Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In August 2015 Gill launched his fifth congressional campaign. Unlike his past campaigns, Gill ran as an independent. Although Gill needed 10,754 signatures to qualify for the general ballot, he came up 2,000 short, so the Illinois State Officers Electoral Board did not permit him to appear on the general ballot for Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. Gill filed suit, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the Illinois State Board of Elections summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court failed to conduct a fact-based inquiry as mandated by the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which considers the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate and identifies and evaluates the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. The court must consider the extent to which those state interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. View "Gill v. Scholz" on Justia Law

An Illinois prison dentist extracted one of inmate Murphy’s teeth. Two days later, a Friday, Murphy went to the prison’s healthcare unit, complaining that his cheek had swollen significantly. Rice, a prison nurse, examined Murphy and described the swelling as “softball‐size[d]” and suspected infection. Dr. Shah prescribed penicillin. Murphy received penicillin that morning. The next day, Saturday, Murphy made several trips to the healthcare unit. The nurse was unable by phone to reach Dr. Shah, who, on Monday, examined Murphy for the first time. After additional treatment attempts, Murphy was sent to an emergency room. A CT scan showed signs of an infection and the closing of Murphy’s airway. Aan oral and maxillofacial surgeon diagnosed him with Ludwig’s angina—a disease that involves infections of nearly all the anatomic spaces in the neck and requires urgent surgical treatment. Ultimately, Murphy underwent three surgeries. Murphy sued Shah for deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the doctor. The record reflects not deliberate indifference but at most a medical disagreement over the course of treatment View "Murphy v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Jackson was driving with Freeman as a passenger, Chicago Police Officer Petrus, on patrol with other officers, observed an object hanging from Jackson’s rearview mirror that appeared to be an air freshener. Petrus ran Jackson's license plate through a database, then pulled Jackson over for violating a city ordinance regarding the obstruction of the driver’s clear view. During the traffic stop, the officers discovered a loaded rifle beside the front passenger’s seat and two loaded handguns underneath the driver’s seat. The men were charged as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At a suppression hearing, Petrus testified that she believed the law to be that a driver “cannot have anything obstructing the driver’s view” and that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view. She explained that her “verbiage was off” when she first spoke to Jackson and said that “can’t have anything hanging from there [the rearview mirror]” and that she was “trying to gain control of the situation.” The court concluded that “this type of air freshener is enough justification to pull the car over,” finding Petrus “very credible.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All that is required for a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion; the officer had an articulable and objective basis for suspecting that the air freshener obstructed Jackson’s clear view in violation of the city municipal code, so the stop was lawful. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued an executive order to reduce transmission of the coronavirus that, among other things, capped at 10 the number of people who could attend religious gatherings. A list of “essential” functions exempt from the 10-person cap included organizations providing food, shelter, and social services, and other necessities of life. Other gatherings, such as concerts, are forbidden, regardless of size.The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the limit effectively foreclosed in-person religious services, even though they were free to hold multiple 10-person services, and that alternatives—online services or services in parking lots while worshipers remain in cars—are inadequate. Before the case was argued, the Governor issued a new order, which permits the resumption of all religious services, with the 10-person cap as a “recommendation.”The Seventh Circuit found that the issue was not moot but declined to grant relief. Illinois has not discriminated against religion and has not violated the First Amendment. While warehouse workers and people who assist the needy may be at the same risk as people who gather for large religious worship, movies and concerts are a better comparison group. By that standard, any discrimination has been in favor of religion. While all theaters and concert halls in Illinois have been closed since mid-March, sanctuaries and houses of worship were open, though to smaller gatherings. View "Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Reid sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a corrections officer used excessive force against him. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Reid had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).The Seventh Circuit vacated. The prison’s communications were so obscure that they made further steps of its administrative process unknowable and, thus, unavailable to Reid. Reid had filed both a “standard grievance” and an emergency grievance, followed by an appeal to the Review Board, which was returned to him. Reid filed a second emergency grievance, which was again denied; the Board returned Reid’s subsequent appeal. The prison’s responses indicated that there was no conceivable next step for Reid. The grievance officer’s memorandum gave him conflicting messages. The Board told him that his appeal was missing specific documents but did not check the box specifying that those documents needed to be provided or that some explanation needed to be given for their absence. When the warden and the Board rejected the second grievance, neither mentioned a pending standard grievance or an ongoing Internal Affairs investigation. As far as Reid could tell, his standard grievance had been either lost in the shuffle or resolved against him. View "Reid v. Balota" on Justia Law

Shaffer sued corrections officials, alleging that an officer attacked him and that others refused to treat his injuries. The court directed Shaffer to notify the court and the defendants if he were released, stating that it would not independently investigate his whereabouts and that failure to notify the court of any address changes could result in a dismissal. Shaffer conducted discovery and flooded the court with filings until he was released on parole 13 months later. The defendants, having had mail returned as undeliverable, moved for an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The case languished for five months. On the deadline for the close of discovery, a defendant filed another motion. A month passed without any response, so the court dismissed Shaffer's case under FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute. Shaffer’s parole was revoked. Shaffer filed a notice of his new address, with requests for appointment of counsel and a status hearing 47 days after the entry of judgment. Shaffer asserted that his notices to opposing counsel and the court about his release must have gotten lost in the mail and that prison officials had not forwarded his mail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shaffer’s motion. Shaffer’s allegation that he tried to notify the court was self-serving and not credible; it was not plausible that the postal service lost multiple, separate mailings. Shaffer had not established that his failure to update the parties stemmed from mistake or excusable neglect. View "Shaffer v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law

Samantha died from a gunshot wound to the head. The coroner concluded Samantha committed suicide. Samantha’s parents, the Harers' claim Samantha’s boyfriend, Flores—a Crest Hill, Illinois police officer—murdered Samantha during an argument at her home in neighboring Channahon. The Harers sued Flores for wrongful death and other torts and Crest Hill for its alleged unconstitutional practice of concealing officers’ misconduct, which the Harers allege emboldened Flores to kill Samantha. The Harers also sued Channahon and police officers, asserting these defendants denied the Harers their constitutional right of access to court when they engaged in a cover-up to protect Flores. The Channahon defendants moved to dismiss the access claim, arguing they did not prevent the Harers from initiating a wrongful death lawsuit against Flores within the statute of limitations. The court denied the motion, holding that the Channahon defendants still frustrated their judicial access by delaying the Harers’ suit and costing them money; clearly-established law prohibited the officers’ conduct, so qualified immunity did not shield the officers.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The backward-looking access-to-court claim is untenable because the underlying tort claims are timely, facially plausible, and still pending; their access claim is not ripe for review. Post-filing conduct generally cannot serve as a basis for an access-to-court claim. View "Harer v. Casey" on Justia Law

O’Neal was convicted of aggravated battery of a police officer after an altercation during a traffic stop. While incarcerated and while his appeal was pending, O’Neal filed a pro se lawsuit that asserted 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers. Under "Heck," O’Neal’s section 1983 suit was barred unless his conviction was reversed or expunged. Heck-barred suits are usually stayed or dismissed without prejudice, but after O’Neal failed to comply with briefing deadlines, the court ordered O’Neal to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. O’Neal didn’t respond. The court dismissed his claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Months later, O’Neal’s conviction was overturned on appeal. Ten months later, O’Neal returned to court, with counsel, with a “Motion to Reinstate the Case and for Leave to File an Amended Complaint" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. His motion nowhere mentioned Rule 60(b), the mechanism for obtaining relief from judgment. The defendants' response, maintained that O’Neal was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief. O’Neal’s reply brief attempted to articulate why Rule 60(b) relief was warranted.The court denied O’Neal’s Rule 15 motion, explaining that he could not file an amended complaint in a terminated case, and held that the Rule 60(b) argument was waived. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. O’Neal waived any argument under Rule 60(b) and, because the case was terminated on the merits, the court was right to deny his Rule 15 motion. View "O'Neal v. Reilly" on Justia Law

Bartholomew County, Indiana officials believe that Cary committed suicide. His son, Logan, believes that Cary was murdered by his wife and her sons. Contending that the Sheriff and his deputies have lost or destroyed evidence that would help Cary’s estate pursue claims against the putative murderers, Logan filed a civil-rights suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986. Logan purported to represent his father’s estate, but except for a brief time he has not been its administrator. The estate would not pursue litigation, but assigned Logan “[w]hatever interest the Estate of Cary A. Owsley has in the federal lawsuit.” The district court dismissed Logan’s suit for lack of standing, stating that Logan has not suffered any personal injury.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Logan asserts injury and seeks damages. Decedents’ relatives may have damages claims against tortfeasors. Logan also has the benefit of the assignment from the estate. Federal law permits assignees to sue on assignors’ claims. The district judge’s belief that the claim is not worth anything concerns the merits rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. The first issue on remand should be to decide whether an access-to-courts claim, the only thing covered by the assignment, can be based on an assertion that the defendants concealed or destroyed evidence that could have been relevant in state court. View "Owsley v. Gorbett" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate McCaa, pro se, claimed that prison officials violated Eighth Amendment rights by responding with deliberate indifference to his threats to commit suicide or to harm himself in other ways. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit ruled that in denying a fourth motion for recruitment of counsel, the district court had not addressed sufficiently McCaa’s ability to present his case himself in light of McCaa’s transfer to a different prison where he said he could not locate witnesses or obtain other discovery, as well as the effects of his fifth-grade reading level and serious mental illness. On remand, the district court considered the issue and reached the same decision to not attempt to recruit counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the district judge’s "detailed and persuasive opinion." He complied with the remand mandate and did not abuse his discretion. The court noted that, on remand, McCaa did not renew his own efforts to obtain counsel; he was able to “send and receive correspondence, make copies, write motions and briefs, and perform legal research;” his reply in support of his renewed motion for counsel was impressive; and he had recently obtained a GED and now reads at a ninth-grade level. View "McCaa v. Hamilton" on Justia Law