Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Bless was employed by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 1996-2013. In 2004, Bless earned his law degree and began practicing law in addition to working as a police officer. The Sheriff’s Office requires its employees to request and receive authorization before engaging in secondary employment. In 2004-2008, Bless received the required approval. In 2008, Bless was involved in a collision while on duty. He sustained injuries, was placed on disability leave, and received temporary disability benefits. Shortly after the accident, Bless was elected as a Republican McHenry County Commissioner. Soon after his return to work as a police officer, Bless was transferred to a less desirable shift.Meanwhile, the County discovered that Bless was driving his car while on disability leave although he had a driving restriction. The Office of Professional Review found no records of secondary employment requests for Bless for 2009-2010. Bless claimed that he had submitted those requests. OPR brought filed a complaint with the Merit Board, which found that Bless had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to OPR investigators; it directed the Sheriff’s Office to fire Bless. After his termination, Bless filed suit, alleging political retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the Sheriff is a Democrat) and race discrimination under section 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims on summary judgment. View "Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as it applies to offenders who have relocated to Indiana from other states. A 2006 SORA amendment applied its requirements to any “person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” Indiana does not require any person to register if the offense occurred prior to SORA, provided that person remains a resident of Indiana. Under the amendment, persons with pre-SORA convictions who relocate to Indiana from another state where registration was required must register in Indiana, even if Indiana would not have required them to register had they committed their offenses in Indiana and never left.The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. SORA does not violate the right to travel because it does not expressly discriminate based on residency, as consistently required by the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs’ ex post facto claim is likewise precluded by precedent. SORA is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to surmount Indiana’s nonpunitive intent for the law. Because the district court did not address whether SORA passes rational basis scrutiny under an equal protection analysis, the court remanded for consideration of the equal protection claim. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law

Chicago offers public-school teachers higher pay if they earn extra college credits. Graham sought a higher salary under this program in July 2015, only to have her application ignored. She tried again in September and was fired on the ground that her application had been backdated, which the Board of Education considered fraud. A hearing officer ordered her reinstated with back pay. Graham alleges the Board did not honor this decision in full, published a declaration that she is a fraudster, and refused to consider her for open positions. Graham sued, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by discriminating against her on account of sex and race and of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by depriving her of pension and health benefits.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. The complaint does not identify other employees who received better treatment from the school system but It is enough for a plaintiff to assert that she was treated worse because of protected characteristics. The school system’s plans are exempt from ERISA. Because the state not only funds the charter schools but also approves their establishment and continued existence, it is not appropriate to treat them as private institutions subject to public regulation. View "Graham v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

McGill was convicted of possessing child pornography. He completed his prison sentence and began serving supervised release. McGill has a history of violating the terms of his supervised release. McGill failed two polygraph tests, administered as part of his sex offender treatment program, when he was asked whether he had sexual contact with a minor.Probation Officer Williams conducted a home visit, entered McGill’s bedroom, and observed a black cell phone that he recognized as McGill’s monitored phone and an unknown white cell phone. McGill attempted to block the officer’s view of the second cell phone, stating that it was an old phone that no longer worked. At Williams’s request, McGill handed over the white phone. Williams claims that he was able to power on the phone, saw that the background photo was of a young boy’s face, and then powered it off. Williams delivered the phone to the FBI, which obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search of the phone revealed thousands of images of child pornography. McGill was again charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B).The district court denied McGill’s motion to suppress, accepted a conditional plea, and sentenced McGill to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams was lawfully present in McGill’s house, the unmonitored phone was in plain view, and, under the circumstances, the phone’s incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Williams had reasonable suspicion to believe that the cell phone was evidence a criminal act. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law

Fredrickson spent time at several Illinois penal institutions, where he received services to manage his serious mental health problems, which included anxiety, depression, and the effects of long-term drug dependence. While in custody at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center, he died by suicide.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of Fredrickson’s Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to his risk of harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Individual defendants (a social worker and a corrections officer) may have been negligent but there was no evidence that they were subjectively aware that Fredrickson was experiencing a mental health crisis and at risk of suicide. Wexford (the provider of prison health services) employees could have done more to ensure better continuity of care for Frederickson, as he transferred across three facilities but there was not sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to find “systemic and gross deficiencies” in Wexford’s procedures or lack thereof. View "Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Evans approached his girlfriend’s house after a fight with While. White appeared with a loaded gun, raised the gun, and tried to strike Evans. Evans blocked the blow, but the gun fired. The bullet struck Evans in the abdomen and grazed the leg of Evans’s girlfriend. White was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). White’s criminal history included 12 previous Illinois convictions, including delivery of crack cocaine (2003), attempted armed robbery (2004), aggravated fleeing (2007), and delivery of crack cocaine near a church (2008). The district court designated White as an armed career criminal, subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, based on his three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense”: the 2008 drug delivery, the attempted armed robbery, and the aggravated fleeing.The Seventh Circuit rejected his 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenge to his 30-year sentence. The sentencing court relied on a previous conviction that no longer supports the enhancement. For that inapplicable conviction, the district court substituted the 2003 cocaine delivery. Reasonable jurists may debate whether a court may substitute one predicate conviction for another for a sentencing enhancement and whether an Illinois cocaine conviction may serve as a predicate offense. White’s petition fails, nonetheless. He had fair notice that the substitute conviction could be used as a predicate offense; waiver and procedural default also foreclose his challenge. View "White v. United States" on Justia Law

DHS Agent Goehring obtained a warrant for Calligan's girlfriend's Fort Wayne house. His supporting affidavit reported that, 10 days earlier, customs agents had intercepted a package containing one kilogram of a synthetic cannabinoid controlled substance (5F‐ADB), addressed to that house, with Calligan as the addressee. Calligan had received more than 50 international shipments there. Calligan had Indiana convictions for attempted murder, criminal recklessness, and unlawfully resisting police, and a pending gun possession charge. Although police delivered the package, agents had replaced the controlled substance with sugar. After Calligan accepted the package, the officers executed the warrant and found money, a gun, and a notebook that contained the package’s tracking number and a recipe for making 5F‐ADB into a consumable product. In the warrant return, Goehring inaccurately reported that police had also recovered 5F‐ADB, the package’s original contents.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Calligan’s convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon, importing a controlled substance, and attempting to distribute a controlled substance. The court rejected arguments that because the warrant application said police would deliver actual drugs, the agent’s replacement of the drugs with sugar took the search outside the warrant’s scope and that Goehring’s warrant application relied on materially false representations that police would deliver drugs to the home before the search. The warrant was supported by probable cause and had no triggering condition and, in any event, police relied on it in good faith. View "United States v. Calligan" on Justia Law

Herrera, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against three correctional officers of the Cook County Jail for failing to protect him from assault and denying him prompt medical care. In his timely filed original complaint, Herrera named each of the defendants “John Doe” as a nominal placeholder until he could ascertain the proper identities of the officers. Herrera then twice amended his complaint to include their actual names—but did so outside of the two-year limitations period set by Illinois law.The district court denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning that suing “John Doe” defendants constituted a “mistake” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), so that Herrera’s amended complaint “related back” to his original complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Knowingly suing a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). Whether Herrer satisfies the factual test for equitable tolling is beyond the scope of an interlocutory appeal and should be considered on remand. View "Herrera v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 2009, Brown, then 13 years old, was tried as an adult, convicted of murder, and sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment. Brown unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in Indiana state courts, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.On remand the federal district court granted Brown a conditional writ of habeas corpus, noting that the court had admitted an out-of-court statement (a jailhouse confession to another detainee) by the co-defendant. The statement was hearsay as to Brown but implicated him in the shooting. Brown could not cross-examine his co-defendant. Brown’s lawyer failed even to ask for a limiting instruction. The conditional writ ordered Indiana to vacate Brown’s conviction and release him from custody unless it elected to retry Brown within 120 days. The state appealed. Brown filed a cross-appeal, challenging the denial of his motions to authorize discovery and expand the record in light of statements made by the elected county prosecutor in a 2018 campaign debate that Brown asserts contradicted the prosecution’s theory at trial. Within 120 days, the state moved to vacate Brown’s murder conviction, to initiate retrial proceedings in a new criminal case, and to transfer Brown to pretrial custody. In March 2021, the state court vacated Brown’s conviction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the state’s appeal. The state court’s vacatur of the conviction ended its jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. View "Brown v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Brooks, an African American police officer, made statements on multiple occasions complaining that his employer, the Kankakee, Illinois, favored white officers. The City issued a reprimand letter, ordering Brooks to stop making such statements and warning him that he faced discipline up to and including termination should he engage in further public disparagement. Brooks filed a complaint, alleging that Kankakee had retaliated against him, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), by failing to promote him and by issuing to him a reprimand letter after he had engaged in protected activity. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Brooks attempted to introduce a new claim alleging that the City’s promotional policies had a disparate impact on minority officers.The district court dismissed Brooks’s disparate impact claim and granted the City summary judgment on his failure-to-promote retaliation claim. The court denied summary judgment on Brooks’s retaliation-by-reprimand claim, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Brooks’s statements constituted protected activity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of the City. The jury was entitled to conclude that each of Brooks’s statements included varying degrees of factual falsehoods. While the district court instructed the jury to find more than legally required (three acts of retaliation), a proper jury instruction would not have made a difference in the outcome. View "Brooks v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law