Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Patrick was convicted of double murder in 1995 and sentenced to life in prison. The convictions were vacated in 2014. The Cook County Circuit Court issued a certificate of innocence. Patrick filed suit for wrongful conviction against seven Chicago police officers and two prosecutors, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. Chicago, also a defendant, stipulated to liability if any of its officers were found responsible for violating Patrick’s rights. A jury exonerated the prosecutors and one officer but found six officers liable and awarded more than $13 million in compensatory damages plus punitive damages.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district judge should have dismissed the case as a sanction for Patrick’s acknowledged perjury during discovery. The judge’s ruling was a reasonable exercise of his discretion. Patrick’s lies concerned peripheral matters and were fully exposed during a rigorous attack on his credibility that emphasized his criminal history and gang affiliation. The admission of the certificate of innocence was not unfairly prejudicial, even in combination with closing argument statements by Patrick’s lawyer. The jury instructions, which failed to explain that Patrick had the burden to prove that the fabricated evidence was used against him at his criminal trial and was material, contained a harmless error. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cook County Jail detainees filed suit after the Jail reported an outbreak of COVID-19, arguing that the Sheriff violated their due process rights by failing to provide them with reasonably safe living conditions. They sought an injunction requiring the Sheriff to implement procedures related to social distancing, sanitation, diagnostic testing, and personal protective equipment for the duration of the pandemic. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, requiring the Sheriff to provide hand sanitizer and soap to all detainees and face masks to detainees in quarantine, and prohibiting the use of a “bullpen” for new detainees. Dismissing the Sheriff’s contention that he faced feasibility limitations on further social distancing, the court later concluded that the detainees were reasonably likely to succeed on their contention that group housing and double-celling is objectively unreasonable, except in certain situations.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in analyzing the issue of group housing and double-celling by failing to consider the Sheriff’s conduct in its totality, failing to afford proper deference to the Sheriff’s judgment in adopting policies necessary to ensure safety and security, and citing an incorrect legal standard when evaluating the likelihood that the claims will succeed on their merits. Regarding the remaining relief, the court made detailed factual findings, properly considered the Sheriff’s conduct in its totality, and closely tailored the relief to CDC guidelines. View "Mays v. Dart" on Justia Law

Marshall worked at the Indiana Department of Corrections for over 20 years. He received good reviews and promotions. He identified as homosexual. He reached the rank of Internal Affairs Investigator. In 2015, he was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Warden Brown issued a written reprimand. In 2016, he attended a law enforcement conference in Indianapolis. A sheriff from another county complained that Marshall became intoxicated at the conference and behaved inappropriately. Marshall denies the allegations. Later that month, Marshall and others confronted Storm—a subordinate directly under Marshall’s supervision—about Storm’s unethical disclosure of confidential investigation materials. The next day, Storm accused Marshall of sexually harassing him twice outside of work. Regional Director Osburn decided to terminate Marshall. At a meeting before the termination, someone said they should be prepared for Marshall to file a complaint with the EEOC. Osburn terminated Marshall and demoted Storm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Marshall’s claims of discrimination based on sexual-orientation discrimination and retaliation. Marshall’s case falters for lack of a similarly situated comparator; there were legitimate issues about whether he was meeting expectations. Marshall’s exposure of Storm’s breach of confidentiality is not protected by Title VII; retaliation for the exposure cannot be Title VII retaliation. View "Marshall v. Indiana Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

During the coronavirus pandemic, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued executive orders designed to limit the virus’s opportunities to spread, similar to orders in other states. Executive Order 2020‐43 (EO43, June 26, 2020), imposing a 50-person cap on gatherings, states: This Executive Order does not limit the free exercise of religion. To protect the health and safety of faith leaders, staff, congregants, and visitors, religious organizations and houses of worship are encouraged to consult and follow the recommended practices and guidelines from the Illinois Department of Public Health.... the safest practices ... are to provide services online, in a drive‐in format, or outdoors (and consistent with social distancing requirements and guidance regarding wearing face coverings), and to limit indoor services to 10 people. Religious organizations are encouraged to take steps to ensure social distancing, the use of face coverings, and implementation of other public health measures. Emergency and governmental functions enjoy the same exemption.The Republican Party challenged the “favored” treatment of religion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Because the exercise of religion involves more than simple speech, the equivalency urged by the Republicans between political speech and religious exercise is a false one. If there were a problem with the religious exercise carve‐out, the state would be entitled to return to a regime in which even religious gatherings are subject to the mandatory cap. View "Illinois Republican Party v. J. B. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Officers Cates and Hannah responded to a call by Lemons. While Lemons was alone with Cates in her home, he sexually assaulted her. Lemons was arrested, then taken to a hospital. A nurse documented swelling on Lemons’ neck and her bloodshot eyes, as evidence that she had been choked. She did not show signs of vaginal trauma or injury. Cates initially denied having sex with Lemons but later admitted to having oral and vaginal sex with Lemons, claiming it was consensual. Cates was charged under 18 U.S.C. 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law) and 18 U.S.C. 942(c) (use of a weapon during a crime of violence). The jury found Cates guilty on the first count and not guilty on the firearm count. By special verdict, the jury found Cates committed aggravated sexual abuse but found Lemons did not suffer bodily injury. Cates was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that the district court had instructed the jury incorrectly on the elements of aggravated sexual abuse by defining “force” to include not just force, but also psychological coercion.Cates was then charged with violation of civil rights under color of law, which again alleged his actions constituted aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a “double jeopardy” motion to dismiss. Cates failed to show the jury decided he did not use force to cause Lemons to engage in sexual acts. A rational jury could conclude that Cates forcibly grabbed Lemons’ neck and continued to squeeze it during the assault without causing her bodily injury, consistent with the jury’s findings. View "United States v. Cates" on Justia Law

Demkovich was hired in 2012 as the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic Church. Demkovich is gay, overweight, and suffers from diabetes and metabolic syndrome. Demkovich claims Reverend Dada subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation and his disabilities. After Demkovich married his partner, Reverend Dada demanded Demkovich’s resignation because his marriage violated Church teachings. Demkovich refused. Reverend Dada fired him. Demkovich filed hostile environment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.The Seventh Circuit declined to extend the constitutional "ministerial" exemption to categorically bar all hostile environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees where there is no challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing. The court reasoned that the First Amendment does not bar those same ministerial employees from bringing contract and tort claims against their employers and supervisors, nor does it bar enforcement of criminal laws arising from the mistreatment of those same employees. Religious employers’ control over tangible employment actions—hiring, firing, promoting, deciding compensation, job assignments, and the like—provides ample protection for the free exercise of religion. The First Amendment does not require complete immunity from the sometimes horrific abuse that a bright-line rule would protect. View "Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish" on Justia Law

Johnson, a student at North Central, reported that she had been raped at an apartment complex by two classmates, Froschauer and Risley. North Central Principal Kirk was aware of a previous rape allegation against Froschauer, made by one of Johnson’s friends. Pending investigations by the Department of Child Services and the sheriff’s department, Principal Kirk issued a no‐contact order between Johnson and Froschauer. The school’s lawyers advised Principal Kirk not to “negatively impact [Froschauer’s] track to graduate on time based on unsubstantiated allegations.” Johnson’s physician and Hawker had requested that Johnson be placed in homebound schooling. Principal Kirk placed Johnson in homebound schooling so that she could avoid her morning classes with Froschauer. She still went to school in the afternoons. The prosecutor did not file criminal charges against Froschauer. The sheriff’s department would not release details of the investigation to the school. Her family refused to allow the school to interview Johnson for a Title IX investigation. Johnson subsequently alleged some bullying at school and obtained a protective order against Froschauer. Johnson alleged additional harassment and eventually withdrew from North Central.In her suit under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson waived any arguments regarding the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The school was not deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s claims of sexual harassment, View "Johnson v. Northeast School Corp." on Justia Law

In 2013, Siddique applied for a temporary student-government position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His application was said to have been rejected because he did not meet a minimum-enrollment requirement crafted for the position. Siddique argued that his application was rejected not because of the enrollment criteria but because of his critical stances against members of the University administration who worked with the student government and who were involved with the application process.Siddique sued University officials in their individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment right to be free from governmental retaliation. The district court determined that qualified immunity prevented Siddique’s claim from proceeding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law does not clearly establish that enforcing an enrollment requirement for a student-government position violates the First Amendment. The right to public employment free from retaliation is not at issue and any violation of state law is irrelevant. View "Siddique v. Laliberte" on Justia Law

Officers Duszak and Weber initiated a traffic stop because the light over Harrington’s license plate was out. Dispatch notified the officers that there was no record of Harrington’s license plate. The officers attempted to identify the vehicle through the VIN number and asked Harrington to exit the vehicle. Harrington fled. The officers chased him down; one tased him and the other hit him with a baton. Harrington’s gun fell to the ground. Officers handcuffed Harrington and took him to the hospital for his injuries. Harrington sued, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene. The jury ruled in favor of the officers. Harrington’s motions for post‐trial discovery and a new trial were denied.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the gun evidence was admissible and not unduly prejudicial. Harrington failed to present any evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury could infer that the officers’ actions were racially motivated. Without support for race‐based allegations during the case or presented at trial, introducing this argument at closing arguments would have been highly inflammatory and prejudicial.Harrington unsuccessfully sought sanctions post‐trial based on an unverified third‐party website detailing undisclosed complaints against Duszak. A records request with the city disclosed that four complaints not included in discovery were filed after the discovery request. Four were not complaints, but information reports. Harrington failed to show how the absence of these records prejudiced him. View "Harrington v. Duszak" on Justia Law

Waagner was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and of possessing a stolen vehicle that had crossed a state line. The court adopted the PSR finding that Waagner was an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on his prior convictions for “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B): two 1978 convictions for Ohio aggravated burglary and one 1992 conviction for Ohio attempted robbery. Waagner had a sentencing guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment; the statutory minimum was 15 years. While awaiting sentencing, Waagner escaped from custody and, while a fugitive, committed offenses in multiple districts. After his apprehension, he pleaded guilty to escape. The court imposed a 364-month sentence.Waagner filed a second collateral attack on his sentence, challenging his ACCA classification. The district court denied his motion, finding that, although his Ohio aggravated burglary convictions no longer constitute ACCA predicate offenses under the Supreme Court's 2015 "Johnson" decision, invalidating the residual clause, they still qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA's enumerated offenses clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The advent of Johnson permitted Waagner to bring a second motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255; before Johnson, any such challenge would have been futile. Nonetheless, Ohio aggravated burglary and Ohio attempted robbery are violent felonies as that term is defined in the ACCA. View "Waagner v. United States" on Justia Law