Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Westray pleaded guilty to a 1998 murder. He received a death sentence which was later commuted to life imprisonment. In a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, he subsequently challenged his confinement, including its duration, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing and on remand when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his claims. The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was presented to the Illinois trial court in Westray’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied without comment. It is therefore presumed that the claim was adjudicated on its merits and AEDPA deference applies. Westray has not shown that but for his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance on remand, he would have been sentenced to a term of years. Westray cannot prove prejudice and his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails. No evidentiary hearing was required. View "Westray v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

Over three weeks in 2002, Santiago participated in a string of armed robberies at Pennsylvania hotels. When he was arrested, Santiago was holding the distinctive firearm that he and his co-defendants used in the robberies. Convicted of three Hobbs Act counts of interference with commerce by robbery, two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, (robbery), 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon (prior state felony convictions for criminal trespass and retail theft), Santiago was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months' imprisonment on the three Hobbs Act and two felon-in-possession counts. Under then-applicable law, Santiago also received mandatory consecutive 60-month and 300-month terms for the 924(c) counts. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit rejected Santiago’s section 2241 habeas petition in which he argued that the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, required that his convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon be set aside. Santiago cannot show he was actually innocent of those charges as required to invoke the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). In order to use section 2241 to avoid the restrictions on successive 2255 motions, he would need to show that no reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Santiago v. Streeval" on Justia Law

In 2014, Abebe, a Black woman of Ethiopian origin, began working for Eskenazi Health’s Dental Clinic as a dental assistant. Abebe has had a record of behavior issues throughout her employment; one annual review suggested that she “work on her personal issues that are affecting her interaction with co-workers.” Another review noted that “when she gets upset, her attitude turns to shocking.” Abebe’s 2018 performance review led to Abebe not receiving a merit-based raise, noting three incidents during which Abebe made accusations against co-workers. Abebe contacted the EEOC and alleged for the first time that she had experienced race- and national origin-based discrimination. Abebe claims Eskenazi Health placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan after she spoke to the EEOC. The parties dispute whether the Plan was actually issued or merely discussed. Eskenazi Health decided, a month later, not to impose the Plan.Abebe sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Eskenazi. Abebe cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, nor can she demonstrate that Eskenazi’s reason for the low scores on her performance review was pretextual. Abebe fails to establish a causal connection between her contact with the EEOC and the issuance of the Performance Improvement Plan, nor that issuing the Plan was an adverse employment action. View "Abebe v. Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County" on Justia Law

Illinois State University charges tuition and multiple fees; the Mandatory Fee covers the cost of on-campus facilities and programs. In 2020, after the Governor declared an emergency because of COVID-19 and issued an order forbidding many in-person gatherings, ISU shifted to distance learning over a video system. ISU remitted some but not all of the Mandatory Fee, telling students that the remainder includes the expense of facilities that must be supported no matter how educational services are provided. Two students filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Constitution does not ensure that states keep all of their promises, any more than it ensures that states observe all of their laws. A violation of a state law or a state contract is a violation of a state entitlement, for which the remedy lies under state law. . ISU lacked authority to violate the Governor’s orders. There was no due process violation because the students were not entitled to hearings. What the students want is substantive–a full refund. A breach of contract does not violate the Constitution. Suing ISU officials in their individual capacities makes no difference; there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. “Plaintiffs’ counsel should count themselves lucky that [those officials] did not seek sanctions for frivolous litigation. View "Thiele v. Board of Trustees of Illinois State University" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state holds exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiffs, who own beachfront property on Lake Michigan’s Indiana shores, believed that their property extended to the low-water mark, and filed suit, alleging that the ruling amounted to a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment–a “judicial taking.” The defendants were Indiana officeholders in their official capacities: the Governor, the Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources Director, and the State Land Office Director.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. None of the named officials caused the plaintiffs’ asserted injury or is capable of redressing it, so the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Pavlock v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

While imprisoned in Indiana, Lauderdale-El petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the loss of good-time credits resulting from a prison disciplinary conviction. His petition asserts that prison officials violated his due process rights in applying an Indiana Department of Correction policy rescinding previously restored good-time credits.The district court concluded that Lauderdale-El could challenge the restoration policy in state court, so it dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). Lauderdale-El had exhausted administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that dismissal of a habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is a final and appealable judgment. Indiana law permits state-court review of Lauderdale-El’s claims. Because Lauderdale-El is still on parole, the court concluded that the matter was not moot. View "Lauderdale-El v. Indiana Parole Board" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued a series of executive orders that first required Illinois residents to shelter in place at their residences, compelled “non-essential” businesses temporarily to cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people (later increased to 50 people). Believing that these orders violated numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, several individuals joined with some Illinois businesses and sued the Governor in his official capacity. After granting the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court found that they lacked standing to sue. The court also concluded that it would be futile to allow a second amendment because, even if it had erred about the existence of a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. With respect to five out of six counts, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the criteria for Article III standing to sue. The remaining count attempts to state a claim under the Takings Clause. The business plaintiffs “may have squeaked by the standing bar” for that theory but have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nowlin v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Whyte was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide for killing his girlfriend, Weiland, during a 2006 altercation. In his habeas petition, Whyte argued his constitutional rights were violated when he was required to wear a stun belt in front of the jury. The parties dispute whether the jury ever saw the stun belt or understood the nature of the device but when Whyte took the stand to testify, he declined to reenact the altercation with Weiland for fear the jury would see the device and draw negative inferences. Whyte also claims the belt had a chilling effect on his testimony, rendering his account of the incident “stilted” and “emotionless,” which the state underscored in its closing argument. Whyte’s trial counsel did not object to the stun belt’s use. Whyte also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Whyte’s claims are procedurally defaulted under adequate and independent state grounds, so federal review is foreclosed. Whyte failed to challenge the stun belt or the effectiveness of his trial counsel, either on direct appeal or in a state court post-conviction motion. Whyte offered no external impediment that prevented him from complying with the state court pleading standards. View "Whyte v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Ali brought this civil rights action against Chicago and several police officers, alleging that the officers followed a city policy “of refusing to release on bond an arrestee taken into custody on an arrest warrant issued by an Illinois state court outside of Cook County.” Days before the deadline for completing fact discovery, Ali moved to certify a class. The district court granted the city’s motion to strike, noting that Ali had not added class allegations to his complaint. Ali sought leave to amend his complaint to include class allegations, arguing that he did not have evidentiary support for the existence of the city policy until a November 2019 deposition. The city replied that it had acknowledged the policy months earlier. The district court denied Ali's motion. Weeks later, Ali settled his case.On January 25, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice. Also on January 25, Miller moved to intervene under Rule 24, asserting that he was a member of Ali’s proposed class. With his motion to intervene pending, Miller filed a notice of appeal from the January 25 order. On March 24, with that appeal pending, the district court denied Miller’s motion to intervene as untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no operative class action complaint. Miller’s motion to intervene was untimely; he is not a party to the lawsuit and cannot pursue other challenges. View "Miller v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Southern District of Indiana imposed a filing bar against Martin for submitting false information in an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Martin subsequently filed suit in the Northern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that an Indiana State Prison guard sexually assaulted him. The defendants argued that Martin had forged the signature, date, and checkmark on a grievance form to avoid summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Martin unsuccessfully moved to remove the allegedly falsified documents from the record and asked the court to appoint handwriting and computer experts; he alleged the defendants had tampered with the forms.The district court found that Martin had knowingly submitted an altered form and, under FRCP 56(h), barred him for two years “from filing any document in any civil case in this court until he pays all fines and filing fees due in any federal court.” The bar does not apply to appeals or to habeas corpus petitions. The court dismissed all of Martin’s pending civil cases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence of Martin’s fraud was plain, and the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that it did not need an expert to understand the evidence. The court reasonably concluded that a hearing would not aid its decision. “Martin’s conduct in this case and others cannot be tolerated.” View "Martin v. Redden" on Justia Law