Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Amendment protects a prisoner's right to express non-threatening sexual desire in communications with a third party outside the prison. Plaintiff, a prisoner at FCI Ray Brook, filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 2 U.S. 388 (1971), asserting First Amendment retaliation and procedural due process claims against two correctional officers. Plaintiff alleged that after he wrote a letter to his sister from prison stating that he "wanted" a woman -- whom officials understood to refer to a particular correctional officer -- he was retaliated against by being placed in the prison's Special Housing Unit (SHU), and spent 89 days in isolated confinement for an "improper purpose."The Second Circuit held that the officers violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by disciplining him for speech that, in the medium used (correspondence to a third party outside the prison), was not threatening and did not implicate security concerns. However, the court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time plaintiff sent the letter that prison officials could not punish him for his statements in that correspondence. View "Bacon v. Phelps" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order of a preliminary injunction entered in favor of Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang and candidates for delegate seats who, if elected, would be pledged to Yang and fellow Democratic candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders. Yang, his delegates, and the Sanders delegates challenged the New York State Board of Elections' decision to remove all qualified candidates from the ballot, with the exception of former Vice President Joseph Biden, and cancel the Democratic presidential primary. The Board cancelled the Democratic presidential primary based on the coronavirus pandemic, claiming that doing so would further the State's interests in minimizing social contacts to reduce the spread of the virus and in focusing its limited resources on the management of other contested primary elections.At issue in this appeal was whether Yang, his delegates, and the Sanders delegates have demonstrated an entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief that reverses the effects of the Board's decision by requiring Yang and Sanders to be reinstated to the ballot, and the Democratic presidential primary to be conducted along with the other primary elections set for June 23, 2020.The court held that plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates have adequately established their entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief on the basis that the Board's decision unduly burdened their rights of free speech and association. The court held that plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates have made a strong showing of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief; demonstrated a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and demonstrated that the balance of the equities tips in their favor and that the public interest would be served adequately by the district court's preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the application for a preliminary injunction, which was carefully tailored to secure the constitutional rights at stake and to afford the Board sufficient time and guidance to carry out its obligations to the electorate and to the general public. View "Yang v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

The Estate of Kenneth Chamberlain, Sr. filed suit against officers of the White Plains Police Department and the City of White Plains under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for unlawful entry and excessive force resulting in Chamberlain's death. Chamberlain, a 68 year old African American Marine veteran with mental illness, had accidentally activated his emergency medical-alert system. When the officers arrived at Chamberlain's apartment, he denied the officers entry, fearing that he would be shot by the armed officers. After an hour-long struggle to gain entry into the apartment, the officers removed the hinges to the apartment's door, crossed the threshold into the apartment, and, when lesser measures apparently failed to subdue Chamberlain, they fatally shot him.The Second Circuit principally held that the complaint and related materials properly considered by the district court upon the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim do state a plausible claim for unlawful entry and that it was also error to determine on such a motion to dismiss that officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court also vacated and remanded for further consideration portions of the judgment determining, on summary judgment, that an officer was not liable for use of excessive force and that certain officers did not have supervisory liability. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Chamberlain v. City of White Plains" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was violently assaulted by a fellow inmate while imprisoned, and that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety.The Second Circuit held that plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to raise a question of material fact -- as to whether a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past -- against the Captain and the Warden. In this case, the Inmate Request Forms the Captain and the Warden received were detailed and explicit regarding the threat plaintiff believed another inmate posed. Furthermore, plaintiff orally conveyed his concerns regarding the threat to both the Captain and the Warden. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Captain and the Warden. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to all other defendants, remanding for further proceedings. View "Morgan v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition based on the grounds that it became moot when petitioner was conditionally released from confinement in a state psychiatric institution as a person with a "dangerous mental disorder." The court held that the conditional release did not render the petition moot, because petitioner remains subject to an "order of conditions" that leaves him vulnerable to recommitment, and the imposition of this order was a mandatory consequence of the confinement orders that his petition challenges. View "Janakievski v. Executive Director, Rochester Psychiatric Center" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely. The district court held that petitioner could not show that his motion was timely under section 2255(f)(3) because the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), did not recognize a retroactive right not to be sentenced based upon the residual clause in the Career Offender Guideline of the pre-Booker Sentencing Guidelines.The court held that Johnson did not itself render the residual clause of the pre-Booker Career Offender Guideline unconstitutionally vague and thus did not recognize the right petitioner asserted. Therefore, the district court properly denied the petition. View "Nunez v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the BOP and Warden Quay in an action alleging that defendants' curtailment of inmate-attorney visits at the MDC in early 2019 violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and the constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's APA claim by failing to consider applicable BOP regulations in its zone-of-interests analysis. Furthermore, the district court misconstrued plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim. Plaintiff brought this claim under the federal courts' inherent equitable powers, but the district court treated the claim as purporting to arise directly under the Sixth Amendment. The court thought it was prudent to defer ruling on the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim because plaintiff raised novel questions of constitutional law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings and directed the district court to consider appointing a master to mediate the parties' differences at the earliest possible time to ensure that plaintiff has meaningful, continuous access to clients. View "Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 principally for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, violation of his rights to free speech and equal protection, and use of excessive force. Plaintiff's claims arose from his arrest during a demonstration organized by an affiliate of the Black Lives Matter movement.The Second Circuit held that plaintiff adequately stated claims against the defendant who signed the summonses against him and the city, agreeing with plaintiff that the district court erred by failing to accept the factual allegations of the amended complaint as true and failing to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in his favor. However, the court held that the complaint was insufficient to state claims against all other defendants. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss an action alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and related state and municipal laws. Plaintiff also filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the same alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act.The court held that an employee cannot make a prima facie case against his employer for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances presented here. In this case, plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that defendants knew or should reasonably have known he was disabled; defendants were under no obligation to initiate the interactive process, and plaintiff's failure to affirmatively request an accommodation was a sound basis for dismissal of his claim. The court also held that the rights established by the Rehabilitation Act were not enforceable under section 1983. View "Costabile v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment award in favor of his former employer in an action alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), impairment and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At issue on appeal was plaintiff's ADA claim.The Second Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 did not alter or erode its well‐settled understanding that the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. In this case, because plaintiff did not attempt to show that his work-induced impairment substantially limited his ability to work in a class or broad range of jobs, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. View "Woolf v. Strada" on Justia Law