Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Joiner is a 31‐year‐old prisoner serving an eight-year sentence at U.S. Penitentiary Marion for a drug crime. In July 2020, amid the COVID‐19 pandemic, Joiner sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” self‐reported hypertension, a body mass index (BMI) of 28.9 (the “over‐weight” category), and his skin color. He argued that Black Americans have disproportionately suffered from COVID‐19 because “society has put them in worse positions.” He cited a CDC article to argue that Black people in the U.S. face a higher risk of hospitalization and death from COVID‐19, and other articles to contend that, even though skin color should not affect health outcomes from infectious diseases, “our society” delivers subpar health care to “people with black skin,” even when controlling for class, comorbidities, and access to health insurance. The government contended that Joiner’s medical records did not contain evidence of hypertension and that his BMI did not place him at “high risk” for severe COVID‐19 complications.The district court ruled that Joiner did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, without comment on Joiner’s racial disparity argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The cited articles identify multiple societal factors that are not relevant to Joiner’s individual situation in federal prison. Without any factual basis tying those broader societal concerns to Joiner’s individual situation, the district court was not required to address the argument. View "United States v. Joiner" on Justia Law

Kelly, an off-duty Chicago police officer, shot his friend LaPorta in the head during an argument after a night of drinking together. LaPorta’s injuries left him severely, permanently disabled. LaPorta sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides a federal remedy against state actors who deprive others of rights secured by the federal Constitution and laws, arguing that the city had inadequate policies in place to prevent the shooting. He identified several policy shortcomings: the failure to have an “early warning system” to identify officers who were likely to engage in misconduct, the failure to adequately investigate and discipline officers who engage in misconduct, and the perpetuation of a “code of silence” that deters reporting of officers who engage in misconduct.A jury awarded LaPorta $44.7 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whatever viability LaPorta’s claim might have under state tort law, it has no foundation in constitutional law. When Kelly shot LaPorta, he was not acting as a police officer but as a private citizen. LaPorta claimed that he was deprived of his due-process right to bodily integrity but it has long been settled that “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence … does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” View "First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Mejia sued correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging his filthy cell conditions and constant hallway lighting that prevented him from sleeping. His primary claim survived dismissal and summary judgment and proceeded to trial. The jury returned a defense verdict. Mejia had asked the district court, six times, to appoint counsel. Each time the court denied the request, reasoning that Mejia had demonstrated through his many filings that he understood his burden of proof and was capable of assembling evidence and marshaling arguments to support his contention that the Pontiac Correctional Center's conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly observed that Mejia had an extensive litigation history, including at least one prior case going to trial, albeit with counsel. Mejia had difficulty with the discovery process, but it was within the judge’s discretion to overlook his slips and help him rather than try to recruit counsel. The court observed, during the pretrial conference, Mejia’s ability to comprehend and address the facts and issues pertinent to his Eighth Amendment claim. There was no abuse of discretion; the fact that some trial witnesses testified by videoconference does not change the analysis. View "Mejia v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Igasaki, a gay, Japanese-American, suffers from gout. From 1994 until his 2015 termination at age 62, Igasaki was an IDFPR staff attorney. In 2011, Forester gave Igasaki a good performance review; in 2012, Forester rated Igasaki poorly, providing specific examples of deficient performance. In 2013, IDFPR placed Igasaki on a corrective action plan. He subsequently received three reprimands. Igasaki made limited progress on seven of 12 plan requirements. The plan listed: failure to meet 50 deadlines; sleeping while at work; problems finding files; and lack of preparation for administrative proceedings. In 2014, the Igasaki was suspended for incompetence. Igasaki’s corrective action plan was again renewed. Igasaki received another suspension for insubordination. In Igasaki’s 2014 review, Forester rated him as needing improvement in all categories. In 2015, Forester noted that he had not progressed on six of the 12 requirements; for the first time, Igasaki formally requested accommodation for his gout. IDFPR granted Igasaki an ergonomic keyboard and authorization for an administrative assistant; Igasaki’s request for flexible deadlines, not supported by a doctor’s note, was denied. IDFPR terminated him weeks later.After filing charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, Igasaki sued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IDFPR, rejecting claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2), age discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623), and disability discrimination (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112). View "Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

Hall filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in the Southern District of Indiana while incarcerated at a facility operated by the federal Bureau of Prisons in that district. Hall was later transferred to a federal prison in the Middle District of Florida. The Indiana district court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction over the petition, and transferred Hall’s case to Florida.The Seventh Circuit granted Hall a writ of mandamus, directing the Indiana court to rescind the transfer and return the case to Indiana. When the government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the district court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has the legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release. Hall filed in the correct court and named his immediate custodian; there is a respondent within the jurisdiction of the original court that has the authority to comply with any order that may issue. The Bureau of Prisons has been and remains Hall’s ultimate custodian; the Bureau can take any necessary action. Mandamus is the proper vehicle for review of a transfer decision, including transfers of a habeas corpus proceeding. Hall did not need to show prejudice before pursuing his venue challenge. View "Hall v. Hanlon" on Justia Law

Williams has been seeking release since he began serving his 2013 18‐year sentence for robbery and brandishing a firearm, contending that his guilty plea was involuntary. In 2020, Williams asked the warden to move for his compassionate release, arguing that the judge’s role in his plea negotiations was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The warden never responded. Weeks later, Williams moved the district court for compassionate release on the same ground. Court-appointed counsel filed an amended motion, advancing a different ground: the COVID‐19 pandemic and Williams’s risk of exposure stemming from his role as a prison chapel usher. The government opposed the motion on the merits and argued that Williams had not met the statute’s exhaustion requirement. The district court denied the motion on the merits, noting that Williams admitted that he did not suffer from any significant medical conditions that might increase his COVID-19 risk.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, also concluding that Williams failed to exhaust his Bureau of Prisons remedies. Exhaustion is a mandatory, claim‐processing rule and must be enforced when properly invoked. An inmate is required to present the same or similar ground for compassionate release in a request to the Bureau as in a motion to the court; any contrary approach would undermine the purpose of exhaustion—to provide the Bureau with information necessary to move for release on a defendant’s behalf. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Eagan, an Illinois Department of Corrections inmate, suffers from mental illnesses including depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. On November 30, 2014, Eagan engaged in self-harming behaviors while under suicide watch. Eagan brought a 42 U.S.C 1983, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment by medical and custodial staff at Pontiac Correctional Center. The district court denied his motions to recruit and appoint counsel for him, then granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. In evaluating the motion to recruit counsel, the district court departed significantly from circuit precedent. Eagan has established that, but for the court's error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the assistance of counsel would have altered the outcome of the summary judgment motion with respect to Eagan’s claims based on the physician's decisions. The alleged "decision" to leave Eagan with significant, prolonged pain in order to teach him a lesson about the consequences of self-destructive behavior does not involve a mere choice of medical remedies; the court noted the lack of evidence with respect to the allegation. Eagan has not established, however, that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome with respect to the officer defendants. The record clearly supports summary judgment in their favor. View "Eagan v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Gacho is serving a life sentence for two 1982 kidnapping-murders. Cook County Judge Maloney presided in his case. For years, Maloney had solicited cash for acquittals. He came down hard on defendants who did not pay. Gacho was tried jointly with Titone. Titone opted for a bench decision, having paid Maloney $10,000 for an acquittal. As federal investigators began closing in, Maloney reneged and found Titone guilty. The jury returned a guilty verdict against Gacho. After Maloney was indicted, Titone won a new trial based on judicial bias, but Gacho’s post-conviction proceedings dragged on for decades. In 2016 the Illinois Appellate Court rejected his due-process claim, reasoning that Gacho needed to prove that the judge was actually biased against him and had not done so.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Evidence that the presiding judge was actually biased is sufficient to establish a due-process violation but is not necessary. Constitutional claims of judicial bias also have an objective component: the reviewing court must determine whether the judge’s conflict of interest created a constitutionally unacceptable likelihood of bias. Ignoring that objective test was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The acute conflict between Maloney’s duty of impartiality and his personal interest in avoiding criminal liability created a constitutionally unacceptable likelihood of compensatory bias in Gacho’s case. View "Gacho v. Wills" on Justia Law

Saunders pleaded guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and possessing a firearm as a felon. Saunders, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in January 2020, asked the court for compassionate release or, alternatively, to transfer him to home confinement in June 2020. Saunders cited “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” based on his serious risk from the novel coronavirus, given his history of chronic bronchitis, type 2 diabetes, blood clots, a heart attack, other heart problems, diabetic neuropathy, and hypertension, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).The district court denied the motion, finding that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed against release because firearms trafficking is a serious crime that fuels Chicago's ongoing gun violence and Saunders had served only 19 months (including time served before sentencing) of his 60-month sentence. Saunders had not demonstrated that the Bureau of Prisons was unable to control the spread of COVID-19. The court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons place him in a medical facility, and it did so.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding that the section 3553(a) factors weighed against release despite the health threat that Saunders faces. Courts are not compelled to release every prisoner with extraordinary and compelling health concerns. The court lacked authority to change Saunders’s place of imprisonment and did not err by declining to review his request for home confinement. View "United States v. Saunders" on Justia Law

McIntosh sued Wexford, a private company that provides prison health care, and jail officials for acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. McIntosh alleged that a nurse funneled him unprescribed medication and that staff members failed to prevent him from attempting suicide after he became addicted to the painkillers and suffered from acute mental illness. McIntosh was then a pretrial detainee; his claim arose not under the Eighth Amendment,, but under the Due Process Clause. McIntosh was required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act to exhaust all available administrative remedies. McIntosh claims he timely filed grievances as prescribed by the jail’s procedures but that Sergeant Strubberg told him that the internal administrative process was on hold pending the outcome of a criminal investigation into how he had obtained large quantities of unprescribed pain medication. Wexford and the jail officials claim that McIntosh submitted no grievances. The district court referred the case to a magistrate, who heard testimony from McIntosh and Sergeant Strubberg of the St. Clair County Jail. McIntosh supported his testimony with two affidavits from fellow inmates. The magistrate accepted McIntosh’s version of events. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court erred in rejecting the magistrate’s recommended finding without holding a new hearing upon which to base its own credibility determinations, given that witness credibility weighed heavily in the exhaustion-of-remedies inquiry. View "McIntosh v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law