Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Berrios was charged with Hobbs Act robbery in connection with an armed robbery of a Chicago AT&T store. The next day, as Berrios and his associate were preparing to rob a currency exchange, the FBI conducted a traffic stop and arrested Berrios without a warrant. During a search incident to that arrest, the agents recovered a Samsung phone and other items including a BB gun that Berrios’ group had used in a series of robberies. The FBI conducted a warrantless search of the phone, downloading the contacts, call logs, text messages, and photographs. Some photos showed Berrios with his co-defendants. The government later admitted that the phone search was illegal but argued that the law at the time of the search did not prohibit it, so the "Davis" good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The other evidence at trial included co-defendant testimony, Berrios’s post-arrest statements, a recorded call that Berrios made from jail, surveillance videos, victim testimony, and the other items recovered from the car.A jury convicted Berrios on all counts; he was sentenced to a total term of 360 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and the convictions. Stating that it “was a close call,” the court concluded that although there was no binding precedent that would have exempted this search from the exclusionary rule, the independent-source rule allowed the admission of the limited evidence the government used. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Women who work at the Cook County Jail or the adjoining courthouse filed a class-action suit against their employers for failing to prevent male inmates from sexually harassing them. The district court certified a class comprising all non‐supervisory female employees who work with male inmates at the jail or courthouse, of whom there are about 2,000.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23. The court’s primary error was using the peripheral and overbroad concept of “ambient harassment” (i.e., indirect or secondhand harassment) to certify a class of employees who have endured a wide range of direct and indirect harassment. Even without this error, the class cannot stand because it comprises class members with materially different working environments whose claims require separate, individualized analyses. Hostile work environment claims are fact-intensive. They turn on the frequency, severity, character, and effect of the harassment. Here, these are “worker‐specific” inquiries because they depend on a class member’s unique experience—which correlates to where she works. Some class members will have had comparable experiences but the plaintiffs have not proven that for the entire class. View "Howard v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Illinois law enforcement agents received a tip from a confidential source claiming that Smith had been dealing methamphetamine in Mattoon. The agents conducted controlled buys between Smith and the source and requested that a patrol officer stop Smith’s vehicle. The officer stopped the vehicle for “extremely dark window tinting,” and learned that Smith’s license was suspended. There was a 10-minute wait for batteries for the device to measure the tint. The officer then searched the vehicle and found marijuana, a marijuana grinder, and a firearm.Represented by court-appointed counsel, Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm as a felon. He then sought to retract his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Smith’s motion, rejected his request for an evidentiary hearing, and sentenced him to 214 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Smith cannot establish that he would have succeeded on a motion to suppress the firearm evidence and did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s pressure to accept a plea, he would not have pleaded guilty. There is no evidence that appointed counsel made a misrepresentation or that suggests his unfamiliarity with the case. The court correctly applied the career offender enhancement to Smith’s sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perry suffers from serious mental illness defined by two suicide attempts, severe depression, paranoid schizophrenia, and auditory hallucinations. He is serving a 70-year sentence for murdering his former wife during a fit of paranoia in 2013. In 2016, while housed in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in southern Indiana, Perry’s condition worsened. He refused all medication, stopped eating because he feared someone had poisoned his food, renewed his conspiracy claims against the Wabash medical staff, and threatened to kill himself if left in his cell any longer. A medical review and administrative hearing culminated in a decision to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication Haldol. Injections continued for about six months.Perry later sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the forcible medication violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied Perry’s request to appoint counsel, finding that Perry understood his case and quite ably prosecuted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The defendants attended carefully to Perry’s health and safety. The Facility’s Review Committee had enough evidence to demonstrate that Perry was a danger to himself or others so as to justify the involuntary administration of Haldol. View "Perry v. Sims" on Justia Law

Joiner is a 31‐year‐old prisoner serving an eight-year sentence at U.S. Penitentiary Marion for a drug crime. In July 2020, amid the COVID‐19 pandemic, Joiner sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” self‐reported hypertension, a body mass index (BMI) of 28.9 (the “over‐weight” category), and his skin color. He argued that Black Americans have disproportionately suffered from COVID‐19 because “society has put them in worse positions.” He cited a CDC article to argue that Black people in the U.S. face a higher risk of hospitalization and death from COVID‐19, and other articles to contend that, even though skin color should not affect health outcomes from infectious diseases, “our society” delivers subpar health care to “people with black skin,” even when controlling for class, comorbidities, and access to health insurance. The government contended that Joiner’s medical records did not contain evidence of hypertension and that his BMI did not place him at “high risk” for severe COVID‐19 complications.The district court ruled that Joiner did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, without comment on Joiner’s racial disparity argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The cited articles identify multiple societal factors that are not relevant to Joiner’s individual situation in federal prison. Without any factual basis tying those broader societal concerns to Joiner’s individual situation, the district court was not required to address the argument. View "United States v. Joiner" on Justia Law

Kelly, an off-duty Chicago police officer, shot his friend LaPorta in the head during an argument after a night of drinking together. LaPorta’s injuries left him severely, permanently disabled. LaPorta sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides a federal remedy against state actors who deprive others of rights secured by the federal Constitution and laws, arguing that the city had inadequate policies in place to prevent the shooting. He identified several policy shortcomings: the failure to have an “early warning system” to identify officers who were likely to engage in misconduct, the failure to adequately investigate and discipline officers who engage in misconduct, and the perpetuation of a “code of silence” that deters reporting of officers who engage in misconduct.A jury awarded LaPorta $44.7 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whatever viability LaPorta’s claim might have under state tort law, it has no foundation in constitutional law. When Kelly shot LaPorta, he was not acting as a police officer but as a private citizen. LaPorta claimed that he was deprived of his due-process right to bodily integrity but it has long been settled that “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence … does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” View "First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Mejia sued correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging his filthy cell conditions and constant hallway lighting that prevented him from sleeping. His primary claim survived dismissal and summary judgment and proceeded to trial. The jury returned a defense verdict. Mejia had asked the district court, six times, to appoint counsel. Each time the court denied the request, reasoning that Mejia had demonstrated through his many filings that he understood his burden of proof and was capable of assembling evidence and marshaling arguments to support his contention that the Pontiac Correctional Center's conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly observed that Mejia had an extensive litigation history, including at least one prior case going to trial, albeit with counsel. Mejia had difficulty with the discovery process, but it was within the judge’s discretion to overlook his slips and help him rather than try to recruit counsel. The court observed, during the pretrial conference, Mejia’s ability to comprehend and address the facts and issues pertinent to his Eighth Amendment claim. There was no abuse of discretion; the fact that some trial witnesses testified by videoconference does not change the analysis. View "Mejia v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Igasaki, a gay, Japanese-American, suffers from gout. From 1994 until his 2015 termination at age 62, Igasaki was an IDFPR staff attorney. In 2011, Forester gave Igasaki a good performance review; in 2012, Forester rated Igasaki poorly, providing specific examples of deficient performance. In 2013, IDFPR placed Igasaki on a corrective action plan. He subsequently received three reprimands. Igasaki made limited progress on seven of 12 plan requirements. The plan listed: failure to meet 50 deadlines; sleeping while at work; problems finding files; and lack of preparation for administrative proceedings. In 2014, the Igasaki was suspended for incompetence. Igasaki’s corrective action plan was again renewed. Igasaki received another suspension for insubordination. In Igasaki’s 2014 review, Forester rated him as needing improvement in all categories. In 2015, Forester noted that he had not progressed on six of the 12 requirements; for the first time, Igasaki formally requested accommodation for his gout. IDFPR granted Igasaki an ergonomic keyboard and authorization for an administrative assistant; Igasaki’s request for flexible deadlines, not supported by a doctor’s note, was denied. IDFPR terminated him weeks later.After filing charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, Igasaki sued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IDFPR, rejecting claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2), age discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623), and disability discrimination (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112). View "Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

Hall filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in the Southern District of Indiana while incarcerated at a facility operated by the federal Bureau of Prisons in that district. Hall was later transferred to a federal prison in the Middle District of Florida. The Indiana district court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction over the petition, and transferred Hall’s case to Florida.The Seventh Circuit granted Hall a writ of mandamus, directing the Indiana court to rescind the transfer and return the case to Indiana. When the government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the district court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has the legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release. Hall filed in the correct court and named his immediate custodian; there is a respondent within the jurisdiction of the original court that has the authority to comply with any order that may issue. The Bureau of Prisons has been and remains Hall’s ultimate custodian; the Bureau can take any necessary action. Mandamus is the proper vehicle for review of a transfer decision, including transfers of a habeas corpus proceeding. Hall did not need to show prejudice before pursuing his venue challenge. View "Hall v. Hanlon" on Justia Law

Williams has been seeking release since he began serving his 2013 18‐year sentence for robbery and brandishing a firearm, contending that his guilty plea was involuntary. In 2020, Williams asked the warden to move for his compassionate release, arguing that the judge’s role in his plea negotiations was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The warden never responded. Weeks later, Williams moved the district court for compassionate release on the same ground. Court-appointed counsel filed an amended motion, advancing a different ground: the COVID‐19 pandemic and Williams’s risk of exposure stemming from his role as a prison chapel usher. The government opposed the motion on the merits and argued that Williams had not met the statute’s exhaustion requirement. The district court denied the motion on the merits, noting that Williams admitted that he did not suffer from any significant medical conditions that might increase his COVID-19 risk.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, also concluding that Williams failed to exhaust his Bureau of Prisons remedies. Exhaustion is a mandatory, claim‐processing rule and must be enforced when properly invoked. An inmate is required to present the same or similar ground for compassionate release in a request to the Bureau as in a motion to the court; any contrary approach would undermine the purpose of exhaustion—to provide the Bureau with information necessary to move for release on a defendant’s behalf. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law