Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Brown pled guilty in the Eastern District of Missouri to unlawfully possessing a firearm and admitted to eight prior state law felony convictions, leading to an enhanced, 262-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief in the Eighth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Brown used 28 U.S.C. 2241 to file a habeas petition in the Seventh Circuit, where he was then confined, contending that Supreme Court precedent leaves him without the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. Brown cited a Seventh Circuit holding (Davenport) that a federal prisoner may seek section 2241 relief in the circuit of confinement where section 2255’s limits on second or successive motions would deny that prisoner even one opportunity to seek habeas relief based on a newly-issued statutory interpretation decision.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Circuit of conviction law (here, the Eighth Circuit) generally applies to Davenport-based habeas petitions. Eighth Circuit precedent clearly leaves Brown with the three predicate offenses necessary to sustain his ACCA-enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit has held that a weapons-exhibiting offense remains a violent felony under section 924(e)’s elements clause, which Supreme Court precedent left untouched. View "Brown v. Krueger" on Justia Law

DiDonato fell and seriously injured her head in the bathroom of Panatera’s home Panatera, a Chicago paramedic, found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding but allegedly only rinsed the blood from DiDonato’s head, wrapped it in a towel, moved her to his bed, and sexually assaulted her. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home. DiDonato went to an emergency room. She had sustained head trauma and a concussion.DiDonato filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Panatera violated her due process rights by failing to provide medical care, with state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DiDonato’s section 1983 claim. DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a “special relationship.” States and municipalities are not in a “special relationship” with all residents and do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. There was no allegation that DiDonato was ever in the city’s care or custody. DiDonato also failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted “under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens; an individual’s employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. DiDonato’s need for help and medical care arose during entirely private interaction. View "Didonato v. Panatera" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate Zimmerman filed a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Though “far from clear and very abbreviated,” the complaint seemed to contend that Corrections Officer Bornick had it out for him because of grievances Zimmerman had filed concerning Bornick. Zimmerman also seemed to allege that he had received an undeserved warning from Bornick, who also confiscated about $100 worth of Zimmerman’s property and issued a conduct report that led to 16 days of disciplinary confinement.The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and determined that Zimmerman failed to state a claim; the complaint did not establish a causal relationship between Bornick’s actions and any protected speech. Deciding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Zimmerman’s allegations were thorough, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court was wrong not to dismiss the complaint but absent a clear indication of futility or some extraordinary circumstance, litigants, including prisoners, should have the opportunity to try again by filing an amended complaint. The district court may have held Zimmerman to a pleading standard beyond that required by the Federal Rules and, regardless, should have given him a second try. View "Zimmerman v. Bornick" on Justia Law

Sanders, a severely mentally ill inmate, has been in the custody of the Illinois Department of Correction since 2004. For eight years, he was in solitary confinement, where his mental health deteriorated. Sanders has attempted suicide and engaged in self-harm multiple times. He claims that self-mutilation was a pre-condition for solitary confinement inmates to speak with a mental health person. Sanders filed suit and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to bring suits without prepaying the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has three strikes—actions or appeals dismissed for being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim”—can only proceed without prepayment if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Sanders cited the “imminent danger exception.”The district court initially granted his IFP application but later revoked its grant, finding that none of Sanders’s allegations demonstrated that he was in imminent danger. The Seventh Circuit reinstated his IFP status. Sanders adequately alleged his belief that certain practices at the Pontiac Correctional Center would lead him to self-harm. The district court erroneously determined that the allegations were fraudulent and did so without explicitly considering whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Gooch alleged that correctional officers Young and Wilson falsely informed another inmate that Gooch had stolen from him and directed the inmate to “take action”; the inmate then attacked Gooch with a weapon. When Gooch defended himself, Wilson intervened and instructed Gooch to lie on the floor, where the inmate attacked him again. Gooch asked his correctional counselor for the form on which to file a grievance against the officers. Gooch asserts that his counselor refused to give him the form, stating “you better watch out snitching on staff.” Over the next two days, “multiple guards” walked by his cell, calling him a “rat” and making threats.Three days later, Gooch filed a “Bivens action,” which was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. Exhaustion is not required when the responsible prison officials refuse to give a prisoner the necessary grievance form or thwart a prisoner from filing a grievance through threats or intimidation. Gooch attested that he feared for his life if he continued with the administrative-remedy process. The government did not contest his assertion and failed to meet its burden of showing that remedies were “available” to Gooch. View "Gooch v. Young" on Justia Law

A felony defendant normally must be present in the courtroom at sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(3). The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 134 Stat. 281, permits district courts to conduct felony plea and sentencing proceedings by videoconference if the defendant consents and the judge finds “for specific reasons” that the sentencing “cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice,” In March 2020, just before the CARES Act was adopted, Coffin pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. Sentencing was postponed several times.Coffin eventually consented to a sentencing hearing by videoconference under the Act. The district judge confirmed Coffin’s consent on the record and found that further delay would seriously harm the interests of justice, noting several reasons why that was so. The judge asked if there were any objections to his findings. Coffin’s attorney said, “No, thank you.” The judge imposed 60-month concurrent sentences. The Seventh Circuit rejected Coffin’s challenges to the judge’s CARES Act findings as “far too late.” He expressly consented to the videoconference sentencing and confirmed that he had no objection to the judge’s findings under the Act. “That’s a waiver.” View "United States v. Coffin" on Justia Law

Detectives Roseman and Hunt stopped Goodwill for a window tint violation. After asking Goodwill to sit in the squad car, Roseman began the paperwork while both detectives asked Goodwill questions. A canine unit arrived minutes later, before Roseman finished the warning form. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search revealed two kilograms of cocaine. Goodwill, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers unlawfully prolonged the search by asking unrelated questions and conducted the dog sniff without his consent.The district court found that the questioning did not extend the stop and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Roseman needed to check the driver’s license and vehicle information—which involved typing in the motorist’s name and date of birth or driver’s license number plus the vehicle’s registration information—then complete, by hand, the warning—which included the date, time, vehicle information, driver’s information, and the location. Roseman’s testimony at the suppression hearing and the traffic-stop video indicated that he worked expeditiously. Roseman worked on the ticket continuously without any breaks. An officer does not need a driver’s consent to conduct a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop, if it does not prolong the stop. View "United States v. Goodwill" on Justia Law

Lewis left her car parked on an Alsip street during a snowstorm. She was fined $50 for violating an ordinance that prohibits parking on any “primary snow route” if more than one inch has fallen within 12 hours and requires all primary snow routes to be identified by signs; a three-inch limit applies to “all other public streets not designated as primary snow routes.” The street where Lewis had parked was not posted as a primary snow route.Lewis could have challenged the fine in state court but instead filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alsip violated the Due Process Clause by failing to erect signs on every block of every street telling drivers when snow requires them to remove their vehicles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Due Process Clause requires governmental bodies to make laws available to the public, not to ensure that everyone knows all rules. The statute or regulation itself is adequate notice if it is clear. Drivers know that many traffic rules are not set out on signs but still must be obeyed. View "Lewis v. Village of Alsip" on Justia Law

Merrill pressured 12-13-year-old girls to take and send him sexually explicit photographs of themselves. Merrill was indicted for producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); receiving child pornography, section 2252A(a)(2)(A); and possessing child pornography, section 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty to one count each of producing and possessing with respect to one girl. At his plea hearing, Merrill confirmed that he remembered: “soliciting photographs and possessing the types of photographs that are set forth in the plea agreement.” Before the scheduled sentencing hearing, new counsel appeared for Merrill and moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that his former attorneys “never explained what the elements of the production charge were or what the government was required to prove to establish his guilt.”At an evidentiary hearing. Merrill’s former lawyers testified to having explained to Merrill the differences among the three charges and how the evidence established each element of the production charge; each told Merrill that he could be convicted of production based on proof that he had asked the minors to take and send the sexually explicit photographs and that the minors did so at his request.The district judge denied Merrill’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Merrill’s attorneys’ advice was sound, and in any event, he has not shown prejudice from the supposedly erroneous advice. View "United States v. Merrill" on Justia Law

Rasho, on behalf of a class of mentally ill inmates in Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) custody, sued IDOC officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for failing to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care. The parties reached a settlement requiring IDOC to meet certain benchmarks across several areas of treatment. A year later IDOC had failed to substantially comply with portions of the agreement. Under the agreement, the plaintiffs needed to prove that the breach itself caused an Eighth Amendment violation. The judge held that they made that showing in five areas of treatment, noting that IDOC’s deficiencies were primarily attributable to chronic, severe staff shortages. Because IDOC knew about its staffing problem for several years, the judge concluded that IDOC was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm. He entered a permanent injunction requiring IDOC to hire and maintain a specific number of staff members and other specific measures on a mandatory timetable.The Seventh Circuit reversed. IDOC officials took reasonable steps to cure the identified deficiencies, particularly understaffing, which is inconsistent with the finding of deliberate indifference. Even if those steps were not fully successful, the reasonable efforts indicated that IDOC did not recklessly disregard the risks. The court’s order also exceeds remedial limitations under the Prison Litigation Reform Act; prospective corrections remedies must be “narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,” 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A). View "Rasho v. Jeffreys" on Justia Law