Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Mandacina was sentenced to life imprisonment for paying to kill a potential witness in a criminal case. His conviction and sentence were affirmed in 1995. Mandacina filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral attack. While his appeal was pending, he attempted to add a contention that the prosecutor failed to produce information that a trial witness—FBI agent Craft—had committed misconduct in other cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed without discussing that contention. Mandacina requested permission to pursue a second 2255 collateral challenge based on information about Craft. The Eighth Circuit denied the request in 2005. Mandacina sought a 28 U.S.C. 2241 writ of habeas corpus, based on the same considerations presented to the Eighth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the petition is blocked by section 2255(e), which says that habeas relief is unavailable unless it appears that the remedy under 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention. Mandacina does not contend that Craft engaged in misconduct while investigating or testifying in his prosecution and did not contend that the prosecutors knew of Craft’s misconduct. Brady claims concerning potential impeachment evidence are routinely decided under section 2255. That Mandacina did not previously succeed does not make section 2255 inadequate or ineffective, nor is a prisoner entitled to section 2241 review just because the court did not write an opinion. “We do not use section 2241 to regulate how our colleagues in other circuits handle their business.” View "Mandacina v. Entzel" on Justia Law

Indiana statutes provided a fast and confidential judicial bypass procedure that is supposed to allow a small fraction of pregnant, unemancipated minors seeking abortions to obtain them without the consent of or notice to their parents, guardians, or custodians. In 2017, Act 404 added a requirement that parents be given prior notice of the planned abortion unless the judge also finds such notice is not in the minor’s “best interests” unlike the judicial bypass of parental consent, which may be based on either maturity or best interests. In 2019, the Seventh Circuit held that Act 404 created a substantial risk of a practical veto over a mature yet unemancipated minor’s right to an abortion, likely to impose an undue burden for the unemancipated minors who seek to obtain an abortion without parental involvement via the judicial bypass. On remand from the Supreme Court in light of its 2020 “June Medical” decision, which struck down a Louisiana law regulating abortion providers, but without a single majority opinion. “The opinions in June Medical show that constitutional standards for state regulations affecting a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy are not stable, but they have not been changed in a way that would change the outcome here.” The court again affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the challenged law pending full review. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Box" on Justia Law

When Bennett began working as a custodian for the School District, she had to either become a Union member and pay union dues or decline membership and pay “fair‐share” or “agency” fees. She joined the Union. Following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Janus” decision, she notified the Union and the School District that she wished to resign her membership and terminate all payments to the Union. The Union allowed Bennett to resign her membership and opt-out of payments, but only after the lapse of the window set forth in her union‐membership agreement.Bennett sued, asserting that the deduction of union dues from her wages violated her rights under the First Amendment as recognized in Janus and that the Union’s exclusive representation of her interests, even though she is no longer a member, violates her constitutional rights by allowing the Union to speak on her behalf. Bennett sought damages in an amount equal to the dues deducted from her paychecks up to the statute of limitations and declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bennett cannot establish that the deduction from her wages of union dues she voluntarily agreed to pay in consideration for the benefits of union membership violated her First Amendment rights under Janus. Nor can she establish that Janus rendered the long-standing exclusive‐bargaining‐representative system of labor relations unconstitutional. View "Bennett v. Council 31 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees" on Justia Law

In July 2009, two people approached a van and opened fire. Patel died; Fernandez was shot but recovered; Russell was not hit. Detectives swore that Russell and Fernandez named Kuri and Gomez as the assailants and that both witnesses had selected their pictures from a photo array. That was the basis of Kuri’s arrest, detention, and prosecution; police lacked any physical evidence such as fingerprints, DNA, or a link between Kuri and the gun. Russell and Fernandez testified at the criminal trial and at the subsequent civil trial that they had not identified Kuri as an assailant, even after the detectives directed them to do so, and that the detectives had made up that accusation. Russell and Fernandez contradicted themselves and changed their statements several times. Kuri spent three years in jail before and during the murder trial. After his acquittal, he sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict of $4 million in compensatory damages plus $50,000 in punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that only a violation of the Fourth Amendment could support relief, and that, as a matter of law, Kuri’s arrest and detention were supported by probable cause. Once the jury decided to believe the victims that the detectives were lying, that left his arrest and detention without support. A Fourth Amendment theory based on lack of probable cause survives a judicial decision holding a suspect in custody. View "Kuri v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Coleman is serving a 45-year sentence for attempting to murder Dye. He was tried twice. The first jury acquitted him of murdering Jackson during the same incident but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the charge of attempted murder. The events were captured by a surveillance camera. By the time Coleman shot Jackson, Dye was on the ground with two bullets in him and Jackson had opened fire at Coleman. Coleman cited the Double Jeopardy Clause, arguing that the first jury must have found that he acted in self-defense when killing Jackson and that this conclusion necessarily applies to Dye. Coleman also argued ineffective assistance at the second trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. It does not require any deference to conclude that Coleman’s acquittal on the murder charge does not establish self-defense in Dye's shooting. Coleman shot Dye twice, including once after he was on the ground. Applying the “Strickland” standard, the court concluded that counsel’s overall performance was admirable. Dye testified at both trials. His testimony was subtly different; Coleman’s lawyer did not try to impeach Dye at the second trial. Counsel may have felt that pointing out such modest inconsistencies would have been nitpicky. That judgment call did not result in prejudice, in light of the video. View "Coleman v. Neal" on Justia Law

In 1997, for his participation (at age 18) in a deadly kidnapping scheme to collect drug debts, Ruiz was convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping resulting in death, assaulting a federal officer, four counts of violating the Hostage Act, including one count resulting in death, and three counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The indictment listed a different predicate offense for each section 924(c) count: the underlying conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, and assault on a federal officer charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his seven concurrent life sentences plus a consecutive term of 45 years for using a firearm during the underlying crimes of violence.Ruiz made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge his sentence through 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 2241. After the Supreme Court invalided as unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, one of the Act’s alternative definitions for a predicate “violent felony,” Ruiz obtained permission (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3_) to file a new collateral attack, contending that the residual clause of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague and that his predicate offenses otherwise did not count as crimes of violence under section 924(c)’s elements clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ruiz’s petition on harmless error grounds; any error in his section 924(c) convictions would have no effect on Ruiz’s seven life sentences. View "Ruiz v. United States" on Justia Law

Madigan was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1970 and re-elected to 25 additional two-year terms. He became Speaker of the House in 1983 and the state’s Democratic Party Chairman in 1998. In 2021 he withdrew from the race to be reelected as Speaker and resigned his seat in the House and his role as Chairman. Four candidates were on the ballot for the 2016 Democratic primary. Madigan won with 65% of the votes; Gonzales received 27%, Rodriguez 6%, and Barboza 2%. Gonzales sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rodriguez and Barboza were stooges put on the ballot by Madigan’s allies to divide the Hispanic vote, violating the Equal Protection Clause.The district judge noted that Gonzales had made his suspicions public early in the race and that an editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times agreed with Gonzales. Concluding that the voters were not deceived, the court granted summary judgment against Gonzales. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge did not penalize Gonzales’s campaign speech. Speech, including in depositions and interrogatories, often affects litigation's outcome; a judge who takes account of speech that proves or refutes a claim does not violate the First Amendment. Gonzales told the voters that he thought Madigan had played a dirty trick. The electorate sided with Madigan. The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to upset that outcome or to penalize a politician for employing a shady strategy that voters tolerate. View "Gonzales v. Madigan" on Justia Law

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act allowed public unions to require nonmembers to pay “fair share” or “agency” fees to compensate for the representative services the union provides. In 1977 the Supreme Court concluded that a similar fair-share fees law did not violate nonmembers’ First Amendment rights. In 2018, in “Janus,” the Supreme Court overruled that decision and held that unions compelling the payment of fair share fees from nonmembers offended the First Amendment by compelling nonmembers to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”Local 150 represents around 3,300 municipal employees in 133 bargaining units, employing nine staff members at an annual cost of about $5 million. Local 150 remains obligated to represent nonmembers but must now do so without any way of compelling fair share fees. Local 150 filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the duty of fair representation in Illinois law without the corresponding ability to collect fair share fees infringes the union’s First Amendment rights of free speech and association.The district court entered summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the union’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The union has not alleged any concrete and particular facts showing that it faces a post-Janus freeriding predicament. The court declined to address the substantial legal question in the abstract. View "Sweeney v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The church holds weekly in-person worship services attended by approximately 80 people. Its pastor suspended these services after he received a March 31, 2020 “Cease and Desist Notice” from the county health department that threatened penalties under Illinois Executive Order 2020-10, issued March 20, 2020, if the church continued to host in-person gatherings of ten or more people. The Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, citing the First Amendment and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act and alleging violations of their due process rights and that the Order exceeded the governor’s powers.On May 29, months before plaintiffs filed their appellate brief, the governor issued Executive Order 2020-38, which removed the mandate. All subsequent pandemic-related executive orders have expressly exempted religious gatherings from mandatory restrictions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. While intervening Supreme Court decisions offer a greater prospect for success on the merits of the First Amendment claim than previously expected, they have also indicated that equitable considerations weigh against granting a preliminary injunction at this time. The prospect of irreparable injury to the plaintiffs is very low; the public interest weighs substantially against injunctive relief. The federal procedural due process claim was not presented to the district court. The Eleventh Amendment bars relief against the governor; it may also bar relief against the local defendants. All of the state-law claims are poor candidates for a federal court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. View "Cassell v. Snyders" on Justia Law

When Indiana officials determine that a child is suffering abuse or neglect, they initiate the Child in Need of Services (CHIN) process. Lawyers are automatically appointed for parents but not for children in the CHINS process. The plaintiffs, children in the CHINS process, claimed that they are entitled to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing “Younger” abstention. While declining to decide that Younger would mandate abstention in all CHINS cases, the court reasoned that principles of comity entitle states to make their own decisions. Because children are not automatically entitled to lawyers, as opposed to the sort of adult assistance that Indiana routinely provides, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to resolve the appointment-of-counsel question in any of the 10 plaintiffs’ state proceedings. A state judge may decide to appoint counsel or may explain why counsel is unnecessary. View "Nicole K. v. Stigdon" on Justia Law