Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Williams, an inmate, suffers from chronic tendinitis and has been prescribed pain medication. After injuring his finger, Williams was seen by a doctor. Williams’s finger did not require further treatment, but in an apparent error, Williams was removed from his pain medication. The next day Williams filed a “Request for Health Care” form, indicating that he was still experiencing pain and was no longer receiving his medication. Williams was seen by a nurse, who allegedly caused him further knee pain by making him do exercises while shackled. His medication was not reinstated and Williams continued to experience pain in his knee. As required by state grievance policies, Williams tried to informally resolve his complaints but Indiana’s policy requires that formal grievances be filed within 10 business days of the incident. Williams did not meet that deadline, believing that prison officials needed to respond to his informal grievance attempts before he could file a formal grievance. After Williams received a response he filed a formal grievance, but it was untimely.In Williams's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust all available remedies in the prison’s administrative-review system before filing suit in federal court. Williams did not do so and his argument that he had good cause for his failure to timely file a formal grievance is unexhausted and waived. View "Williams v. Rajoli" on Justia Law

After the public health department for the City of Madison and Dane County, Wisconsin issued a COVID-19 mask mandate, an owner of Helbachs Café posted a sign: “Mask Free Zone. Please remove mask before entering” and then took it down about 30 minutes later. Over the next few days, Madison’s public health officials cited Helbachs several times for violating its COVID-19 orders and set a hearing to revoke Helbachs’ food and drink license for cumulative violations. The dispute caught the public’s attention and the landlord decided not to renew Helbachs’ lease.Helbachs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The local citations were later dismissed, and the revocation hearing was not pursued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Helbachs has standing to bring this First Amendment retaliation claim because the record shows that Helbachs suffered injury-in-fact beyond the revoked citations and the threatened, but aborted, hearing. However, Helbachs’ First Amendment claim fails under “Monell” because the defendants’ actions were not part of a larger pattern or practice of retaliation. View "Helbachs Cafe LLC v. City of Madison, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Dunn was convicted in Indiana state court for the Torres murder. The case against Dunn was based largely on the testimony of two pathologists. In a state court post-conviction proceeding, Dunn argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with any forensic pathologist. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a state court post-conviction hearing, a board-certified forensic pathologist, Dr. Sozio, testified that the autopsy was substandard, missed a great deal, and that Torres’s injuries were more consistent with a fall than with being bludgeoned by a blunt object. If the defense had presented Sozio's testimony, the jury would have been presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding whether the fall alone caused the injuries. The state conceded that blood evidence effectively ruled out the use of a bat; no other weapon was found. Two eyewitnesses testified consistently that Torres was not beaten after his fall. Sozio's testimony was critical in this case to create reasonable doubt because it countered the state's scientific evidence and gave the jury reason to doubt that Torres was beaten. Dunn demonstrated prejudice under Strickland. View "Dunn v. Neal" on Justia Law

Police arrested Davis, a convicted felon, on a state warrant for three counts of aggravated battery by discharge of a firearm, just outside of his residence. While being arrested, Davis stated that there were children in the house. Officers entered the house to conduct a limited sweep of areas where a person could be hiding, finding an eight-year-old child and a 19-year-old. An officer observed a rifle, upright in plain view, in an open bedroom closet. About 45 minutes later, after the sweep had concluded, Antionette, a woman with whom Davis was living and the owner of the house, arrived and gave the officers oral and written consent to search the home, acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights.Davis, charged with illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle on the basis that no valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry or the later search. The district court found that three separate exceptions applied: a protective sweep following Davis’s arrest, exigent circumstances because a child was in the home, and Antoinette's voluntary consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Davis did not dispute that Antoinette’s consent was voluntary and not tainted by the initial entry into the house. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Towne was the LaSalle County State’s Attorney, 2006-2016. Donnelly worked as a legal intern with that office in 2012 and impermissibly accessed a file about the ongoing prosecution of her son. Towne locked the file to prohibit her continued access. A few years later, Donnelly applied for a position with the State’s Attorney’s Office. Towne did not hire her. Donnelly defeated Towne in the 2016 election for State’s Attorney, then launched an investigation into Towne’s conduct as State’s Attorney; she enlisted assistant state’s attorneys and Ottawa police officers to investigate. For seven months, they interviewed witnesses, allegedly concealing exculpatory portions of the interviews, and fabricating inculpatory testimony. A grand jury indicted Towne, who successfully moved to have a special prosecutor appointed. The special prosecutor did not act on the charges. After 10 months with no development, Towne successfully moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds.Towne filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the prosecution was retaliation for his campaign for state’s attorney and violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely, applying a two-year statute of limitations that began to run when Towne was indicted, not when he was acquitted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. First Amendment retaliation claims accrue when the underlying criminal charge is brought; the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in McDonough v. Smith did not change that rule. View "Towne v. Donnelly" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the district court dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant at summary judgment, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's excessive force claims against correctional officer Brian Piasecki.Plaintiff, the special administrator of the estate of Michael Madden, brought this action alleging deliberate indifference, use of excessive force, Monell liability, and state law claims against the state actors involved in the care of Madden while he was jailed in Milwaukee County. Over the course of one month, Madden developed infective endocarditis, which medical staff failed to diagnose. Madden died at the end of the month. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims at summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in awarding Piasecki summary judgment based on qualified immunity; and (2) the district court's judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Stockton v. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to stop the University of Southern Indiana from imposing a three-semester suspension on the grounds that the university violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 by discriminating against him on the basis of his sex, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary injunction.The university's Title IX committee in this case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff, a student of the university, had sexually assaulted another student and imposed a three-semester suspension. Plaintiff subsequently brought a complaint alleging discrimination. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief because Plaintiff did not show a likelihood of success on the merits that would support a preliminary injunction. View "Doe v. University of Southern Indiana" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that the retroactivity rule from two Seventh Circuit opinions - United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2011), and Vasqez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018) - controlled and that, therefore, a disputed ordinance applied prospectively, holding that the ordinance was retroactive.The ordinance at issue was passed by the Village of Hartland, Wisconsin and placed a moratorium against any new sex offenders residing there either temporarily or permanently. Plaintiff, a registered sex offender, brought this action against the Village, alleging that the ordinance violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of U.S. Const. art. I, 10. Under the Leach-Vasquez rule, a law is not retroactive and cannot violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if it applies "only to conduct occurring after its enactment." The district court only considered the retroactivity prong of the two-part analysis because, under Leach-Vasquez, the ordinance operated only prospectively. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) this Court overturns the Leach-Vasquez rule governing the retroactivity inquiry of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and instead, the critical question is whether the law attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment; and (2) the subject ordinance applies retroactively. View "Koch v. Village of Hartland" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit dismissed this interlocutory appeal from a district court order denying qualified immunity to a law enforcement officer because of disputed facts, holding that because Defendant did not bring a purely legal argument that did not depend on disputed facts, this Court lacked jurisdiction.Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City of Logansport and Defendant, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights stemming from certain incidents involving the alleged use of excessive force. Defendant sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity based on a factual dispute precluding the grant of qualified immunity on summary judgment. Defendant appealed. The Seventh District dismissed the appeal, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal. View "Stewardson v. Biggs" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision affirming Defendant's conviction did not reflect an unreasonable application of clearly established law.Defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to a detective, arguing that his statement "I don't want to talk about this" expressed an unambiguous intention to cut off all further questioning and that the detective's continued questioning violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The trial court denied the motion, after which Defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery and first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of Miranda. Thereafter, Appellant brought his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision amounted to a reasonable application of the Supreme Court's Miranda line of cases. View "Smith v. Boughton" on Justia Law