Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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In the case of Veronica-May Clark, an incarcerated transgender woman, against corrections officers who allegedly sexually assaulted her, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The District Court had dismissed Clark's case as untimely, denying her claim for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the effects of the abuse. The Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not err in holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve Clark’s equitable tolling claim and did not make any factual findings that infringed the Seventh Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's determination that Clark had failed to demonstrate circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. In effect, the court ruled that Clark had not sufficiently proven that her trauma and fear of retaliation prevented her from filing the lawsuit within the required time frame. View "Clark v. Hanley" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal from the City of New Haven and three of its police officers (collectively, "the City"), who sought to challenge the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the claims of Solomon Maye. Maye alleged that the City violated his constitutional rights by evicting him from his place of business. The district court had denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which was based on the defense of qualified immunity, because the motion was filed more than six months after the court's deadline for dispositive motions. The Court of Appeals held that a district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment as untimely is not a "denial of a claim of qualified immunity" that turns on an issue of law and is thus not subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Consequently, the Court of Appeals found no jurisdiction to hear the City's interlocutory appeal and dismissed it. View "Maye v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Veronica-May Clark, an incarcerated transgender woman, was repeatedly sexually assaulted by corrections officer Thomas Hanley. More than seven years after the abuse, Clark filed a lawsuit against Hanley and other officers, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights and seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the traumatic effects of the abuse. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) denied Clark's claim for equitable tolling and dismissed her case as untimely. Clark appealed, claiming that the court improperly conducted factfinding at the pleading stage and violated her Seventh Amendment rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the court properly resolved Clark's equitable tolling claim and did not infringe her Seventh Amendment rights. View "Clark v. Hanley" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a group of non-transgender female athletes have legal standing to challenge a policy that allows transgender girls to compete in girls' high school sports. The athletes had sued the Connecticut Association of Schools and several school districts, claiming that the policy violated Title IX by depriving them of equal athletic opportunity. The court held that the athletes had established Article III standing because they had plausibly stated a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact - the alleged denial of equal athletic opportunity and concomitant loss of publicly recognized titles and placements during track and field competitions in which they competed against and finished behind transgender athletes. The court also held that the injury was plausibly redressable by monetary damages and an injunction ordering defendants to alter certain athletic records. The court did not rule on the merits of the athletes' Title IX claim, instead remanding the case to the district court for consideration of whether the athletes have plausibly stated a claim under Title IX. View "Soule ex rel. Stanescu v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc." on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland (ABY) sued the Town of Clarkstown, George Hoehmann, CUPON Inc., and Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods of Greater Nanuet Inc. ABY, a religious educational institution, planned to purchase property in Clarkstown, New York, to establish an Orthodox Jewish school. It alleged that the Defendants manipulated an ostensibly neutral building permit application and zoning appeals process to block this construction. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that ABY's religious discrimination and civil rights claims were not ripe as it had not received a final decision from the town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and that the lost-contract injury underpinning ABY’s tortious interference claim was not traceable to the Town Defendants.In this appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court. The Second Circuit found that the ZBA's refusal to adjudicate ABY's appeal of its permit application constituted a final decision for ripeness purposes. The court also determined that ABY had plausibly alleged a causal connection between the Town Defendants’ actions and the injuries resulting from ABY's lost contract with Grace Church. Therefore, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland v. Town of Clarkstoawn" on Justia Law

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In a class action suit brought by George Mandala and Charles Barnett against NTT Data, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that NTT's policy of not hiring individuals with a felony conviction disproportionately impacted Black applicants, constituting disparate impact discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, and that decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to vacate the dismissal judgment and sought leave to file a first amended complaint, which the district court denied as untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1).On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs' motion should have been evaluated under Rule 60(b)(6) rather than Rule 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(6) allows for relief from a judgment under "extraordinary circumstances," which the court found to be present in this case. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to amend their complaint, and that their decision to stand by their initial complaint was not unreasonable given that its sufficiency had been a point of dispute. Additionally, the court found that the proposed amendments to the complaint were not futile. Consequently, the Second Circuit ordered the case to be remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, who was formerly incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the officers for violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiff named as defendants additional corrections officers. He alleged that the officers violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by preventing him from observing the Jewish holiday of Shavuot on two consecutive evenings. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers because (1) some named officers were not personally involved in the alleged violation on the first night of Shavuot, and (2) Plaintiff’s observance of the second night of the holiday was only shortened, not denied entirely, which did not rise to the level of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court. The court wrote that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff could not prevail on his claim because he did not make the threshold showing of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. Such a showing is not required. Rather, because Plaintiff has shown a burden on his sincere religious beliefs, he has established a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The court vacated the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment because of a purported “substantial burden” requirement, and affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment to those officers for whom there was no evidence of personal involvement. View "Kravitz v. Purcell" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff a practicing Baptist, was incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility from 2002 until 2018. After prison officials failed to update the Protestant services “call-out list,” Wiggins was excluded from all religious services for over five months. He sued Green Haven officials Thomas Griffin, M. Kopp, D. Howard, and Dr. G. Jebamani under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that (1) Defendants did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion, (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) if there were a constitutional violation, Kopp was not personally involved in it.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. First, the court concluded that Defendants’ failure to update the Protestant services call-out list, which prevented Plaintiff from attending worship services for over five months, substantially burdened his religious exercise. Second, because disputed issues of material fact remain, qualified immunity cannot shield Defendants from liability at this juncture. Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Kopp’s personal involvement in a First Amendment violation by pleading that Kopp took no action even after she was informed that Plaintiff’s rights were being infringed. Finally, the court held that a Section 1983 free exercise claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights. View "Wiggins v. Griffin, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law

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This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law