Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Rucker v. Giffen
Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that officials at the Monroe County Jail denied him adequate medical care and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment during his pretrial confinement. Plaintiff was ultimately admitted to the hospital where he was found to be in critical condition and was placed in a coma for over a month where he underwent serious surgeries. After his grievance was denied by the prison, plaintiff argued that administrative procedures were unavailable to him because he was hospitalized and in critical medical condition for over a month and therefore could not have filed a grievance within that five-day timeframe.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that administrative remedies are "unavailable" when (1) an inmate's failure to file for the administrative remedy within the time allowed results from a medical condition, and (2) the administrative system does not accommodate the condition by allowing a reasonable opportunity to file for administrative relief. In this case, administrative remedies were unavailable to plaintiff because he was hospitalized and in a critical medical condition during—and well past—the five-day timeframe to file a grievance according to the jail's grievance procedures. Furthermore, the prison made clear that it would not process any grievance filed past that five-day timeframe. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's claim on the merits. View "Rucker v. Giffen" on Justia Law
T.W. v. Board of Law Examiners
Plaintiff filed suit against the Board, asserting that the Board had violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by allegedly discriminating against her in denying appropriate disability accommodations for the bar examination. The district court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the Board may not be sued under the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that the district court erred in determining that the Unified Court System was the appropriate department, agency, or instrumentality under the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, the relevant recipient of federal funding is the "Courts of Original Jurisdiction." The court explained that, because the Board is not an operation of the "Courts of Original Jurisdiction," and because the Board does not otherwise receive any federal funding, it is immune from suit under Section 504. The court remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the Board's motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's remaining claim under the ADA. View "T.W. v. Board of Law Examiners" on Justia Law
Dixon v. von Blanckensee
Defendant appealed the district court's order granting in part and denying in part her motions to dismiss and reconsider dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1999), seeking money damages for, inter alia, an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right to have meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiff alleged that Pennsylvania state officials violated his rights by using excessive force during an arrest.The court concluded that plaintiff does not state a plausible claim under the Fifth Amendment and that the district court thus erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to defendant on that claim. In this case, plaintiff had no obligation to comply with the transport order from the state court, and plaintiff's complaint does not plausibly allege that the decision to permit plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference only telephonically rather than in person was arbitrary, or in any way prejudicial to his case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order to the extent they denied the motion to dismiss plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Bivens claim and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the claim. View "Dixon v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law
Ketcham v. City of Mount Vernon
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law assault and battery claims.The court found that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes in favor of defendants at the summary judgment stage. In this case, the district court's recitation of the facts elided crucial distinctions between the testimony of the three parties to the encounter. The court explained that, while the officers testified to using a reasonable amount of force to restrain an uncooperative individual matching the description of a suspect, plaintiff testified to an aggressive assault, pleas for help, and a spiteful effort to punish a confused citizen by deliberately slamming his head into the patrol car's exterior as punishment for his confusion. Therefore, the court concluded that it is for a jury and not a judge to decide which of these versions of events is accurate, and qualified immunity would not protect the deliberate infliction of injury suggested by plaintiff's testimony. However, the court did not find that reassignment to another judge was necessary absent any reason to find that the district court would not accept the court's remand and any grounds to reassign the case. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ketcham v. City of Mount Vernon" on Justia Law
Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc.
In this Fair Housing Act of 1968 case, plaintiff's claims stemmed from his neighbor's verbal attacks and attempted intimidation of plaintiff based on his race. The principal question presented to the en banc court is whether a plaintiff states a claim under the Act and parallel state statutes for intentional discrimination by alleging that his landlord failed to respond to reported race-based harassment by a fellow tenant.The en banc court concluded that landlords cannot be presumed to have the degree of control over tenants that would be necessary to impose liability under the FHA for tenant-on-tenant misconduct. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a claim that the KPM Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of the FHA, Sections 1981 and 1982, or the New York State Human Rights Law. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the KPM Defendants under New York law. View "Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc." on Justia Law
Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim as time-barred. The court held that plaintiff's disability discrimination claim arises under the Affordable Care Act for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1658(a), which grants a four-year catchall statute of limitations period for all Acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990, and thus the district court erred in applying a three-year statute of limitations period. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health" on Justia Law
Watley v. Department of Children and Families
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court determined that the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, collateral estoppel, the statute of limitations, qualified immunity, and lack of standing. The district court also dismissed some claims for failure to state a claim.The court concluded that, under both federal and Connecticut law, the issue at the core of the parties' dispute is whether DCF reasonably accommodated plaintiffs' actual or perceived disabilities in providing services and programs to assist their reunification with their children. The court explained that the issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined by Connecticut courts. Therefore, the district court correctly granted DCF's motion to dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds. The court did not reach the merits of the parties' arguments regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Connecticut's statute of limitations, or plaintiffs' standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. View "Watley v. Department of Children and Families" on Justia Law
Tardif v. City of New York
Plaintiff filed suit against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and various officers and officials, after confrontations with the officers during Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in 2012. Plaintiff alleged that the City violated the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in failing to reasonably accommodate her epilepsy by timely administering medication during her pre-arraignment detention following her arrest, and that Sergeants Giovanni Mattera and Thomas McManus committed assault and battery under New York law when, during separate demonstrations, each officer used force against plaintiff.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the ADA claim because there was no evidence demonstrating the City delayed administering medication "by reason of" plaintiff's disability, as required under the statute. In regard to the state law assault and battery claims, the court held that the district court correctly determined, contrary to plaintiff's contention, that a justification instruction was warranted on those claims because New York law permits a police officer, even in a non-arrest situation, to use an objectively reasonable degree of force in the performance of a public duty, including crowd control. However, the court concluded that the district court, in providing that justification charge, erroneously instructed the jury that it could consider an officer's subjective intent, which is contrary to New York's objective reasonableness inquiry. Furthermore, although the error was prejudicial as it relates to the assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera and warrants a new trial, the error was harmless as to the claims against Sergeant McManus given that his subjective good faith was never raised, or even at issue, during the trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tardif v. City of New York" on Justia Law
Kinsey v. New York Times Co.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the New York Times. Plaintiff alleged defamation based on the Times's print and online articles about gender bias, favoritism, and groping at the Justice Department. The article details a Times investigation into a series of complaints, using records derived from an EEOC complaint and a sex discrimination and retaliation suit. One of the declarations described an incident between plaintiff and an intern. Plaintiff alleged that the language from this declaration was false and defamatory per se and that the fair report privilege did not apply.The court concluded that the district court performed the proper choice-of-law analysis, applying New York law to the conflict; correctly reasoned that New York was the state with the most significant interests in the litigation and applied New York's fair report privilege; and then properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint as barred by the fair report privilege because the alleged defamatory statement was attributed to an official proceeding. View "Kinsey v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law
Domen v. Vimeo, Inc.
Plaintiff and Church United filed suit against Vimeo, alleging that the company discriminated against them by deleting Church United’s account from its online video hosting platform. Plaintiffs claimed that Vimeo discriminated against them based on sexual orientation and religion under federal and state law. The district court concluded that Vimeo deleted Church United's account because of its violation of one of Vimeo's content policies barring the promotion of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) on its platform.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, agreeing with the district court that Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act provides Vimeo with immunity from suit. The court concluded that, under Section 230(c)(2), Vimeo is free to restrict access to material that, in good faith, it finds objectionable. In this case, plaintiffs' conclusory allegations of bad faith do not survive the pleadings stage, especially when examined in the context of Section 230(c)(2). The court explained that Section 230(c)(2) does not require interactive service providers to use a particular method of content restriction, nor does it mandate perfect enforcement of a platform's content policies. Indeed, the fundamental purpose of Section 230(c)(2) is to provide platforms like Vimeo with the discretion to identify and remove what they consider objectionable content from their platforms without incurring liability for each decision. View "Domen v. Vimeo, Inc." on Justia Law