Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Subdiaz‐Osorio stabbed his brother to death during a drunken fight in Wisconsin. He attempted to flee but was stopped in Arkansas while driving to Mexico. At Subdiaz‐Osorio’s request, the interview in Arkansas was conducted in Spanish. Neither Subdiaz‐Osorio nor Officer Torres had any trouble understanding each other. Subdiaz‐Osorio signed a waiver of his Miranda rights, indicating that he understood his rights. During the interview, after discussing the extradition process, Subdiaz‐Osorio asked in Spanish, “How can I do to get an attorney here because I don’t have enough to afford for one?” The officer responded: If you need an attorney‐‐by the time you’re going to appear in the court, the state of Arkansas will get an attorney for you. The interview continued for an hour with Subdiaz-Osorio’s full cooperation. Denying a motion to suppress, the court concluded that Subdiaz‐Osorio’s question about an attorney was not a request to have an attorney with him during the interview; he was asking about how he could obtain an attorney for the extradition hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, that Subdiaz‐Osorio did not unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Subdiaz‐Osorio’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The state court finding was not contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. View "Subdiaz-Osorio v. Humphreys" on Justia Law

Lett worked as an investigator for Chicago’s Civilian Office of Police Accountability. In 2016, Lett was investigating police involvement in a particular civilian shooting. The Chief Administrator, Fairley, directed Lett to include in the report a finding that police officers had planted a gun on the shooting victim. Lett refused because he did not believe that the evidence supported that finding. Lett raised his concerns with Fairley’s deputy, who spoke with Fairley. Soon after, Lett was removed from his investigative team, then removed from investigative work, and ultimately assigned to janitorial duties. Fairley opened an internal investigation that concluded that Lett had violated the office’s confidentiality policy. Fairley ordered that Lett be fired. Lett initiated a grievance through his union. The arbitrator ordered the office to reinstate Lett with back pay and to expunge his record. Fairley immediately placed Lett on administrative leave with pay. Lett was assigned on paper to the Police Department’s FOIA office but was not allowed to return to work. Lett sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for his refusal to write a false report and Monell liability for the city and Fairley in her official capacity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Lett spoke pursuant to his official duties and not as a private citizen when he refused to alter the report; the First Amendment does not apply. View "Lett v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) periodically administered an examination for sergeants seeking promotion to lieutenant. While the CPD retained discretion over whom to promote, those who scored highest on the exam were generally first in line. Word has served with the CPD since 2001. When he took the exam in 2006, he was ranked 150th. The sergeants ranked 1-149 received promotions; Word was the highest-scoring sergeant who did not. In 2015, when Word next took the exam, his ranking fell to 280th. He was passed over. Word alleges that three senior CPD leaders each had “wives or paramours” who were sergeants who took the 2015 exam and then received promotions. Word alleges that one defendant had early access to the exam and provided test content to the wives and paramours. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit, which alleged violations of equal protection and due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and breach of contract. While Illinois law prohibits “wilfully or corruptly furnish[ing] to any person any special or secret information,” there is no property interest in any municipal promotional process. Class-of-one equal protection claims are barred in the public employment context. Word’s s theory does not amount to gender discrimination. There was no contract and Word has not plausibly alleged that the city and exam administrator intended to confer legally enforceable rights on the test takers. View "Word v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Barnes works in facilities management at UIC, reporting to Donovan. UIC hired Barnes in 2008 as an operating engineer and later promoted him to assistant chief engineer. In 2015, a chief engineer retired. UIC identified 11 candidates, including Barnes, who received one of the top-three exam scores and met the minimum qualifications. Barnes and another candidate were African-American; nine candidates were white. Donavan interviewed the candidates without looking at personnel files or performance evaluations. Donovan selected Civito. Civito and Barnes both have several decades of education and relevant experience. Donovan had interviewed Barnes for 15-30 minutes. Barnes did not bring anything with him to the interview, nor had he been asked to. Donovan interviewed Civito for about 20 minutes. Civito, unprompted, brought written materials including his résumé, a letter of reference, a proposal to solve problems with a UIC building, and training items he developed. Barnes sued, alleging that UIC had a practice of not promoting African-Americans to the chief engineer level. Barnes learned during discovery that in performance reviews by the same supervisor, he had received a higher score than Civito. Donovan claimed that he selected Civito because he came to his interview fully prepared,, articulated the most thoughtful approach to the position and demonstrated a commitment to professional development. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Barnes lacked sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination or to allow the inference that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered for hiring Civito was pretextual. View "Barnes v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois" on Justia Law

Chicago officers Valadez and Reyes, in an unmarked police car patrolling a neighborhood where a gang-related shooting had recently occurred, saw a passenger in Cruz’s Chevy Tahoe fire gunshots at the occupants of another car. Cruz sped away. The officers followed Cruz’s Tahoe, which had dark, tinted windows, but did not activate emergency lights or sirens. Cruz turned and struck a parked car, pushing it forward into a second car, which rolled into a third. Cruz kept driving before crashing into another car and coming to a stop. The officers parked behind Cruz’s Tahoe, believing that it had stalled. Valadez began getting out of the car, announcing that he was a police officer. Cruz put his Tahoe into reverse, striking the police car, then pulled forward into a parking lot. The officers followed on foot, wearing bulletproof vests that displayed the police star. The parking lot was “pretty well lit.” Cruz’s passenger testified that he knew that Valadez was an officer because he could see Valadez’s vest. Cruz did not stop but turned back toward the exit. Cruz’s headlights shone directly at the officers, who opened fire. Cruz died as a result of a gunshot wound. Approximately 90 seconds elapsed from the initial shots until Cruz was shot; roughly 16 seconds elapsed during the encounter in the parking lot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force to protect others in the vicinity by preventing Cruz's escape. View "Ybarra v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Dr. Ley and his opioid addiction treatment company, DORN, conducted undercover surveillance, and decided Ley did not have a legitimate medical purpose in prescribing Suboxone. Indiana courts issued warrants, culminating in arrests of four physicians and one nurse and seven non-provider DORN employees. Indiana courts dismissed the charges against the non-providers and the nurse. Ley was acquitted; the state dismissed the charges against the remaining providers. DORN’s providers and non-provider employees sued, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, holding probable cause supported the warrants at issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to every plaintiff except Mackey, a part-time parking lot attendant. One of Ley’s former patients died and that individual’s family expressed concerns about Ley; other doctors voiced concerns, accusing Ley of prescribing Suboxone for pain to avoid the 100-patient limit and bring in more revenue. At least one pharmacy refused to fill DORN prescriptions. Former patients reported that they received their prescriptions without undergoing any physical exam. DORN physicians prescribed an unusually high amount of Suboxone; two expert doctors opined that the DORN physicians were not prescribing Suboxone for a legitimate medical purpose. There was evidence that the non-provider employees knew of DORN’s use of pre-signed prescriptions and sometimes distributed them. There were, however, no facts alleged in the affidavit that Mackey was ever armed, impeded investigations, handled money, or possessed narcotics. View "Vierk v. Whisenand" on Justia Law

Johnson showed up drunk for an appointment at a rehab clinic and threatened a therapist and the security guard. Police officers arrested and handcuffed Johnson behind his back. He told them that he would run away; they sat him on the pavement next to a patrol car. Subsequent events were captured on video. Johnson managed to stand. The officers walked him backward and sat him on the grass. They returned to their cars to do paperwork. In about a minute Johnson got to his knees and stood again. He started to move away, shouting threats and racial taunts. Officer Rogers pulled Johnson backward by his cuffed hands. When that did not return him to the ground, Rogers claims he used a leg sweep. Johnson contends that his fall and compound leg fracture resulted from a kick designed to punish him rather than to return him to a sitting position. The grainy video does not enable a viewer to distinguish these possibilities. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rogers is entitled to qualified immunity. Johnson, who had told the officers that he wanted to run away, was not under control. That an attempt to regain control caused injury, perhaps because poorly executed, does not lead to liability. The excessive-force inquiry is objective. If the force used was objectively allowable, the officer’s state of mind cannot make it unconstitutional. View "Johnson v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Harnishfeger published a book under a pseudonym, Conversations with Monsters: Chilling, Depraved and Deviant Phone Sex Conversations, concerning her time as a phone‐sex operator. A month later, Harnishfeger began a one‐year stint with the Indiana Army National Guard as a member of the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program, a federal anti-poverty program administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS). When Harnishfeger’s National Guard supervisor discovered Conversations and identified Harnishfeger as its author, she demanded that CNCS remove Harnishfeger. CNCS complied and ultimately cut her from the program. Harnishfeger filed suit alleging First Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act violations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The book is protected speech; it was written and published before Harnishfeger began her VISTA service. Its content is unrelated to CNCS, VISTA, and the Guard. It was written for a general audience, concerning personal experiences and is a matter of public concern. A jury could find that Harnishfeger’s National Guard supervisor infringed her free-speech rights by removing her from her placement because of it. The supervisor’s actions were under color of state law, so 42 U.S.C. 1983 offers a remedy, and she was not entitled to qualified immunity. There is no basis, however, for holding CNCS or its employees liable. Harnishfeger failed to show a triable issue on any federal defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation. View "Harnishfeger v. United States" on Justia Law

Centralia’s “Rude Boyz” gang threatened a boy who witnessed a gang-related shooting. The threats were investigated by Peebles, who had arrested many Boyz and was the “go-to guy” for gang intelligence. As Peebles and Sergeant James arrested the gang members on open warrants, Barnes drove by. According to Peebles, Barnes parked and yelled epithets. Law enforcement knew that Barnes had gang connections and that the Rude Boyz used Barnes’s home. Barnes posted on Facebook: “This thirsty b**** Mike out here on the same on [sic] bulls***.” Barnes later posted: “But this b**** don’t believe that what goes around come[s] around and when you got kids of your own.” A police secretary saw the posts and texted Peebles, who felt that these were credible threats against him and his family. Sergeant James arrested Barnes for intimidation. Weeks later the state dropped those charges. Barnes sued Peebles for unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the city had an express policy or widespread practice that motivated her arrest and prosecution. Peebles and James testified Peebles made his complaint against Barnes as a private citizen. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. With no evidence Peebles acted under color of state law in his role as a witness in Barnes’s arrest and prosecution, Barnes cannot prove Peebles violated Barnes’s rights against unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution. Barnes’s submitted no evidence to support her contention that Centralia failed to train its officers in handling profanity and that her profanity was the cause of her arrest. View "Barnes v. City of Centralia" on Justia Law

Frederickson lived in Joliet. He was homeless, had a sex crime conviction, and was subject to the Illinois Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA). He has to register every week in the jurisdiction in which he resides. Joliet requires that a person moving to a new jurisdiction register with the new jurisdiction, and “register out” of the old jurisdiction within three days. For Frederickson's first four years in Joliet, Frederickson complied. In 2007 Detective Landeros took over Joliet’s SORA registrations. The relationship became so contentious that Frederickson began bringing witnesses to his registrations. Landeros arrested Frederickson several times. In January 2011, Frederickson informed Landeros that he was leaving Joliet. Landeros threatened to arrest Frederickson (on unclear grounds) if Frederickson relocated. Frederickson moved to Bolingbrook on February 8. On February 9, Frederickson registered in Bolingbrook. Landeros believed that Frederickson had to “register out” of Joliet. To update Illinois’s Law Enforcement Agency Data System database, Bolingbrook needed Frederickson’s LEADS file. Only one law enforcement agency can “own” a LEADS file and only the agency that owns the file can update it. Joliet refused to transfer Frederickson’s LEADS file. Landeros indicated that Frederickson was not actually residing in Bolingbrook. Several additional problems followed and Frederickson was convicted of failing to register on March 3. 2011.In Frederickson's civil rights suit, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a finding that Frederickson had adequately alleged that Landeros had singled Frederickson out for unfavorable treatment, was motivated solely by personal animus, and lacked a rational basis for his actions. The court denied Landeros’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Frederickson’s equal protection right to police protection uncorrupted by personal animus was clearly established. View "Frederickson v. Landeros" on Justia Law