Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Schutt, her children, and her boyfriend were driving into her Fort Wayne apartment complex when the car was hit with bullets; one grazed her boyfriend's scalp. Schutt saw her ex-boyfriend, Parker, shooting, wearing a red hooded sweatshirt. Other witnesses agreed about the hoodie and seeing a long gun. The police found ammunition and a spent shell casing. A Ford Fusion in the parking lot had a red hoodie lying inside. Parker appeared with the keys to the Ford, which contained Parker’s debit card and paperwork and a rifle in the trunk with ammunition in the chamber.Parker was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The owner of the Ford testified that on the day of the shooting she loaned the car to Parker, among others; the keys in Parker's possession were the only keys to the vehicle. She had never before seen the gun. Parker’s counsel asked the crime scene investigator if he collected DNA samples from the gun. The district court prohibited the question under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, noting that Parker was not challenging the reliability of any specific investigative steps but was impermissibly arguing generally that the investigation was shoddy because it did not attempt DNA testing. The police department’s latent fingerprint examiner testified that he found no prints of value on the gun or magazine.After his conviction, the court sentenced Parker to 114 months in prison. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected a Confrontation Clause argument. It is beyond reasonable doubt that any exclusion of cross-examination about the DNA evidence did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The evidence of Parker’s guilt was overwhelming. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

A store employee overheard his coworker talking with Matthews about a pipe bomb that they had detonated the previous day; they discussed where to place another bomb that Matthews apparently had with him. Long called the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and told Sergeant Becherer that Matthews was a frequent customer and that he knew Matthews owned a “highly modified” AR-15 with a silencer, lived in a trailer behind “the old Fin & Feather Restaurant,” worked on cars in the shed, and had “free reign of the property.” Someone living near the restaurant had called the Sheriff's Office about an explosion. Matthews’s social media posts showed that he possessed explosives. Nothing in the warrant complaint or affidavit explained why Becherer or the State’s Attorney believed Matthews had access to all structures and buildings. The judge heard their testimony and signed the warrant covering all buildings and structures on the former restaurant property. An hour later, a team searched the property and found multiple firearms, silencers, a pipe bomb, and more explosive materials.Matthews, present during the search, was charged with possessing a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), an unregistered silencer, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and an unregistered short-barreled rifle. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a motion to suppress. An objectively reasonable officer, having consulted with the State’s Attorney in preparing the complaint and affidavit, could have relied in good faith on the search warrant, which, although incomplete, was not utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

FKFJ was established to operate Saraya Restaurant & Banquet and Zaman Café in Worth, Illinois. Werner, the Village President at the time, decided to run for reelection the year Saraya opened. FKFJ supported Werner’s political opponent in the election. Around the same time, FKFJ had various disputes with the Village of Worth.FKFJ filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment, equal protection, and due process violations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the “tapestry of colorful factual threads.” Whatever occurred between FKFJ and the Village, FKFJ has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could find the disputes are of constitutional import. FKFJ has not presented sufficient argument about any similarly situated entities and cannot satisfy the rational basis prong of a class-of-one equal protection claim. FKFJ had a mere unilateral expectation its license would be renewed. FkFJ failed to establish causation between the protected activity and adverse action for its First Amendment claim. View "FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth" on Justia Law

Andrade owns a Hammond, Indiana apartment building. Hammond inspected and issued a notice that the building was unsafe. After a hearing, the Hammond Board of Public Works ruled in favor of Hammond. The Lake Superior Court reversed because Andrade did not have proper notice of the hearing. A year later, Hammond re-inspected and issued a new notice. The Board scheduled another hearing. Andrade received proper notice; he served the Chief of Inspection a subpoena requesting that he bring to the hearing all “regulations, ordinances, and/or statutes” that the Chief relied upon during the first hearing. Hammond did not comply with the subpoena. The Board ordered Andrade to remedy the unsafe conditions. The Lake Superior Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed; the Indiana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.Andrade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging that the defendants violated and conspired to violate Andrade’s due-process rights by making “intentional false representations of opinion testimony” before the Board, “fail[ing] to comply with a lawfully-issued subpoena without justification,” and pursuing an “unannounced policy to deny subsidized residential units in more desirable neighborhoods.” The district court dismissed Andrade’s complaint, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; appellate review of state-court judgments is reserved exclusively to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Andrade’s claims concern the defendants’ actions separate from any state-court judgment. View "Andrade v. Hammond Board of Public Works" on Justia Law

Inmate Ebmeyer alleged that when the Illinois Department of Corrections Special Operations Response Team, “Orange Crush” performed a facility-wide shakedown, they subjected him to a humiliating, unconstitutional strip search and excessive force, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. 1983. He asserted that an unidentified “John Doe” placed him in extremely tight handcuffs that caused him injuries; Sergeant Oelberg struck him with a baton, squeezed his testicles, and forced him to stand handcuffed and facing a wall in a stress position for more than three hours; and prison officials Yurkovich and Akpore promulgated policies that encouraged the challenged unconstitutional conduct.The court granted summary judgment in favor of Yurkovich, Akpore, and Oelberg for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. After Ebmeyer identified the unnamed defendant as Adam Brock, the court became aware that Ebmeyer had known from the beginning that John Doe’s first name was “Adam,” and issued an Order to Show Cause why it should not dismiss the case with prejudice for Ebmeyer’s failure to disclose that information sooner. The court rejected Ebmeyer’s ensuing explanation and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Brock but otherwise affirmed. Ebmeyer did not establish that the grievance process was unavailable. The court failed to make the necessary findings to support the dismissal sanction. View "Ebmeyer v. Brock" on Justia Law

Gloria called 911 seeking medical care for her husband, Steven (age 61), who was experiencing a diabetic emergency at their Milford, Illinois home. Officer Garrett responded and restrained Steven in a prone position, face down on his bed, for several minutes. Steven vomited and lost consciousness. He did not regain consciousness before he died at a hospital 10 days later. Steven had been released from the hospital one week before the 911 call, having suffered a heart attack. Garrett had previously volunteered as an EMT for another city and had earned his certification as a paramedic. Garrett prevented Steven’s niece from giving him orange juice for his blood sugar and used a hold that inflicted pain in an effort to restrain Steven, despite the pleas of family members and Steven’s statement that he could not breathe. Garrett later testified that he believed that Steven was a danger to himself and was acting aggressively and that he did not know Steven had vomited or lost consciousness before EMTs arrived. Steven’s relatives and his treating physician explained that hypoglycemic patients may act confused, “tired[,] sluggish, lethargic,” and possibly “rowdy defensively because they don’t understand what’s going on.”In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Garrett at the summary judgment stage. View "Taylor v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

Four men robbed a liquor store. Hours later, three of them also robbed a gas station. Surveillance video captured these robberies. Five days later, three of the perpetrators (Cooper, Holliman, and Williams) committed another robbery. Holliman and Williams died from a car crash during a high-speed pursuit. Cooper spoke to officers from his hospital bed and signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth man from the liquor store robbery.At Flint’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement described the testimony that Cooper would provide. Flint’s counsel described Flint's interview, stating: “My client, thinking that he’s being cooperative, talks to them, says, yes, I know Kenneth Cooper; he and I have been childhood friends. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, citing inadmissible hearsay. Flint’s counsel contended that a mistrial was inappropriate because multiple witnesses would testify about the friendship between the men. The judge granted a mistrial. During preparations for Flint’s second trial, a different judge raised the issue of double jeopardy but, after looking at a transcript, found that the statement "sufficient to cause a mistrial. A jury found Flint guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the manifest necessity standard to find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to move for dismissal based on double jeopardy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Expressing some reservations about whether a mistrial should have been declared, the court cited deference to the discretion of a trial judge. View "Flint v. Carr" on Justia Law

In 2016, Wisconsin charged Carter with drug and firearm offenses. Mid-trial, Carter pleaded guilty to heroin and firearm charges; the state agreed to recommend a six-year sentence. The prosecutor backtracked at sentencing. The court sentenced Carter to nine years’ imprisonment in July 2017. Carter sought to appeal his sentence, contending that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sentencing and that the court imposed the sentence based on inaccurate information. In Wisconsin, a defendant must file, within 20 days of sentencing, a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief. Carter filed such a notice five days after sentencing. The public defender’s office assigned him counsel but the clerk and court reporter took 10 months to locate and share the trial transcripts, a step that should have been completed within 60 days. Carter’s counsel successfully filed a new extension request on each day the prior request was due to expire. Over four years Carter had three different public defenders and 14 extension requests by counsel and the court without a ruling on the merits.Carter filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the petition. The “extreme and tragic” delay experienced by Carter excuses him from otherwise applicable statutory exhaustion requirements and shows that Wisconsin’s appellate process, at least with respect to Carter, is ineffective to protect rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. View "Carter v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

Smith reportedly left a fight and returned with a gun. After a citizen complained, two Milwaukee police officers on patrol came upon Smith and saw that he matched the description relayed by dispatch. When the officers approached Smith, he fled. The officers followed, believing Smith was armed. Smith was found hiding on a rooftop one block away. When the pursuing officers discovered him, an intense and dangerous standoff took place. After Smith refused numerous orders to cooperate, two other officers (defendants) approached Smith, and believing he was armed, drew their guns. The officers thought Smith was reaching behind an air conditioning unit for a gun; Smith said he was responding to an earlier command to get down on the ground. The defendants shot Smith three times. He survived with serious injuries. Video from the officers’ body cameras captured these events.Smith sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers’ motion, seeking summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Some of the circumstances weighed in favor of the police using deadly force to seize Smith, but in the short time frame before and when the officers shot Smith, factual disputes exist about how much of a threat Smith posed and how actively he was resisting. The qualified immunity decision cannot be separated from those factual disputes. View "Smith v. Finkley" on Justia Law

Chicago requires its police officers to seize, inventory, and store property belonging to an arrested person if that property is not permitted in the Cook County Jail. After 30 days, any property unclaimed by the owner or her authorized representative is deemed abandoned and is sold or destroyed. The plaintiffs brought a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Chicago’s right to seize and inventory the property upon arrest is not at issue and the plaintiffs do not contend that municipalities are not permitted to manage the seized property. The plaintiffs alleged that the notice Chicago furnished was not adequate to alert them to the fact that the police would destroy their personal property if they did not claim it within 30 days.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Chicago did not seize the plaintiffs’ property with an intent to keep it permanently; its motive for the seizures related to safety at the jail, not punishment, The 30-day limit reflected the practical constraints on storage capacity. The detainee knows exactly what has been taken from him and when that confiscation occurred and is told both how to get his property back and how quickly he must do so. The plaintiffs did not show that they were unable to find out the details of the property-recovery process that were disclosed on the police webpage. View "Conyers v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law