again. His follow-up appointment with the UW was canceled and he was unable to see a doctor for several weeks. The doctor removed loose stitches that had been causing his pain. Pennewell never recovered his right eye vision and is legally blind. The district court held that based on his adequate pleadings he was competent to litigate his 42 U.S.C. 1983 Eighth Amendment case alone during the advanced pre-trial stages of the litigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the court failed to give Pennewell’s motion particularized consideration, The court remanded with instructions to recruit counsel. View "Pennewell v. Parish" on Justia Law

In 1995, Sotelo was convicted of three counts each of mailing communications with the intent to extort money and mailing threatening communications, based on threatening letters he sent while imprisoned for rape and robbery. The court sentenced Sotelo using the 1994 Sentencing Guidelines. Before the career offender adjustment, Sotelo's sentencing range was 77–96 months’ imprisonment. With that adjustment, the range was 210–262 months. An individual qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 if he had two prior qualifying convictions and the offense of conviction was a felony and a crime of violence. Under the 1994 Guidelines, “crime of violence” meant any conviction that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (elements clause), or “burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, (enumerated offenses) or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (residual clause). Sotelo was sentenced to the top of the career-offender range. On appeal, Sotelo did not challenge his career-offender sentence. He filed his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2016, within a year of the Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision, invalidating the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Soleto’s motion does not fit within the 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) exception for motions filed within one year of the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court if that right was made retroactively applicable on collateral review. Johnson, which applies only to the residual clause, does not address Sotelo’s conviction under the elements clause. Sotelo's claim hinges on cases post-dating Sotelo’s conviction, none of which has been declared retroactively applicable on collateral review. View "Sotelo v. United States" on Justia Law

Durham faced revocation of his supervised release. A magistrate found that Durham was “financially unable to retain counsel,” under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(b). Initially, Durham was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. Before the revocation hearing, that lawyer withdrew with court permission. At the hearing, Durham was represented by retained counsel, who was then allowed to withdraw. Durham sought pro se to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. His IFP status lapsed when appointed counsel withdrew. The court denied Durham’s motion, citing his incomplete financial affidavit. The Seventh Circuit appointed the Federal Defender’s Office for the limited purpose of re-filing a proper motion. The district court again denied IFP status, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1); because Durham had $750 in his prison account he could not show that he was “unable to pay the costs of commencing his appeal.” ($505 filing fee.), and ruling that Durham’s appeal was frivolous.The Seventh Circuit reversed, granting leave to appeal IFP. Durham is not trying to bring a civil appeal, which would be governed by the general IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915, but sought to proceed under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, which asks only if the defendant is “financially unable” to obtain adequate representation. In determining the need for appointed counsel under the Act, the Seventh Circuit is not governed by a requirement of indigence but by financial inability to employ counsel. The Criminal Justice Act does not permit courts to appoint counsel only for defendants whose appeals the court deems not to be frivolous; Anders procedures are available, should counsel come to that conclusion. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

Goudy, convicted of a 1993 murder, obtained habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The state did not retry him. Goudy filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that state and local officials failed to comply with their “Brady” obligations to turn over material, exculpatory evidence and that he is entitled to damages for the years he spent in prison. The district court focused on allegations that the investigators violated his due process rights by subjecting him to an improper show‐up procedure, withholding a videotape showing a line‐up in which several witnesses identified a different person as the shooter, and withholding interview notes showing that the other suspect initially denied any involvement in the murder, but later switched his story. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Goudy presented enough evidence on the second and third arguments to move forward. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Cummings (initially an investigator, later a prosecutor) suppressed the lineup videotape and both investigators suppressed the interview notes. Even if the videotape were the only suppressed evidence, the jury could find it material, given the lack of definitive physical evidence, the state’s reliance on eyewitness testimony, inconsistencies among the testifying witnesses, and the utility of the video as both evidence of an exculpatory theory and impeachment. View "Goudy v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Carrillo was involved in an extramarital relationship with Noeller. Carrillo’s family reported that Noeller called Carrillo, accused her of seeing someone else, and threatened her life; Noeller later came to her mother’s Mexico City house, where he shot and killed her. Noeller maintains that he ended their relationship after finding out about her family’s affiliation with the Los Pepes gang and Zetas drug cartel. He says that after the murder, he received warnings that Carrillo’s mother had hired hitmen to kill him. Noeller fled for the U.S. with his wife and children, who are U.S. citizens. Noeller's family members provided affidavits describing incidents after he left, in which gang members came to their homes looking for Noeller, threatened them, and beat them. During removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Noeller sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Immigration judges twice denied his applications. Noeller’s BIA appeal was pending when Mexico submitted its extradition request. Noeller challenged the warrant issued in Mexico by an “Amparo proceeding,” which is “similar to habeas corpus ... to review and annul unconstitutional judicial decisions.” Noeller claims that the court in Mexico suspended the warrant. Mexico’s government contends that the original arrest warrant remains enforceable. The district court granted extradition. Noeller sought habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mexico submitted a valid request for extradition, which U.S. courts must honor. Noeller’s challenges to that request are “beyond the narrow role for courts in the extradition process.” View "Noeller v. Wojdylo" on Justia Law

Indiana requires all inmates convicted of a sex offense to complete the Sex Offender Management and Monitoring (INSOMM) program. INSOMM requires inmates to identify which illegal sexual acts they committed and how often. Based on their offense history, participants are sorted into risk groups for group therapy sessions. Higher‐risk groups must complete more hours of therapy. In therapy, participants must fill out workbooks that require them to describe all past acts of sexual violence and abuse, regardless of whether they were ever charged for those offenses. Participants enjoy neither immunity nor confidentiality for the disclosures. Inmates may not opt out of any part of INSOMM and must respond fully to all questions. A counselor who suspects that a participant has been deceptive or less than forthcoming may order polygraph testing. Failure to participate satisfactorily in INSOMM is a Major Conduct disciplinary violation. For a first offense, inmates are denied the opportunity to accrue good‐time credits to which they would otherwise be entitled by statute. Continuing violations are punishable by revocation of already‐acquired good‐time credits. Lacy filed a class action under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the disclosures required by INSOMM and the penalties imposed for non‐participation, taken together, amount to a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self‐incrimination. View "Lacy v. Butts" on Justia Law

Officer Sweeney pulled Lewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a warning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in the squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised release for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a drug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. The dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found heroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officer had lawful grounds to initiate the traffic stop; it is irrelevant whether Lewis actually committed a traffic offense because Sweeney had a reasonable belief that he did so. Officer Sweeney did not unjustifiably prolong the traffic stop past the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a warning; any delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to sniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Gaston, an Illinois prisoner, first complained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs did not help. After some delay, Gaston saw an orthopedic surgeon in September 2010. An MRI exam was approved but not conducted until February 2011. In August 2011, Gaston had arthroscopic surgery. While Gaston’s left knee was healing, Wexford (the corporation that provides prison medical care) delayed approving an MRI of his right knee; one knee had to be sound before treatment of the other. In May 2012 Gaston had an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed serious problems. Another arthroscopic surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not bring relief. Arthroplasty (knee replacement) was delayed while specialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and cardiology systems would handle the strain but took place in February 2015 and was successful. Gaston claimed that the delays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indifference to his pain so that the pain became a form of unauthorized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants offered evidence that the delays could be chalked up to a preference for conservative treatment before surgery and never to any desire to injure Gaston or indifference to his pain. The district court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, ruling that none acted (or delayed acting) with the state of mind required for culpability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and affirmed judgment in favor of Wexford. Private corporations, when deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C. 1983, are not subject to vicarious liability. Wexford could be liable for its own unconstitutional policies, but the policies to which Gaston pointed, reflected medical judgment rather than a constitutional problem. View "Gaston v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Wisconsin amended its state constitution to permit state‐funded transportation of private and parochial students. Under Wis. Stat. 121.54, if a school district operating within a metropolitan area where other public transportation is available to schoolchildren exercises the "city option," there must “be reasonable uniformity" regardless of whether students attend public or private schools. The Milwaukee district (MPS) has public city-wide schools, which offer special courses; attendance‐area schools, which draw only from a particular neighborhood; and nonattendance-area schools, which do not offer special classes but serve students from outside the area.MPS Policy provides free transportation for high schoolers only if they live two or more miles from their school and more than one mile from public transportation. Students who attend citywide or nonattendance‐area schools are governed by “Racial Balance, Modernization, Overload, and Lack of Facility” rules, making any student assigned to a school farther than two miles from her home eligible for free transportation, regardless of proximity to public transportation. Private schools must submit lists of students eligible to receive busing by May 15. There is no notification deadline for public schools. On May 14, St. Joan, a private school, submitted a 62-name list; on September 29, it added six names. MPS refused to bus any of the students because each lived within one mile of public transportation, and the later‐added students were disclosed after the deadline.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Rational bases exist for the differences in busing eligibility. MPS has legitimate interests in reducing overcapacity in crowded attendance‐area schools and in expanding special program access. MPS students who attend citywide or nonattendance‐area schools are more likely to have to travel farther than students who go to attendance‐area schools. The court remanded with respect to the deadline. View "St. Joan Antida High School Inc. v. Milwaukee Public School District" on Justia Law

Kanter pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, based on his submission of bills to Medicare for non-compliant therapeutic shoes and shoe inserts. Due to his felony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm under both federal and Wisconsin law, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. 941.29(1m). He challenged those felon dispossession statutes under the Second Amendment, as applied to nonviolent offenders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment upholding the laws. Even if felons are entitled to Second Amendment protection, so that Kanter could bring an as-applied challenge, the government met its burden of establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are substantially related to an important government interest in preventing gun violence. Congress and the Wisconsin legislature are entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonviolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such individuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The “bright line categorical approach … allows for uniform application and ease of administration.” View "Kanter v. Barr" on Justia Law