Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Based on his perception that Cole was following another vehicle too closely, Illinois Trooper Chapman stopped Cole. The initial stop lasted 10 minutes. Chapman spent about six minutes questioning Cole, then told Cole that he would get a warning but that, for safety reasons, they had to go to a gas station to complete the paperwork. Chapman testified later that he had already decided that he was not going to release Cole before searching the car. Chapman requested a drug-sniffing dog and learned that Cole had been arrested for drug crimes 15 years earlier. At the gas station, Cole’s answers became contradictory; 30 minutes after the stop, Chapman told Cole that he could not leave because he suspected Cole was transporting drugs. The dog arrived 10 minutes later and alerted. Chapman found several kilograms of methamphetamine and heroin in a hidden compartment. The Seventh Circuit initially reversed the denial of Cole’s motion to suppress. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial. Travel-plan questions ordinarily fall within the mission of a traffic stop but, like other police inquiries during a traffic stop, must be reasonable under the circumstances. Here they were reasonable. The trooper inquired about the basic details of Cole’s travel, and his follow-up questions were justified given Cole’s less-than-forthright answers. The stop itself was lawfully initiated, and the trooper developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity before moving to the gas station for the dog sniff. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

DEA obtained a search warrant for Perryman’s Indianapolis home. Agents arrived at the property, read Perryman his Miranda rights, then searched the home. In the master suite, they found fentanyl, baggies, a digital scale, and a loaded AR-15 rifle, three to four steps away from the fentanyl, along with men’s shoes and clothes. Perryman’s girlfriend, Moore, lived elsewhere but had signed the lease for the home. Moore said that the drugs, money, and gun were not hers. The agents read Perryman his Miranda rights for a second time. He agreed to talk. He admitted that the drugs were his, then provided the agents with the name of his drug supplier but said the rifle “belonged to a girlfriend.”Perryman was indicted for possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), and possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, 922(g)(1). The court excluded questioning concerning the disciplinary record of Sergeant Jones, who participated in the search of Perryman’s home. Jones’ 15-year-old disciplinary offense resulted in a reprimand and stemmed from an unrelated investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Perryman’s convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and, under the Confrontation Clause, to the exclusion of evidence relating to Jones’ disciplinary record. View "United States v. Perryman" on Justia Law

Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, would leave her van parked on the street near her home for extended periods of time. In 2018, pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code, her van was towed, impounded, and destroyed. She sued the city on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the ordinance. The district court granted, in part, her motion to certify her suit as a class action. With respect to the “Tow Class,” the court concluded that Santiago “is asserting only a facial challenge: the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to require adequate notice before a vehicle has been towed.” Concerning the Vehicle Disposal Class, the court rejected Chicago’s assertion that state law requires the class to show prejudice from the city’s failure to strictly follow its ordinance.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The class certification order does not fully demonstrate the “rigorous analysis” required by FRCP 23 and constituted an abuse of discretion. Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The district court did not discuss any of the elements of the underlying causes of action or what the causes of action are. View "Santiago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Von Kahl is serving a life sentence, plus consecutive terms of 10 and five years’ imprisonment, for murdering two deputy U.S. Marshals and related crimes. The Bureau of Prisons originally calculated his release date as February 2013. In 1994, the Bureau recalculated his release date as February 2023. Von Kahl contested the calculation of his release date 28 U.S.C. 2241. Von Kahl, whose crime predates the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act, is subject to the 1976 Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. 4201–28, and was eligible for parole as soon as he was sentenced. The Parole Commission denied him release. He contends that he is now entitled to mandatory release under section 4206(d), which caps how long anyone must serve unless the inmate has seriously or frequently violated institutional rules or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any crime.The Seventh Circuit upheld the 2023 release date. The statute says that a life term is treated the same as a 45-year term, so anyone sentenced to life is presumptively released after 30 years but, unless paroled earlier, a prisoner must serve two-thirds or 30 years of “each consecutive term or terms.” Von Kahl is serving three consecutive terms: life, ten years, and five years. Thirty years for the life term, plus two-thirds of each term of years, adds to 40 years, running through February 2023. View "Von Kahl v. Segal" on Justia Law

Police were called when a highly-inebriated Gupta became belligerent while trying to enter a hotel at which he was not a guest. Surveillance video shows Gupta stumbling around and knocking over a brochure rack. A police officer, attempting to move Gupta outside, tugged on his handcuffed arm causing him to fall on his head and chest and fracture a vertebra in his neck. The officer then picked Gupta up by the arms and dragged him to the sidewalk. The officer asserts that he used a reasonable amount of force because Gupta was resisting arrest. Gupta asserts that he was not resisting the arrest, and was intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The video does not show Gupta stiffening or jerking himself away from the officer.The Seventh Circuit reversed an order granting the defendant summary judgment on Gupta’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claim. There are material disputes of fact that make resolution of this case on summary judgment inappropriate. View "Gupta v. Melloh" on Justia Law

Chambers appealed the denial of two petitions for habeas corpus, asserting that he was denied due process in prison disciplinary hearings. Chambers lost good-time credit for one incident of refusing a prison guard’s instructions to provide a urine sample, disobeying a staff member’s order, and acting with insolence towards the staff member and another incident of interfering with a security device (he had activated a cell alarm by forcibly kicking his cell door). The hearing officers discounted Chambers’s claim that the guard never asked for a sample, noting video evidence that the guard was carrying a sample bottle and found Chambers guilty based on his undisputed statement to the guard that he was not in distress or having a medical emergency when he kicked his cell door.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The disciplinary determinations were supported by sufficient evidence. Chambers had no due-process right to call witnesses whose testimony would be repetitive and irrelevant. The record lacked any evidence of bias and the initial reviews of Chambers’s cases by a one-member Unit Disciplinary Committee complied with BOP rules. Federal courts must affirm prison disciplinary decisions if they are supported by “some evidence,” and the incident reports cleared that low bar. “Chambers, a frequent litigant, is warned that he risks monetary sanctions if he continues to repeat in future cases these arguments that we have found to be frivolous.” View "Chambers v. Ciolli" on Justia Law

Anderson rode with Cooper and Jackson to a Chicago sandwich shop. The trio entered the shop. Inside were customers Hazziez and Hart and several cooks, behind a glass wall. While waiting for food, Jackson sold two dime bags of crack cocaine to an unknown person outside the shop. Hart confronted Anderson’s group, stating it wasn’t their turf and they shouldn’t be selling drugs there. The argument moved outside. Anderson shot Hart three times. Hazziez, having witnessed the shooting, jumped in his car and took off. As Hazziez drove away, he heard three more shots.Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder of Hart, attempted first-degree murder of Hazziez, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by Hazziez. His first-degree murder conviction was affirmed. Because of an erroneous jury instruction, the attempted murder conviction was reversed. The court entered judgment on the aggravated discharge of a firearm count. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Anderson then sought federal habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated-discharge conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent in upholding Anderson’s conviction by pointing to trial testimony supporting an inference that Anderson was shooting at Hazziez. View "Anderson v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

Reinebold, then 56 years old, applied to be the head baseball coach of Indiana University South Bend (IUSB). After IUSB declined to hire Reinebold, he sued IUSB, Athletic Director Bruce, and Assistant Athletic Director Norris under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed all of Reinebold’s claims with his concession except for his section 1983 claims against Bruce and Norris in their individual capacities. The district court then entered summary judgment in favor of Bruce and Norris, finding that Reinebold did not identify a suitable comparator and did not show that he was intentionally treated differently because of his age.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The hiring committee distinguished Reinebold and his proposed comparator Buysse (age 31) based on their respective performances during their interviews. The evidence shows that Reinebold performed poorly during his phone interview. Buysse performed well. An employer is not required to score a job interview using objective criteria. View "Reinebold v. Bruce" on Justia Law

After a steady buildup of performance problems, Sweet lost her job as a customer service representative in the Bargersville, Indiana clerk-treasurer’s office. Months before she was fired, Sweet criticized Longstreet, the elected clerk-treasurer, for reconnecting the utility service of a delinquent customer who was Longstreet’s wealthy business partner. Arguing that she was fired for vocalizing her opposition to the reconnection, she sued Longstreet and the town alleging retaliation in violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Sweet cited “suspicious timing” in the form of a five-month gap between her criticism and the termination of her employment; an ambiguous affidavit from a fellow employee; and the fact that her former employer offered several reasons for her termination rather than a single, consistent explanation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Even if Sweet’s criticism of Longstreet was constitutionally protected, she lacks sufficient evidence to support an inference that it was a motivating factor in the termination of her employment. The evidence, considered as a whole, indicates that Sweet was fired for multiple reasons, including “her long documented history of deficient performance, failure to improve on requested areas, incidences of bullying and repeated mistakes.” View "Sweet v. Town of Bargersville" on Justia Law

Moreland, convicted of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance, unsuccessfully appealed. On August 11, 2013, his direct review ended when the opportunity to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from that date to file a federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Moreland sought collateral postconviction relief in state court on July 30, 2014. On March 7, 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Moreland’s petition for review. All 586 days of the state postconviction process were tolled.Moreland filed a federal habeas petition on March 28, 2016, nine days after the one-year statute of limitations elapsed; 374 untolled days had elapsed since the end of Moreland’s direct review. Moreland’s petition raised claims related to due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. Moreland alleged that the time for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because he suffered from schizophrenia, and on several occasions, was unable to research his case due to lack of access to the prison library.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Moreland has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. The court rejected claims that the district court should have tolled the time connected with motions for postconviction discovery and for reconsideration. View "Moreland v. Eplett" on Justia Law