Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hildreth, an inmate at an Illinois maximum-security prison, suffers from Parkinson’s disease. He takes a prescription medication, Mirapex, to manage his symptoms. As a specialty prescription, Mirapex was not kept in stock at the prison; it was filled by an outside pharmacy. The prison allows Hildreth to keep a monthly supply of Mirapex in his cell. To refill his prescription, Hildreth must submit a sticker within seven days of the end of the prescription. Hildreth usually receives his refill when he has three to five days of pills left. On three occasions Hildreth received his refill a few days late, causing him to experience withdrawal symptoms. His symptoms also render his handwriting illegible, so Hildreth uses a typewriter to draft documents. He requested to keep that typewriter in his cell, which the prison denied because it was considered contraband. The prison provided Hildreth with an assistant to help him draft documents and increased access to the library where he can use a typewriter. With those accommodations, Hildreth has not missed any court deadlines.Hildreth sued Wexford Health and jail administrators under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hildreth has not shown medication delays were a widespread practice or custom at the prison; he received reasonable accommodations for his Parkinson’s disease, . View "Hildreth v. Butler" on Justia Law

Two female Polk County Jail inmates endured repeated sexual assaults by correctional officer Christensen. The County’s written policy prohibited sexual contact between inmates and guards but failed to address the prevention and detection of such conduct. The County did not provide meaningful training on the topic. Near the beginning of the relevant period, the County learned that another guard made predatory sexual advances toward a different female inmate. The County imposed minor discipline on the guard but made no institutional response—no review of its policy, no training, and no communication with inmates on how to report such abuse. In a civil rights suit, the jury returned verdicts for the inmates. A Seventh Circuit panel overturned the verdict against Polk County, determining that the evidence failed to meet the “Monell” standard for municipal liability.On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the verdicts against both Christensen and Polk County. While the standard for municipal liability is demanding, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The evidence did not require the jury to accept as inevitable that Christensen’s conduct was unpreventable, undetectable, and incapable of giving rise to Monell liability. Nor was the jury compelled to conclude that the sexual abuse had only one cause. The law allowed the jury to consider the evidence in its entirety, use its common sense, and draw inferences to decide for itself. View "J.K.J. v. Christensen" on Justia Law

Hoglund and Mallot's daughter, A.H., was born in 1998. A.H. twice told her mother her father was molesting her. Mallot went to the police after Hoglund admitted he committed adultery. Detective Holliday interviewed A.H. in 2006. She said her father had her perform oral sex on him. Dr. Butler examined A.H. Hoglund denied the allegations but made strange and incriminating statements. Indiana charged him with child molesting. A.H. met with Counselor Shestak in 2007 and Dr. Mayle in 2009. At trial in 2010, A.H. testified; Butler, Shestak, and Mayle relayed what A.H. told them and essentially said they believed her. A jury found Hoglund guilty.After exhausting state proceedings, Hoglund filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object properly to hearsay when the prosecutor asked the experts to say what A.H. said. The prosecutor invoked the medical exception under Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(4); defense counsel failed to assert the lack of a foundation that A.H. thought she was speaking to the experts for diagnosis or treatment. He also claimed the admission of the experts’ vouching violated due process. Indiana precedent at that time allowed limited, indirect vouching. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Defense counsel was deficient but did not prejudice Hoglund. Even without the objectionable hearsay, the case against Hoglund was strong. The vouching did not produce a significant likelihood an innocent person was convicted. View "Hoglund v. Neal" on Justia Law

James, a pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail, was assaulted by another inmate and suffered severe facial injuries. James filed a pro se civil-rights lawsuit against Hale, the jail infirmary's administrator, accusing her of inadequately treating his medical needs. He later acquired counsel. Significant discovery followed, including the production of jail infirmary and outside medical records that contradicted allegations in his complaint. James obtained leave to file an amended complaint, but the factual section simply repeated the allegations in the original version. In a subsequent deposition, James contradicted those factual assertions.When Hale moved for summary judgment, James responded by swearing out an affidavit incorporating by reference the allegations in the amended complaint. The magistrate disregarded the affidavit and an affidavit submitted by James’s mother and recommended that the court grant the motion. The district judge excluded the affidavits under the sham-affidavit rule and entered summary judgment for Hale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. James’s affidavit was a sham and an improper attempt to convert the complaint's allegations into sworn testimony to avert summary judgment. The exclusion of his mother’s affidavit was harmless error because she added nothing of substance. The constitutional claim lacks factual support, so summary judgment in Hale’s favor was proper. View "James v. Hale" on Justia Law

Fredrickson, in pre-trial federal custody, unsuccessfully sought release under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142 asserting that conditions existed to ensure that he would not be a flight risk or a threat to the public. Five months later Fredrickson filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Fredrickson then sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that the court wrongly denied him release on bond and that he was denied effective assistance by counsel who allowed his bail hearing to be delayed and then failed to appeal. He also challenged the determination that his notice of appeal was untimely, arguing that the Bail Reform Act permits him to appeal his detention at any time.The district court dismissed the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that in January 2020 Fredrickson was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 2020; he faces a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The district court appropriately refused to entertain the request for pretrial release in his section 2241 petition. A federal detainee’s request for release pending trial can be considered under only the Bail Reform Act, which created a comprehensive scheme to control pretrial release or detention decisions. No authority allows a detainee to contest pretrial detention through a section 2241 petition simply because he missed the deadline to appeal. View "Fredrickson v. Terrill" on Justia Law

Following a 1992 fight that involved Johnson, Herron, and Walker, two shooters shot the three men. Johnson survived. In the hospital, Johnson described a shooter by the street name “Duke,” where Duke lived, and Duke's car. Johnson identified Duke and his accomplice from a photo array. Police pulled over a vehicle matching Johnson’s description and arrested the driver, Kirkman, and the passenger, who matched the general description of the second shooter. Kirkman had a tattoo of Duke on his arm. Police took additional photos and presented a second photo array to Johnson, who identified them as the shooters. At trial, Johnson identified Kirkman and his passenger as the shooters. There was disputed testimony about the cause of the fight. Convicted of murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, Kirkman was sentenced to life in prison.Johnson had a change of heart and submitted an affidavit, identifying Ford and an unknown man as the shooters. At Kirkman’s post-conviction hearing, Johnson testified that he and his family had been threatened. Other testimony was inconsistent with Johnson’s. Illinois courts denied post-conviction relief, finding that Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. Johnson later pleaded guilty for perjury but failed to specify which statement was false. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Illinois courts found Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. An evidentiary hearing satisfied Kirkman’s due process rights. The Illinois trial court’s determination defeated Kirkman’s innocence and perjured testimony claims. View "Kirkman v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Tuduj, having received extensive dental treatment, filed a “deliberate indifference” suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his dentists and prison officials. The court recruited counsel to assist Tuduj in filing an amended complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel defended against two summary judgment motions, one arguing that Tuduj had not exhausted his administrative remedies and another on the meritsWhile the motions were pending, Tuduj moved “for leave to represent himself,” stating that he was “concerned that his counsel has filed a structurally, technically and legally insufficient response doomed to be denied.” He asked to file his own brief, except “in the event this Honorable Court deems counsel’s response … legally sufficient and Grants same[,] Plaintiff would be open to continued effective representation.” A magistrate denied Tuduj’s motion, stating that Tuduj “varie[d] between saying he would like to" represent himself and "indicating that he is happy with counselʹs representation as long as he prevails.” The district judge granted the motions for summary judgment, citing professional judgment and finding “no competent evidence” of any policy that unlawfully influenced dental‐treatment decisions. The Seventh Circuit rejected Tuduj’s argument that the court wrongly denied his “unqualified” right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. 1654, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the Seventh Amendment. The district court permissibly denied his equivocal request. View "Tuduj v. Newbold" on Justia Law

In 2011, Illinois prisoner Williams was diagnosed with a left-eye cataract. He became completely blind in that eye and experienced dizziness, acute pain, photophobia, and the feeling that some foreign substance was in his eye. His doctors recommended cataract extraction surgery; without this common operation, they would be unable to detect other vision-threatening conditions. Wexford, which provides prison health services, refused to authorize the surgery, based on its “one good eye” policy. In February 2016, an optometrist diagnosed a right-eye cataract and a possible macular hole and vitreomacular traction. Weeks later, a specialist recommended cataract extraction. Doctors found no vision in Williams’s left eye and cataracts in both eyes. Still, he did not qualify for surgery.In February 2016, Williams filed a grievance form, checking a box indicating an emergency. Pontiac’s warden responded by checking a box: “an emergency is not substantiated. Offender should submit this grievance in the normal manner.” Williams asserts that the Administrative Review Board (ARB). denied his grievance. Williams filed a second grievance in August; the warden denied emergency status. The ARB returned the grievance to Williams without addressing the merits. It checked boxes indicating that Williams had not satisfied the requirements of the standard procedure; he was required to provide responses from his counselor and others. Williams filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, stating that Williams “did not file a standard grievance" after the denials of emergency status, thereby failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Williams did enough to satisfy the PLRA. View "Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenosha Officer Torres, on patrol, received a call requesting assistance apprehending Siler. The dispatcher stated that Siler was wanted on a warrant for strangulation and suffocation, had taken a vehicle without consent, and was known to have violent tendencies. Siler did not actually have a warrant for strangulation and suffocation; he was wanted for violating probation. When Torres spotted Siler, he activated his lights and siren. Siler did not stop, resulting in a three-minute chase. Siler crashed his car and fled on foot. Torres followed him to an auto body shop. Bystanders indicated that Siler was in the back room. Siler again attempted to flee. Torres blocked the exit. Within seconds Torres and Siler were on opposite sides of an SUV and began to move in “cat and mouse” fashion. Torres pointed his service revolver at Siler, ordering him to the ground. Siler responded, “fuck you” and “shoot me.” Siler bent over and, when he stood up, Torres saw a black cylindrical object pressed against Siler’s forearm. Torres yelled “drop it.” Siler responded, “fuck you,” “no,” and “shoot me.” Torres still could not see Siler’s hands. Eventually, Torres fired his gun seven times successively. Siler died from gunshot wounds. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by Siler’s estate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Torres, citing qualified immunity. Torres’s action conformed to constitutional standards. View "Siler v. City of Kenosha" on Justia Law

The doctor examined Chambers during the intake process at the Stateville Correctional Center. Chambers was housed there for a few weeks when he was processed into state custody. Chambers requested medication to treat a flare-up of a painful chronic condition, herpes. The doctor did not provide the medication. Chambers filed a grievance with the Stateville grievance office but was transferred to a different prison before the grievance was investigated. A grievance officer returned the grievance to Chambers unreviewed and invited him to take the matter to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), which normally serves in an appellate capacity reviewing decisions of grievance officers. ARB’s regulations also specify that grievances pertaining to problems at an earlier-assigned prison must be filed directly with ARB. Chambers skipped this step and instead sued the prison doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners must pursue their complaints about prison conditions through all levels of the relevant administrative-review system before bringing a lawsuit in federal court. View "Chambers v. Sood" on Justia Law