Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Officers Cates and Hannah responded to a call by Lemons. While Lemons was alone with Cates in her home, he sexually assaulted her. Lemons was arrested, then taken to a hospital. A nurse documented swelling on Lemons’ neck and her bloodshot eyes, as evidence that she had been choked. She did not show signs of vaginal trauma or injury. Cates initially denied having sex with Lemons but later admitted to having oral and vaginal sex with Lemons, claiming it was consensual. Cates was charged under 18 U.S.C. 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law) and 18 U.S.C. 942(c) (use of a weapon during a crime of violence). The jury found Cates guilty on the first count and not guilty on the firearm count. By special verdict, the jury found Cates committed aggravated sexual abuse but found Lemons did not suffer bodily injury. Cates was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that the district court had instructed the jury incorrectly on the elements of aggravated sexual abuse by defining “force” to include not just force, but also psychological coercion.Cates was then charged with violation of civil rights under color of law, which again alleged his actions constituted aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a “double jeopardy” motion to dismiss. Cates failed to show the jury decided he did not use force to cause Lemons to engage in sexual acts. A rational jury could conclude that Cates forcibly grabbed Lemons’ neck and continued to squeeze it during the assault without causing her bodily injury, consistent with the jury’s findings. View "United States v. Cates" on Justia Law

Demkovich was hired in 2012 as the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic Church. Demkovich is gay, overweight, and suffers from diabetes and metabolic syndrome. Demkovich claims Reverend Dada subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation and his disabilities. After Demkovich married his partner, Reverend Dada demanded Demkovich’s resignation because his marriage violated Church teachings. Demkovich refused. Reverend Dada fired him. Demkovich filed hostile environment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.The Seventh Circuit declined to extend the constitutional "ministerial" exemption to categorically bar all hostile environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees where there is no challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing. The court reasoned that the First Amendment does not bar those same ministerial employees from bringing contract and tort claims against their employers and supervisors, nor does it bar enforcement of criminal laws arising from the mistreatment of those same employees. Religious employers’ control over tangible employment actions—hiring, firing, promoting, deciding compensation, job assignments, and the like—provides ample protection for the free exercise of religion. The First Amendment does not require complete immunity from the sometimes horrific abuse that a bright-line rule would protect. View "Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish" on Justia Law

Johnson, a student at North Central, reported that she had been raped at an apartment complex by two classmates, Froschauer and Risley. North Central Principal Kirk was aware of a previous rape allegation against Froschauer, made by one of Johnson’s friends. Pending investigations by the Department of Child Services and the sheriff’s department, Principal Kirk issued a no‐contact order between Johnson and Froschauer. The school’s lawyers advised Principal Kirk not to “negatively impact [Froschauer’s] track to graduate on time based on unsubstantiated allegations.” Johnson’s physician and Hawker had requested that Johnson be placed in homebound schooling. Principal Kirk placed Johnson in homebound schooling so that she could avoid her morning classes with Froschauer. She still went to school in the afternoons. The prosecutor did not file criminal charges against Froschauer. The sheriff’s department would not release details of the investigation to the school. Her family refused to allow the school to interview Johnson for a Title IX investigation. Johnson subsequently alleged some bullying at school and obtained a protective order against Froschauer. Johnson alleged additional harassment and eventually withdrew from North Central.In her suit under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson waived any arguments regarding the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The school was not deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s claims of sexual harassment, View "Johnson v. Northeast School Corp." on Justia Law

In 2013, Siddique applied for a temporary student-government position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His application was said to have been rejected because he did not meet a minimum-enrollment requirement crafted for the position. Siddique argued that his application was rejected not because of the enrollment criteria but because of his critical stances against members of the University administration who worked with the student government and who were involved with the application process.Siddique sued University officials in their individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment right to be free from governmental retaliation. The district court determined that qualified immunity prevented Siddique’s claim from proceeding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law does not clearly establish that enforcing an enrollment requirement for a student-government position violates the First Amendment. The right to public employment free from retaliation is not at issue and any violation of state law is irrelevant. View "Siddique v. Laliberte" on Justia Law

Officers Duszak and Weber initiated a traffic stop because the light over Harrington’s license plate was out. Dispatch notified the officers that there was no record of Harrington’s license plate. The officers attempted to identify the vehicle through the VIN number and asked Harrington to exit the vehicle. Harrington fled. The officers chased him down; one tased him and the other hit him with a baton. Harrington’s gun fell to the ground. Officers handcuffed Harrington and took him to the hospital for his injuries. Harrington sued, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene. The jury ruled in favor of the officers. Harrington’s motions for post‐trial discovery and a new trial were denied.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the gun evidence was admissible and not unduly prejudicial. Harrington failed to present any evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury could infer that the officers’ actions were racially motivated. Without support for race‐based allegations during the case or presented at trial, introducing this argument at closing arguments would have been highly inflammatory and prejudicial.Harrington unsuccessfully sought sanctions post‐trial based on an unverified third‐party website detailing undisclosed complaints against Duszak. A records request with the city disclosed that four complaints not included in discovery were filed after the discovery request. Four were not complaints, but information reports. Harrington failed to show how the absence of these records prejudiced him. View "Harrington v. Duszak" on Justia Law

Waagner was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and of possessing a stolen vehicle that had crossed a state line. The court adopted the PSR finding that Waagner was an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on his prior convictions for “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B): two 1978 convictions for Ohio aggravated burglary and one 1992 conviction for Ohio attempted robbery. Waagner had a sentencing guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment; the statutory minimum was 15 years. While awaiting sentencing, Waagner escaped from custody and, while a fugitive, committed offenses in multiple districts. After his apprehension, he pleaded guilty to escape. The court imposed a 364-month sentence.Waagner filed a second collateral attack on his sentence, challenging his ACCA classification. The district court denied his motion, finding that, although his Ohio aggravated burglary convictions no longer constitute ACCA predicate offenses under the Supreme Court's 2015 "Johnson" decision, invalidating the residual clause, they still qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA's enumerated offenses clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The advent of Johnson permitted Waagner to bring a second motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255; before Johnson, any such challenge would have been futile. Nonetheless, Ohio aggravated burglary and Ohio attempted robbery are violent felonies as that term is defined in the ACCA. View "Waagner v. United States" on Justia Law

After four months of pretrial detention at the Madison County jail in 2007, Pittman attempted suicide by hanging himself with a blanket. The attempt left Pittman in a vegetative state. In his suicide note, he stated that the guards were “f***ing” with him and would not give him access to “crisis [counseling].” Banovz, an inmate housed near Pittman’s cell, substantiated the claim that Pittman had made in his suicide note. In a recorded interview with a county detective, Banovz stated that in the days leading up to Pittman’s suicide attempt, Pittman had asked officers Werner and Eaton to refer him to crisis counseling; neither of them followed through with their promises. On remand, in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court’s exclusion of the Banovz video interview was a reversible error. After a second trial, the jury again returned a verdict for the defendants.The Seventh Circuit again remanded. One of the jury instructions erroneously directed the jury to evaluate Pittman’s Fourteenth Amendment claim according to a subjective rather than objective standard. The jury was told to consider whether the defendants “consciously failed to take reasonable measures to prevent [Pittman] from harming himself.” View "Pittman v. Madison County" on Justia Law

Machicote, a Wisconsin inmate underwent surgery to remove damaged bone, tissue, and cartilage in his ankle after he suffered an injury while playing basketball in the prison yard. After the procedure, the surgeon supplied Machicote with oxycodone and warned that he would be in “extreme pain” when the medication wore off. He was discharged with instructions recommending narcotic-strength painkillers every six hours. At the prison, Dr. Herweijer ordered Tylenol #3, as needed every six hours for three days. Because of Nurse Stecker’s scheduling of the doses, Machicote woke at 3:30 a.m. in “excruciating pain.” Machicote continued to have trouble accessing the medication that had been ordered; the prison’s medication distribution schedule did not match Machicote’s prescription. Concerned about pain during the night, Machicote was told: “That’s how it will go.” Machicote’s medication order ran out completely and he began experiencing agonizing pain around the clock. Nurse Stecker refused to contact a doctor. Five days later, Dr. Hoffman prescribed him another painkiller, Tramadol. Machicote did not receive the medication for two more days, and his medical records show that the pain required management for several more weeks.In Machicote’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the other defendants but vacated in part; a factual issue remains as to the deliberate indifference of Nurse Stecker. View "Machicote v. Roethlisberger" on Justia Law

In July 2010, Fieldman climbed into a truck in a Walmart parking lot and told a hitman that he wanted his ex-wife and her boyfriend killed. The hitman was actually an undercover police officer who videotaped their conversation. Fieldman was convicted in Illinois state court for solicitation of murder for hire. Fieldman contested his intent, a necessary element of the offense, and sought to testify about his interactions with the informant during the weeks before his conversation with the hitman. Fieldman believed this testimony would provide critical contextual information about his state of mind and demonstrate that his meeting with the hitman was a charade. The trial court did not allow the jury to hear this testimony because the court concluded it was irrelevant. Fieldman unsuccessfully appealed his convictions.In his federal habeas petition, Fieldman successfully argued that the court’s exclusion of his testimony deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of the testimony was contrary to clearly established federal law confirming a defendant’s right to testify, on his own behalf, about circumstances bearing directly on his guilt or innocence or the jury’s ascertainment of guilt. The exclusion of material portions of his testimony had a detrimental effect on his interests because it undercut his entire defense and effectively prevented him from challenging the state’s strongest evidence. View "Fieldman v. Brannon" on Justia Law

A certified class claimed that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet guards; the inmates were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder, in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their sanitary protection in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies, clothing, and the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough.The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment theory; a jury returned a defense verdict on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists as to the reasonableness of the strip and body cavity searches. View "Henry v. Hulett" on Justia Law