Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Two churches sued Illinois Governor Pritzker after he issued an executive order that limited to 10 the number of people who could attend a religious service during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court declined to enjoin enforcement. By the time the appeal reached the Seventh Circuit, Pritzker had rescinded the order. The court held that the case was not moot but that the order did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The churches nonetheless requested that the district court issue an injunction, citing recent Supreme Court decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the request. The court noted that the Governor will likely consider recent legal developments in crafting any new order in response to the recent surge. The court further noted that Pritzker is entitled to qualified immunity and that an award of damages is not available. View "Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Simpson unsuccessfully applied to work as a Correctional Officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections four times in 2014-2017. Simpson believed the hiring practices underlying those rejections violated his rights—and those of other unsuccessful Black applicants—under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). Invoking disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, Simpson’s class action complaint alleged that, through the use of a five-step hiring process for correctional officers, the Department both intended to discriminate against Black applicants and succeeded in producing that result. The district court denied Simpson’s motion for class certification, finding that none of his proposed classes—a general class of all unsuccessful applicants and five subclasses of candidates dismissed at each step of the hiring process—satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement that they present “questions of law or fact common to the class.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis apparently merged Simpson’s disparate impact claims with his disparate treatment claims for intentional discrimination. While disparate treatment claims may require a more searching commonality inquiry, disparate impact claims most often will not: the common questions are whether the challenged policy has in fact disparately impacted the plaintiff class and, if so, whether that disparate impact is justified by business necessity. The court did not clearly delineate its reasoning for declining to certify three of Simpson’s disparate impact subclasses. View "Simpson v. Dart" on Justia Law

Burgess left the apartment he shared with Howard, texting threats to kill her and burn down the apartment. That night, Burgess set a fire that destroyed the building and all of Howard’s and her children’s belongings. Burgess fled and eluded law enforcement for four months, during which Burgess walked into a Metro store, displayed a semi-automatic handgun, and told the clerk he was not “playing.” The clerk opened the register and Burgess stole $650. Metro had a security camera; a citizen identified Burgess and told Milwaukee Police. Burgess was arrested at his sister’s house; police recovered a handgun and the clothing Burgess wore during the Metro robbery.The government presented evidence Burgess had contacted Howard extensively while in custody, discouraging her from cooperating and encouraging her to change her story. A magistrate entered a no-contact order. Burgess nonetheless consistently and repeatedly contacted Howard. Burgess unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest, arguing MPD lacked probable cause to believe he was inside his sister’s house, then pled guilty The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 174-month sentence and the application a 2-level adjustment for obstruction of justice based on Burgess’s perjurious testimony at his suppression hearing and on his violations of a no-contact order. The factual findings upon which the district court relied established by a preponderance of the evidence that Burgess’s violations of the no-contact order amounted to obstruction. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law

Allen County Officers received an arrest warrant for Gosnell. An anonymous tip indicated that Gosnell was staying at a Fort Wayne motel. The motel manager stated that Gosnell was staying in a room with Jones. Jones had arrests dating back to the 1990s and was listed as a “known resister,” “convicted felon,” and “substance abuser.” At the room, the officers knocked and called out Jones’s street name, stating: “It’s police. We’re not here for you.” Jones said, “She’s not here.” The officers asked Jones to open the door. He requested some time. Both officers estimate that 30-60 seconds elapsed between the first knock and when Jones opened the door. In conversational tones, they reiterated that they were not there for Jones, showed him the warrant, and explained that they would like to “verify” Gosnell was not there. Jones eventually said, “fine,” and moved away from the door. The officers lifted the beds and found a firearm.Jones pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) after the denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Jones has not shown that he was seized prior to the search. In light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Jones’s position would have felt free to decline the officers’ request to open the door. Jones voluntarily consented to a search of his motel room. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Around midnight, four people were in Shaffers' car, with Shaffers in the driver’s seat, smoking and listening to music while parked. Chicago Police Officers Streeper and Bruno heard loud music coming from the car and smelled marijuana. They blocked Shaffers' car with their car, then approached, identified themselves, and instructed the occupants to put their hands up. Streeper testified that Shaffers initially failed to comply and made “furtive movements with his hands below the [driver’s] seat.” Shaffers fled. Streeper recovered a gun from the floorboard between the driver’s seat and the console. Months later, Shaffers was arrested while appearing in state court for a traffic infraction.Shaffers was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Denying Shaffers’ motion to suppress, the court concluded that the officers’ approach was a seizure because Shaffers could not move his car and a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave but that the seizure was permissible under "Terry" because the officers had reasonable suspicion. After a mistrial, obstruction of justice charges were added based on Shaffers’ attempts to influence witness testimony. The Seventh Circuit upheld his convictions, rejecting arguments that the gun should have been suppressed; that Shaffers’ Confrontation Clause rights were violated by admitting a witness’s grand jury testimony, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that his prior aggravated assault conviction was improperly considered a “crime of violence” at sentencing. View "United States v. Shaffers" on Justia Law

An eyewitness testified that Turner arrived at Krystal's residence, pulled a handgun from his pants, and fatally shot Krystal. Turner claimed that Krystal grabbed his handgun, which accidentally fired during the ensuing scuffle. Turner admitted that he frequently kept a loaded firearm in his car for protection. The prosecutor asked whether he knew it was illegal to have a loaded gun in his car in Chicago and whether he thought he was “entitled to just break the law.” Turner replied that keeping a loaded gun in his car was not illegal, or if it was, he was unaware of that law.Convicted of first-degree murder, Turner appealed, unsuccessfully arguing that the cross-examination about the legality of his gun possession violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms. After exhausting state postconviction remedies, Turner sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), reprising his Second Amendment argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court addressed Turner’s claim on the merits and its decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law.” The evidence of Turner’s firearm possession was relevant even if his firearm possession was constitutionally protected. Any attempt by the prosecutor to draw an improper character-propensity inference is not a constitutional problem, but a state law evidentiary problem. View "Turner v. Brannon-Dortch" on Justia Law

Gilbreath was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child for repeatedly molesting his step-granddaughter, S.L., beginning when she was nine years old. Gilbreath argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to investigate S.L.’s claims that she disclosed the assaults to others in the household; impeach S.L.’s testimony denying her motive to lie with her prior statements discussing her behavioral problems and Gilbreath’s interference with her dating life; impeach S.L. with inconsistencies between her various statements; present testimony from family members corroborating Gilbreath’s version of events and establishing S.L.’s character for dishonesty; and present evidence regarding S.L.’s motive to lie. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus relief.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The attorney’s explanation of his pre-trial decisions and his strategy as the case unfolded was worthy of being “required reading in every law school trial practice class.” His defense was that S.L. fabricated the allegations; fully aware that a young accuser in a sexual abuse case can be perceived sympathetically by the jury, he sought to demonstrate not that she was a liar but that she was not a reliable witness. Gilbreath failed to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of a claim of deficient performance was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. View "Gilbreath v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

Cory died in her bed in 2006. Although young, Cory was severely alcoholic, bulimic, and had been sick with flu-like symptoms. An autopsy revealed “marked steatosis of the liver” and no signs of trauma. Investigators verified her husband, Curt’s, timeline and interviewed their three children, who had seen Cory alive before Curt took them to school. Dr. Bowman, who conducted the autopsy, indicated that the cause of death was inconclusive and did not suggest foul play.Seven years later, Detective Gibson, reviewing old files, noticed a photo of Cory’s body and concluded that Curt had suffocated Cory with a pillow the evening before her death was reported. The photos had been taken after Cory’s arms were repositioned. Gibson launched a murder investigation. Coroner Keller joined Gibson’s effort, claiming without corroboration, that Cory’s body had been in full rigor and that the room had smelled bad. The two “searched” for experts until finding Dr. Turner, to whom they provided limited information. Turner prepared a report supporting the suffocation hypothesis. Curt was arrested and spent 21 months in jail, followed by nine months under house arrest. After a mistrial, FOIA requests revealed undisclosed evidence. In 2017, a jury acquitted Curt. Curt sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on fabrication and manipulation of evidence and on violations of his “Brady” right to be provided with exculpatory evidence, and a Fourth Amendment “malicious prosecution” claim premised on Curt’s detention, without probable cause. The district court denied the officials’ motions, seeking qualified immunity . The Seventh Circuit dismissed in part, citing lack of jurisdiction over the Fourth Amendment claim. Curt withdrew his Fourteenth Amendment claim as precluded by circuit precedent. View "Lovelace v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff on drug-interdiction duty in central Illinois observed an RV with a dirty license plate traveling on I-72 and followed it, exiting the freeway and pulling into a truck-stop parking lot. The driver, Ahmad, entered the convenience store with one of his passengers. A store employee informed the deputy that the men were acting strangely. The officer asked to speak with them. They agreed. After a few preliminary questions, the deputy asked for Ahmad’s driver’s license and the vehicle's rental agreement. Ahmad produced the documents. The deputy then asked for consent to search the RV. Ahmad agreed. The deputy did not immediately conduct a search but called for a K-9 unit, which arrived minutes later. Ahmad agreed to a dog sniff of the RV. The dog alerted about 15 minutes into the encounter. The deputy searched the RV, where a large quantity of marijuana was discovered.Ahmad moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that his consent to search was involuntary because he had already been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the deputy retained his driver’s license and the RV rental agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The deputy’s brief possession of Ahmad’s license and rental agreement did not transform this otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. Ahmad voluntarily consented to both the external dog sniff and the search of the RV. View "United States v. Ahmad" on Justia Law

After being fired from the CTA, Miller and McGuire (both Caucasian) sued their former employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal (42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Illinois state law. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Despite receiving two extensions, however, Miller and McGuire failed to respond. Finding no persuasive excuse for this failure, the district court denied their third extension and took up the motion without a responsive pleading. The court concluded that the undisputed evidence did not support the claims and granted CTA summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension, and evidence of basic elements of a retaliation claim was lacking. Miller and McGuire could not avoid summary judgment based on the suspicious timing of their discharges alone unless, “[a]t minimum,” they first produced evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Bonds (a CTA officer) knew of their EEO complaints. They did not. Undisputed evidence showed that CTA had legitimate (nonracial) reasons for terminating Miller and McGuire’s employment and these reasons were not pretextual. View "Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law