Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2017 Nigro, a certified nurse anesthetist, began working at Riley Hospital. Division Director, Dr. Sadhasivam, recruited her and started implementing a new team-based care model. Within a year, an internal investigation revealed department-wide concern over the model’s efficacy and impact on team dynamics. Some employees believed that Sadhasivam’s leadership style resulted in a tense workplace. In 2017-2019, Nigro was the subject of multiple complaints, mostly concerning her attitude and ability to work on a team. Coworkers described her as “rude, snappy and belittling,” with management expressing concern that her behavior undermined the department’s already delicate atmosphere of collegiality. After investigating the complaints, hospital decision-makers issued a “coaching memorandum” to Nigro. A month later, it was determined that Nigro had engaged in timekeeping fraud by not working at times when she had been clocked in, Sadhasivam and three female administrators, agreed to terminate her for misconduct.Nigro filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), alleging sex-based discrimination and retaliation because of a supportive affidavit she had signed in another employee’s discrimination case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There is neither direct nor indirect evidence to support Nigro’s Title VII claim. View "Nigro v. Indiana University Health Care" on Justia Law

Seven years into his 15-year sentence for heroin dealing, Brock sought early discharge under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Receiving that relief depended on Brock first identifying a legally cognizable “extraordinary and compelling” reason for ending his sentence early and then convincing the district court the outcome was further justified by an application of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Brock argued, as “an extraordinary and compelling ground to consider a lower sentence,” that his 2005 cocaine conviction was no longer a proper predicate for his 21 U.S.C. 851 sentencing enhancement because the Illinois statute under which he was convicted covers isomers of cocaine omitted from the federal definition of cocaine.The district court denied relief, finding that the compassionate release statute could not be used as a path to a sentence reduction based on a position available to defendants during plea negotiations or trial, direct appeal, or in a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenging a sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Intervening Circuit precedent, even if viewed as announcing new law or a new interpretation of an existing statutory provision, cannot alone constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason authorizing a reduced sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Brock" on Justia Law

Mangine, serving a 35- year sentence for federal drug and firearm offenses, sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that the sentencing court mischaracterized him as a career offender and that the error resulted in his ineligibility for a discretionary sentence reduction he would like to pursue under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). His previous post-conviction motions under sections 2266 and 2241 had been unsuccessful. He had previously been denied a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2); Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two levels the offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes. did not change his Guidelines range as originally calculated.The district court denied relief, concluding that such ineligibility does not amount to a miscarriage of justice—thereby precluding Mangine from satisfying the conditions for pursuing post-conviction relief under section 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mangine could no longer be designated as a career offender in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions but that is not what drove his sentence. Even without the designation, his Guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. Mangine did not receive “far greater punishment than that usually meted out for an otherwise similarly situated individual who had committed the same offense.” He did not suffer a miscarriage of justice. View "Mangine v. Withers" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of Paul Reina on his claim that Walmart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b) and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Reina, who was deaf and legally blind, worked as a cart attendant for Walmart for almost twenty years. After providing Reina with a job coach, Walmart eventually ended Reina's employment. Reina filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which sued Walmart for violating the ADA. The jury concluded that Walmart violated the ADA by refusing Reina a reasonable accommodation in the form of a full-time job coach and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights. The jury awarded Reina $200,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Walmart's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to issue an injunction against Walmart as proposed by the EEOC. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, six men robbed a marijuana dealer, Thomas, at gunpoint in his home. Two of the robbers shot Thomas, who died. One of those shooters also shot Landon, Thomas’s business partner. Landon survived. Reyes was convicted of Thomas’s murder, Landon’s attempted murder, and home invasion. The state’s evidence against Reyes included Landon’s identification of Reyes as the shooter after viewing a photo array. It took the police five attempts to extract that identification from Landon; several times, he seemed to confuse Reyes with another man who was not a suspect in the robbery. Reyes moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress the identification.After Reyes exhausted state-court review, he sought federal collateral relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and that Landon’s identification was too unreliable to pass constitutional muster. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. While the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, as noted by the state court, it did not taint the conviction. Error alone is not enough to entitle Reyes to relief. A section 2254 petitioner must also show prejudice. Reyes cannot because the jury that convicted him heard significant evidence of his guilt beyond the identification and had the opportunity to evaluate most of the evidence bearing on the reliability of the identification. View "Reyes v. Nurse" on Justia Law

Famous was convicted in Wisconsin state court of four counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of exposing a child to harmful material and was sentenced to 168 years of confinement. In 2001, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied relief. Famous did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. The one-year statute of limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) began to run on February 25, 2002, the date on which the time to file a petition expired. Famous filed his federal habeas petition on August 17, 2010.The district court dismissed it as untimely, rejecting Famous’s estoppel arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Famous failed to set forth sufficient information to raise statutory estoppel to the statute of limitations defense; he failed to provide even the information reasonably available to him. “Given the laconic nature of his submission,” the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Famous’s request to take further discovery on that issue. In rejecting the defense of equitable tolling, the court did not clearly err in concluding that, even excluding the period when his appellate attorney allegedly retained his file, Famous did not timely file his petition. A finding that Famous’s chronic mental illness did not impede a timely filing was supported by the record. View "Famous v. Fuchs" on Justia Law

Lee‐Kendrick was charged with sexual assault of girls under the age of 16: his biological daughter; his girlfriend’s daughter, A.W.; and a friend. Lee‐Kendrick testified that the accusations arose only after he started taking away their cell phones and allowances. There was no physical evidence. The jury found him guilty. Lee‐ Kendrick unsuccessfully sought a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to certain prejudicial cross‐examination.In post-conviction motions, Lee‐ Kendrick argued his postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in not calling as a witness A.W.'s friend, Keeler. Lee‐Kendrick cited a memorandum from a Wisconsin State Public Defender's investigator, recounting an interview in which Keeler said that A.W. told Keeler of her plan to get Lee‐Kendrick in trouble. The state trial court did not find Lee‐Kendrick’s claims procedurally barred for having not been raised on direct appeal but applied the “Strickland” standard to reject Lee‐Kendrick’s arguments. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, going beyond his failure to raise the argument on appeal and reasoning that the attorney’s decision was not prejudicial because Keeler had no direct knowledge of the sexual assaults; Keeler’s testimony would have been inconsistent with the defense theory.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. His claim concerning failure to call Keeler was denied on an adequate and independent state‐law ground and is procedurally defaulted. That default is not excused by cause and prejudice. View "Lee-Kendrick v. Eckstein" on Justia Law

Greenpoint Tactical Income Fund and its affiliates and managers were the subjects of an FBI investigation into suspected fraud, particularly with respect to Greenpoint’s asset valuation practices. The investigation led to the issuance of a search warrant for plaintiffs’ properties and the seizure of some assets. Plaintiffs filed suit against Agent Pettigrew and Assistant United States Attorney Halverson, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights by submitting a false and misleading affidavit in support of the search warrant. They sought damages. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that plaintiffs were seeking to extend “Bivens” to a “new context” and that “special factors” counseled hesitation in doing so.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on different grounds. Even assuming that Bivens can reach the Fourth Amendment violations alleged here, Halverson is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and Agent Pettigrew is entitled to qualified immunity. There is no allegation that Halverson was interviewing witnesses himself, was actively involved in the investigation as it was unfolding, or personally vouched for the truth of the allegations in Pettigrew’s affidavit. A reasonable agent in Pettigrew’s position could believe the allegations amounted to probable cause. View "Greenpoint Tactical Income Fund LLC v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law

Brown, a prisoner in the Illinois River Correctional Center, experienced abdominal pain. A few days later, the prison’s nurse practitioner prescribed some pain medicine. Brown returned to his cell, but the pain became more severe. Brown was taken to the prison’s ’infirmary, where the prison’s nurses and doctor treated him over three-and-a-half days. Despite the treatment, the symptoms worsened, and Brown was transported to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with appendicitis, which required surgery to remove his appendix. Brown sued, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prison medical staff did not act with deliberate indifference toward Brown’s serious medical condition. Brown may have received subpar care in the prison’s infirmary but medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. › Brown has presented no direct or circumstantial evidence that the physician “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” View "Brown v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

St. Vincent Hospital adopted a COVID-19 vaccine requirement. Employees had until November 12, 2021 to get vaccinated unless they received a medical or religious exemption. In reviewing exemption requests, St. Vincent considered the employee’s position and amount of contact with others, the current health and safety risk posed by COVID, and the cost and effectiveness of other safety protocols. Dr. Halczenko treated gravely ill children, including those suffering from or at risk of organ failure.St. Vincent denied Halczenko’s request for religious accommodation on the ground that “providing an exemption to a Pediatric Intensivist working with acutely ill pediatric patients poses more than a de minim[i]s burden to the hospital because the vaccine provides an additional level of protection in mitigating the risk associated with COVID.” Halczenko and four other St. Vincent employees filed an EEOC complaint. The others—a nurse practitioner and three nurses, including two in the pediatric ICU—were granted religious accommodations. St. Vincent terminated Halczenko’s employment. Halczenko attributes his lack of success in finding new work to his non-compete agreement with St. Vincent, his preference not to move his family, and the limited demand for an unvaccinated physician in his specialty. In a purported class action, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of preliminary relief, concluding that Halczenko had shown neither irreparable harm nor an inadequate remedy at law. View "Halczenko v. Ascension Health, Inc." on Justia Law