Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Perez was born in rural Mexico in 1989 and entered the U.S. without authorization at age 13. He has two children, who were born in the U.S., whom he visits and helps support financially. In July 2016, Perez was attending a barbeque when a violent fight broke out. Several young men wielding bats and machetes were attacking a member of a rival gang. Perez borrowed a firearm from an acquaintance and fired several shots into the air. Hearing the gunshots, the young men scattered, and Perez returned to the barbeque and returned the gun to his acquaintance. Days later, the NYPD obtained a video recording of the incident, identified Perez, and identified the firearm.Perez was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition while being an alien illegally and unlawfully in the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Perez unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that section 922(g)(5) on its face violated the Second Amendment by erecting a categorical bar on the possession of firearms by illegal or unlawful aliens. The Second Circuit affirmed. Assuming without deciding that, even as an undocumented alien, Perez is entitled to Second Amendment protection, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), as applied to Perez, withstands intermediate scrutiny. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Bellin brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that managed long-term care plans (MLTCs) that contract with New York State violate Medicaid beneficiaries’ due process rights by denying them the right to appeal an MLTC’s initial determination of the personal care services hours the MLTC will provide the beneficiary if they choose to enroll with the MLTC. Bellin also alleged that beneficiaries are entitled to this appeal right, and to notice of the right, under federal statutory and constitutional law. Bellin brought her claims against ElderServe, an MLTC that she alleges denied her these rights, and Zucker, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, for his alleged failure to enforce these asserted rights.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Bellin’s federal law claims on the grounds that the relevant federal statutes do not provide Medicaid beneficiaries a right to appeal initial personal care services hours determinations. The court vacated the dismissal of Bellin’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims; Bellin plausibly alleged a constitutionally protected property interest in the determination of her personal care services hours. View "Bellin v. Zucker" on Justia Law

Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont and the state's Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection James Rovella appeal from the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction ordering that the Governor repeal, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, a provision to suspend collection of fingerprints in connection with applications for authorization to obtain firearms. The injunction also ordered that the Governor repeal that provision of the executive order and that the DESPP Commissioner resume fingerprinting services at that agency.The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and concluded that: (1) with respect to the individual plaintiffs, the preliminary injunction motion became moot in the district court; and (2) CCDL lacked organizational standing. Because the motion was moot and CCDL lacked standing, the district court had no jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. View "Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. Lamont" on Justia Law

After the County formally revoked plaintiff's pistol license and prohibited him from possessing any firearms following the dismissal of a Family Court matter and temporary order of protection that was dissolved, he filed suit against the County alleging the violation of his Second Amendment rights. The district court applied intermediate scrutiny and held that plaintiff failed to state a Second Amendment claim.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleges that the County did not have substantial evidence that plaintiff is a danger to the safety of others. The court explained that because these allegations, accepted as true, would mean that the County's actions were not substantially related to its interests in public safety and crime prevention, the complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim under intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's other claims. View "Henry v. Nassau County" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his former employer for violating company policies prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, he filed suit alleging that the stated basis for his termination was pretext and that the real reason he was fired was age discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).Although on a Rule 12(c) motion the district court should not have weighed the plausibility of competing allegations in the movant's pleading or considered evidence extrinsic to the non-movant's pleading, the court affirmed the district court's judgment because plaintiff's complaint failed to plead that either his age or protected speech was a but-for cause of his termination. Likewise, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails for similar reasons. View "Lively v. WAFRA Investment Advisory Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated its previous opinion and filed an amended opinion in its place.Plaintiff and Church United filed suit against Vimeo, alleging that the company discriminated against them by deleting Church United’s account from its online video hosting platform. Plaintiffs claimed that Vimeo discriminated against them based on sexual orientation and religion under federal and state law. The district court concluded that Vimeo deleted Church United's account because of its violation of one of Vimeo's published content policies barring the promotion of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) on its platform.The court agreed with the district court that Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act protects Vimeo from this suit and that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. In this case, plaintiffs argue that Vimeo demonstrated bad faith by discriminating against them based on their religion and sexual orientation, which they term "former" homosexuality; deleting Church United's entire account, as opposed to only the videos at issue; and permitting other videos with titles referring to homosexuality to remain on the website. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs' conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a plausible inference of bad faith sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court explained that Vimeo removed plaintiffs' account for expressing pro-SOCE views which it in good faith considers objectionable, and plaintiffs, while implicitly acknowledging that their content violated Vimeo's Terms of Service, nevertheless ignored Vimeo's notice of violation, resulting in Vimeo deleting their account.Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim under either the New York Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act or the California Unruh Act. Because plaintiffs make no allegation suggesting that Vimeo removed their content for any reason other than this violation of the Terms of Service, plaintiffs' allegations lack the substance required to support an inference of discriminatory intent. View "Domen v. Vimeo, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on plaintiff's claims that the cadet separation procedures of the United States Military Academy at West Point fail to provide due process and that plaintiff's separation proceedings violated West Point's own regulations in a manner that substantially prejudiced him.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that West Point's cadet separation procedures satisfy due process and that the intra military immunity doctrine, which bars judicial interference in discretionary military personnel decisions, renders plaintiff's regulatory claims nonjusticiable. The court explained that plaintiff was not substantially prejudiced by any purported regulatory deviation and the court may not circumvent the doctrine to engage in a fact-specific inquiry as to whether military personnel properly applied the military's own evidentiary standard. View "Doolen v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, which (A) declared the Board to be in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for denying a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to disabled students between the ages of 21 and 22 while providing a free public education to nondisabled students in the same age range, and (B) permanently enjoined the Board and its successors, employees, and agents, etc., from terminating, on the basis of age, FAPEs for plaintiff class members who have not received a regular high school diploma before they reach the age of 22.The court concluded that the original plaintiff, D.J., had standing to bring the action where D.J. received ten months less of special education than he would have if not for the Board's enforcement of the challenged state regulation, thereby demonstrating injury for purposes of Article III standing. Furthermore, D.J.'s standing was entirely traceable to the Board's enforcement of the regulations at issue and the injury could be redressed by judicial action. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the IDEA term "public education" to encompass free adult education programs offered by the State of Connecticut. The court considered all of the Board's arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. View "A.R. v. Connecticut State Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit joined the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that under the expanded definition of "disability" under the ADA Amendments Act, which now covers impairments "lasting or expected to last less than six months," 28 C.F.R. 35.108(d)(ix), a short-term injury can qualify as an actionable disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.After plaintiff sustained injuries as an inmate at the Westchester County Jail by stepping on crumbled concrete in the recreational yard, he filed suit pro se against the County defendants and the medical defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The court concluded that the district court erred in categorically excluding short-term injuries from qualifying as a "disability" under the ADA. The court explained that plaintiff's claim could not be dismissed as a matter of law simply because the injury causing these limitations was temporary. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal to the extent it dismissed plaintiff's ADA claim against the County, remanded for further proceedings as to that claim, and affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims. View "Hamilton v. Westchester County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action challenging New York City's Third Party Transfer (TPT) Program, through which the City initiates in rem foreclosure proceedings against tax-delinquent properties and, following a foreclosure judgment, transfers ownership of the properties to third party partners who develop and manage the properties. Plaintiffs alleged federal constitutional and state law claims stemming from the transfer of their properties through the TPT. The district court dismissed the complaint.The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; the TIA is not directly applicable to plaintiffs' claims and the district court exceeded its discretion in concluding that comity bars their claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs' equal protection and due process claims, or their second takings claim – that their property was taken for a public purpose without just compensation – to the extent that for each of those claims, they seek only the value of their lost property in excess of the amount owed in taxes. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. View "Dorce v. City of New York" on Justia Law