Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Connecticut's Northern Correctional Institute, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights under Article I, Section 10 (the Bill of Attainder Clause) of the Constitution, as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. On appeal, current and former Connecticut Department of Correction officials appeal the district court's judgment and permanent injunction principally granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying defendants' motion for summary judgment.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred by deciding disputed issues of material fact in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court correctly concluded that, with respect to plaintiff, Conn. Gen. Stat. 18-10b is an unconstitutional bill of attainder; and plaintiff's unreviewable classification score of Risk Level 5 violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the difference in his treatment compared to that of other similarly-situated inmates lacks a rational basis. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Reynolds v. Quiros" on Justia Law

The Attorney General of the State of New York (OAG) appealed the district court's order denying it a preliminary injunction against defendants relating to their protest activities in violation of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), the New York Clinic Access Act (NYSCAA), and the New York City Clinic Access Act (the City Act). Defendants appealed from the district court's order denying the OAG a preliminary injunction, challenging the district court's conclusion that FACE and its analogs are not facially unconstitutional and arguing that the City Act's follow-and-harass and clinic-interference provisions are void for vagueness. Defendants also challenged the district court's conclusions that the OAG has parens patriae standing to sue under the City Act and that Defendant George violated FACE, NYSCAA, and the City Act by physically obstructing patients.The Second Circuit vacated and remanded in part, concluding that the district court made certain improper evidentiary and credibility rulings, relied on clearly erroneous factual findings in assessing the OAG's physical obstruction claims, erred in its interpretation of the FACE statute and its state and local analogs, and abused its discretion in finding no irreparable harm. The court affirmed as to the remainder. In regard to the cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Defendant George violated FACE, NYSCAA, and the City Act by physically obstructing patients; the statutes do not violate the First Amendment; and the OAG has parens patriae standing to sue under the City Act. View "People of the State of New York v. Griepp" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity on plaintiff's unlawful search and seizure claims. The court concluded that defendants violated clearly established law by detaining and frisking plaintiff based on nothing more than an officer's unconfirmed hunch that there might be an open warrant for plaintiff's arrest. In this case, police officers stopped plaintiff and his daughters as they walked out of a Target store. Although the officers admittedly had no reason to think plaintiff had committed a crime, one officer speculated that there "might be" a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. The court explained that the officers clearly lacked any facts giving them reasonable suspicion that plaintiff was involved in criminal activity (much less carrying a dangerous weapon) or wanted for a crime. View "Vasquez v. Maloney" on Justia Law

The State of New York enacted new party-qualification requirements in the spring of 2020, requiring political organizations to earn the greater of 130,000 votes or 2 percent of the vote in elections for President and for Governor to achieve party status and the automatic place on the ballot it confers. In this appeal, the SAM Party and its chairman challenged the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction against the party-qualification requirements.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that appellants are not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim because the burden imposed by the presidential-election requirement is (1) not severe and (2) justified by the State's interest in uncluttered ballots, effective electoral competition, and the preservation of resources dedicated to public financing of elections. Therefore, the district court appropriately denied the SAM Party's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "SAM Party of New York v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants unlawfully used photographs of them to advertise strip clubs owned by defendants in violation of New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that plaintiffs signed full releases of their rights to the photographs.The Second Circuit concluded that the terms of Plaintiff Shake and Hinton's release agreements are disputed material facts, and defendants concede that neither they nor the third-party contractors that created and published the advertisements secured legal rights to use any of the photographs at issue. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants and in denying summary judgment to plaintiffs on liability. Therefore, the court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings.The court affirmed in part and held that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs had not accepted the offer of judgment because the offer's settlement amount term was ambiguous, the parties disagreed over how to interpret the term, and there was accordingly no meeting of the minds. Finally, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), New York General Business Law Section 349, and libel claims. View "Electra v. 59 Murray Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Connecticut inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant and other Connecticut state officials, alleging deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. A jury found defendant liable for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights and awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. At issue in this appeal is the satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment. After the judgment became final, the State voluntarily undertook to satisfy the judgment on defendant's behalf. In doing so, the State took actions against plaintiff under Connecticut law to recoup portions of the payment.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on plaintiff's "motion for aid of judgment" and "motion to unfreeze assets," as well as defendant's motion for reconsideration and "motion for credit against judgment." The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the district court's ruling that defendant's debt to plaintiff had not been satisfied. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that Connecticut's actions were preempted by section 1983. In this case, the court found no error in the district court's conclusion that the State's attempt to discharge defendant's judgment obligations in significant part through payments to itself and payments to plaintiffs that the state might eventually recoup undermines the objectives of section 1983. Likewise, defendant's motion for reconsideration also failed for the same reasons as the district court's ruling on plaintiff's post-judgment motions. Finally, defendant waived his challenge to the district court's denial in part of his motion for credit against judgment. View "Williams v. Marinelli" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Hartford and enjoining defendants, who are administrators and clerks at the Connecticut Superior Court, from enforcing a Connecticut statute that mandates automatic sealing of all judicial records and closure to the public of all court proceedings in criminal prosecutions of juvenile defendants transferred to the regular criminal docket.The court held that Public Act Number 19-187 is unconstitutional. The court concluded that the Courant has a qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal prosecutions of juveniles in regular criminal court. The court agreed with the district court that, for cases in criminal court, even those involving juvenile defendants, the "place and process" have historically been open to the public. Furthermore, public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. The court also concluded that the Act infringes on that right because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Finally, the court concluded that the Courant has shown that all four requirements for a preliminary injunction have been met. View "Hartford Courant Co., LLC v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Connecticut prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that state correctional officials violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him a meaningful opportunity to exercise for six months. In this case, the alleged denial occurred when prison officials required him to wear full restraints when exercising in the prison yard. After a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, the district court granted the Warden's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that plaintiff's personal involvement was for too short a time to support an Eighth Amendment claim.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that plaintiff was subjected to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court explained that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Warden had the requisite state of mind for the entire six-month period during which plaintiff was required to exercise in restraints when outside of his cell, not just the two weeks that the district court found; the jury's verdict was not based on "sheer surmise and conjecture," but on abundant circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably inferred that the Warden's actual knowledge of plaintiff's recreation status and the concomitant risk to plaintiff's health from being required to exercise in restraints; and the Warden's claims that there can be no Eighth Amendment violation are unavailing. The court also concluded that the Warden was liable for the Eighth Amendment violation, and that the Warden is not protected by qualified immunity where he knowingly violated plaintiff's clearly established right to meaningful exercise under the circumstances and lacked a sufficient justification for doing so. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Quiros" on Justia Law

Former inmate Kotler sued prison officials, claiming that they planted a weapon in his housing area in retaliation for his activities on an inmate grievance committee. He also alleged violations of his due process rights in a disciplinary hearing over the incident. After a second remand, the district court dismissed Kotler’s due process claim as abandoned during prior appeals, and dismissed the alleged linchpin defendant, now-deceased Superintendent Donelli, finding that no one timely moved for substitution of Donelli’s successor after his death. A jury returned a defense verdict on Kotler’s retaliation claims.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The dismissal of Donelli was proper; under FRCP 25(a), the 90-day deadline for a plaintiff to move to substitute a defendant is triggered by service of a notice on the plaintiff of the defendant’s death, regardless of whether that notice was also served upon the decedent’s successor or representative. The district court gave Kotler a fair trial on his retaliation claim. The court asked witnesses questions, limited Kotler’s questioning of a witness, and told Kotler to hurry up numerous times but in light of the entire record, the court’s questions were attempts to clarify and organize information. A supplemental jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error. Kotler did not abandon his due process claim during his previous appeals, so the district court erred in dismissing it. View "Kotler v. Jubert" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs will likely succeed in showing that, as applied, the Dual Enrollment Program's "publicly funded" requirement violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In this case, A.H., her parents, and the Diocese filed suit against the Agency of Education after A.H.'s application for public funding to the program was denied solely because of her school's religious status.The court concluded that, in these circumstances, the State's reliance on the "publicly funded" requirement as a condition for program eligibility imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion, because it forced Rice Memorial High School, a ministry of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, to chose whether to participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution. At the same time, the requirement puts A.H.'s family to a choice between sending their child to a religious school or receiving benefits. In light of Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017), the court explained that the denial of a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity can be justified only by a state interest of the highest order. In this case, the Agency has not identified any compelling interest that could survive strict scrutiny. The court also concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted the motion for a preliminary injunction. View "A.H. v. French" on Justia Law