Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Emad, an active member of Milwaukee’s Islamic community for 25 years, practices Salah by praying five times each day in a state of physical purity. Emad also participated every Friday afternoon in congregational prayer known as Jumu’ah. Although most often led by an imam at a mosque, Jumu’ah can be held in other locations but must occur in a group setting. From March 2018 to May 2019, Emad was an immigration detainee. He was one of 175 Muslim detainees. The jail had a written policy that “[p]ersonal worship may be done in your cell.” It was not permitted in the dayroom areas. The cell contained a toilet, leaving Emad unable to pray in a clean environment in accordance with Salah. The jail also prohibited all “[g]roup activities led by inmates,” which kept Emad from participating in Jumu’ah. Emad asserts that the jail has long permitted Christian inmates to pray freely within the facility and to gather in the dayroom and library for Bible studies and group prayer.Emad sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, characterizing Emad’s allegations as “unsettling” but stating that it is essential to know precisely how Emad may have experienced discrimination and what role each named defendant played in favoring Christian prayer over Muslim prayer. The court remanded for development of the factual record. View "Emad v. Dodge County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s criminal history included a 1998 guilty plea to felony mail fraud. After maintaining an otherwise clean record for 24 years, he decided he wanted a gun. But 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) bars gun possession for anyone who, like Plaintiff, has a conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” So he brought this suit under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A to challenge the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as the law applied to him. Relying on pre-Bruen framework, The district court granted a motion from the government and dismissed the case.   The Seventh Circuit remanded to allow the district court to undertake the Bruen analysis. The court explained the parties may be unable altogether to find answers to certain questions, may find incomplete information in response to others, and perhaps in some instances, may identify substantial historical information pertinent to one or another dimension of the required inquiry. In the end, the district court will have to give the best answer available to whether the government has carried its burden of “affirmatively proving that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” View "Patrick Atkinson v Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court held in HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), that a public housing authority may enforce a term in a tenant’s lease allowing eviction if a member of the household or guest commits a crime (even without the tenant’s knowledge), some cities enacted ordinances extending that approach to private leases. Granite City, Illinois, required private landlords to evict tenants not as a condition of receiving a subsidy but as a matter of regulatory compulsion. Plaintiffs permitted their adult daughter to stay in their leased home occasionally, and one night they welcomed their daughter and her boyfriend into their house briefly. After they left, they were arrested for stealing a van. The City served a “Notice of Violation.” A hearing officer directed Plaintiffs’ landlord to begin eviction proceedings. The landlord dragged his feet long enough for them to file suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. A district court entered a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction. In January 2022, Plaintiffs gave up their lease voluntarily and moved out of Granite City.   The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs contend that if they prevail on the merits, they will be entitled to nominal damages. The court explained Plaintiffs’ potential problem is that their complaint did not allege a “completed” violation of their rights, so they have failed to identify a concrete injury that could be redressed by nominal damages. View "Deborah Brumit v Granite City, Illinois" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Kankakee Fire Department (“KFD”)—was attacked by another firefighter while responding to a fire at a senior living facility. The City suspended the other firefighter for twenty-four hours without pay, ordered him to complete an anger management course, and directed him to avoid working on the same shift as Plaintiff for three months. Plaintiff experienced ongoing physical and mental injuries from the incident, causing her to take leave from work and apply for workers’ compensation. She returned to work six months later but permanently left her position shortly after. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Defendants, among other things, retaliated against her for certain protected activities under Title VII and condoned aggressive and inappropriate behaviors as part of a “code of silence” that resulted in her attack. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and this appeal followed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the merits, Plaintiff’s claim fails because none of her evidence, separately or taken together, creates a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants had a practice of condoning aggressive behavior, resulting in a constitutional injury. Further the court wrote that the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that there was such a high risk of constitutional injury from the other firefighter that the “single incident” theory of municipal liability applies here. The court held Plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment regarding her Fourth Amendment Monell claim and her Title VII retaliation claim. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. View "Michelle Giese v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Carrington Mortgage Services on behalf of the United States for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. Calderon is a former employee of Carrington. She alleged that Carrington made false representations to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the course of certifying residential mortgage loans for insurance coverage from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Carrington moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet her evidentiary burden on two elements of False Claims Act liability. The district court sided with Carrington on both elements and granted summary judgment, disposing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff does have sufficient proof of materiality. However, the court agreed that she has not met her burden of proof on the element of causation. The court explained that on the present record, it is not clear how a factfinder would even spot the alleged false statement in each loan file, let alone evaluate its seriousness and scope. And though Plaintiff asserted that the misrepresentations, in this case, are of the type identified in Spicer, the court did not see much in the record to support that point other than Plaintiff’s assertions. Without more evidence from which a jury could conclude that Carrington’s alleged misrepresentations in each loan caused the subsequent defaults, the nature of those misrepresentations is not enough to get past summary judgment. View "Michelle Calderon v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Bell v. Hepp" on Justia Law

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

In 2018, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) hired Bronson as a treatment center teacher. Bronson was assigned to Lurie Hospital. Bronson and another teacher assigned to Lurie (Cooper), are Black; the third teacher, Lee, is White. Lurie’s family services director, Ruohonen, was the teachers’ “representative supervisor” at Lurie. Ruohonen is White. Bronson alleges that Lurie and Ruohonen treated Bronson and Cooper, the first Black teachers assigned to Lurie, in a discriminatory manner. In a departure from consistent past practice, Lurie denied Bronson and Cooper access to Lurie's electronic medical records system, EPIC, for a year. Identification badges issued to Bronson and Cooper bore a different color than those issued to others: Lee’s badge granted her “regular employee access” to EPIC. In 2019, Ruohonen sent an email to their CPS supervisor, complaining about Bronson and Cooper. Bronson contacted the Chicago Teachers Union, which responded that the complaint was inconsistent with the union contract, Bronson also alleges that she and Cooper were denied adequate office and desk space.In December 2019, Bronson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, then filed suit, asserting violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Because the allegations in Bronson’s complaint establish that Lurie is not her de facto employer, she cannot sue Lurie under Title VII. View "Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of Chicago" on Justia Law

Police found Miller lying on the sidewalk, bleeding from an apparent gunshot wound. An officer rendering aid removed a vehicle key fob from Miller’s hand, dropping it on the ground. A car, parked 15-20 feet from Miller, had bullet holes in the rear driver’s side door. Officers checked whether there was anyone in the car. One officer shined his flashlight through the windshield and saw what he thought was blood on the front passenger seat. An officer picked up the key fob and clicked a button. The car’s horn honked. Minutes later, an officer stated that he could see the barrel of a gun sticking out from under a hat on the front passenger seat. The car was towed to the police station. At the hospital, Miller said that he was using his girlfriend’s car. A database check showed that the impounded car was registered to Miller. The police obtained a warrant to search the car without mentioning the key fob. Police recovered the gun. DNA on the gun matched Miller’s. He was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Miller’s motion to suppress. Miller argued that clicking the key fob qualified as a search. The district judge reasoned that the fob was used only to identify the car, not to gain entry, and that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the evidence was also admissible under the independent source doctrine. The car would have been searched regardless of the identity of its owner. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

Beechler and Turner, both serving home confinement through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC), reported separate residences. An FBI Task Force was conducting a wiretap investigation involving individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. They discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence. Watching the house, agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking. An MCCC employee, with Indianapolis officers, went to Turner’s address to check compliance with the home detention contract. They encountered Turner and Beechler and discovered methamphetamine in the bedroom. Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, heroin, and $1,508 in cash. After receiving his Miranda rights, Beechler acknowledged the drugs and guns, admitting that they were there to protect the drugs.Beechler unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that although police labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, they actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes so that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Convicted of multiple counts, Beechler was sentenced to 360 months in prison—below the bottom of the 420-month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s expectation of privacy was minimal; the government’s legitimate needs were significant. The search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Beechler" on Justia Law